Control in Hedonic Games

We initiate the study of control in hedonic games, where an external actor influences coalition formation by adding or deleting agents. We consider three basic control goals (1) enforcing that an agent is not alone (NA); (2) enforcing that a pair of agents is in the same coalition (PA); (3) enforcing that all agents are in the same grand coalition (GR), combined with two control actions: adding agents (AddAg) or deleting agents (DelAg). We analyze these problems for friend-oriented and additive preferences under individual rationality, individual stability, Nash stability, and core stability. We provide a complete computational complexity classification for control in hedonic games.

Authors

• Jiehua Chen TU Wien
• Jakob Guttmann TU Wien
• Merisa Mustajbaš ić TU Wien
• Sofia Simola TU Wien

Keywords

• Hedonic Games
• Control
• Computational Social Choice
• Additive Preferences
• Friend-Oriented Preferences