Arrow Research search

Author name cluster

Yuan Deng

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

30 papers
2 author rows

Possible papers

30

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Addax: Utilizing Zeroth-Order Gradients to Improve Memory Efficiency and Performance of SGD for Fine-Tuning Language Models

  • Zeman Li
  • Xinwei Zhang 0001
  • Peilin Zhong
  • Yuan Deng
  • Meisam Razaviyayn
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Fine-tuning language models (LMs) with the standard Adam optimizer often demands excessive memory, limiting accessibility. The ``in-place'' version of Stochastic Gradient Descent (IP-SGD) and Memory-Efficient Zeroth-order Optimizer (MeZO) have been proposed as solutions to improve memory efficiency. However, IP-SGD still requires a decent amount of memory, and MeZO suffers from slow convergence and degraded final performance due to its zeroth-order nature. This paper introduces Addax, a novel method that improves both memory efficiency and algorithm performance of IP-SGD by integrating it with MeZO. Specifically, Addax computes the zeroth-order or first-order gradient of the data points in the minibatch based on their memory consumption and combines zeroth- and first-order gradient estimates to obtain the updated direction in each step. By computing the zeroth-order order gradient of data points that require more memory and the first-order gradient of the ones that require less memory, Addax overcomes the slow convergence of MeZO and excessive memory requirement of IP-SGD. Additionally, the zeroth-order gradient acts as a regularizer for the first-order gradient, further enhancing the model's final performance. Theoretically, we establish the convergence of Addax under mild assumptions, demonstrating faster convergence and less restrictive hyper-parameter choices than MeZO. Our extensive experiments with diverse LMs and tasks show that Addax consistently outperforms MeZO in terms of accuracy and convergence speed, while having a comparable memory footprint. In particular, our experiments using one A100 GPU on OPT-13B model reveal that, on average, Addax outperforms MeZO in terms of accuracy/F1 score by 14%, and runs $15\times$ faster, while having a comparable memory footprint to MeZO. In our experiments on the larger OPT-30B model, on average, Addax outperforms MeZO in terms of accuracy/F1 score by >16% and runs $30\times$ faster on a single H100 GPU. Moreover, Addax surpasses the performance of standard fine-tuning approaches, such as IP-SGD and Adam, in most tasks in terms of Accuracy/F1 score with significantly less memory requirement.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

No-Regret Online Autobidding Algorithms in First-price Auctions

  • Yilin Li
  • Yuan Deng
  • Wei Tang
  • Hanrui Zhang

Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e. g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI constraints. While prior work has addressed truthful auctions or non-truthful auctions with weaker benchmarks, this paper provides a significant improvement: We develop online bidding algorithms for repeated first-price auctions with ROI constraints, benchmarking against the optimal randomized strategy in hindsight. In the full feedback setting, where the maximum competing bid is observed, our algorithm achieves a near-optimal $\tilde O(\sqrt{T})$ regret bound, and in the bandit feedback setting (where the bidder only observes whether the bidder wins each auction), our algorithm attains $\tilde O(T^{3/4})$ regret bound.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

PiKE: Adaptive Data Mixing for Large-Scale Multi-Task Learning Under Low Gradient Conflicts

  • Zeman Li
  • Yuan Deng
  • Peilin Zhong
  • Meisam Razaviyayn
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Modern foundation models are trained on diverse datasets to enhance generalization across tasks and domains. A central challenge in this process is determining how to effectively mix and sample data from multiple sources. This naturally leads to a multi-task learning (MTL) perspective. While prior work in MTL has emphasized mitigating gradient conflicts, we observe that large-scale pretraining scenarios—such as multilingual or multi-domain training—often exhibit little to no gradient conflict. Motivated by this observation, we propose $\textbf{PiKE}$ ($\textbf{P}$ositive gradient $\textbf{i}$nteraction-based $\textbf{K}$-task weights $\textbf{E}$stimator), an adaptive data mixing algorithm that dynamically adjusts sampling weights during training. PiKE exploits non-conflicting gradient interactions to minimize a near-tight upper bound on the average loss decrease at each step, while incurring negligible computational overhead. We provide theoretical convergence guarantees and show that PiKE outperforms static and non-adaptive mixing baselines. Furthermore, we extend PiKE to promote balanced learning across tasks. Extensive experiments on large-scale language model pretraining confirm that PiKE achieves faster convergence and improved downstream performance compared to existing approaches.

ICML Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Procurement Auctions via Approximately Optimal Submodular Optimization

  • Yuan Deng
  • Amin Karbasi
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Renato Paes Leme
  • Grigoris Velegkas
  • Song Zuo

We study the problem of procurement auctions, in which an auctioneer seeks to acquire services from a group of strategic sellers with private costs. The quality of the services is measured through some submodular function that is known to the auctioneer. Our goal is to design computationally efficient procurement auctions that (approximately) maximize the difference between the quality of the acquired services and the total cost of the sellers, in a way that is incentive compatible (IC) and individual rational (IR) for the sellers, and generates non-negative surplus (NAS) for the auctioneer. Our contribution is twofold: i) we provide an improved analysis of existing algorithms for non-positive submodular function maximization and ii) we design computationally efficient frameworks that transform submodular function optimization algorithms to mechanisms that are IC and IR for the sellers, NAS for the auctioneer, and approximation-preserving. Our frameworks are general and work both in the offline setting where the auctioneer can observe the bids and the services of all the sellers simultaneously, and in the online setting where the sellers arrive in an adversarial order and the auctioneer has to make an irrevocable decision whether to purchase their service or not. We further investigate whether it is possible to convert state-of-art submodular optimization algorithms into descending auctions. We focus on the adversarial setting, meaning that the schedule of the descending prices is determined by an adversary. We show that a submodular optimization algorithm satisfying bi-criteria $(1/2, 1)$-approximation in welfare can be effectively converted to a descending auction in this setting. We further establish a connection between descending auctions and online submodular optimization. Finally, we demonstrate the practical applications of our frameworks by instantiating them with different state-of-the-art submodular optimization algorithms and comparing their welfare performance through empirical experiments on publicly available datasets that consist of thousands of sellers.

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Hanrui Zhang
  • Song Zuo

The recent increasing adoption of autobidding has inspired the growing interest in analyzing the performance of classic mechanism with value-maximizing autobidders both theoretically and empirically. It is known that optimal welfare can be obtained in first-price auctions if autobidders are restricted to uniform bid-scaling and the price of anarchy is $2$ when non-uniform bid-scaling strategies are allowed. In this paper, we provide a fine-grained price of anarchy analysis for non-uniform bid-scaling strategies in first-price auctions, demonstrating the reason why more powerful (individual) non-uniform bid-scaling strategies may lead to worse (aggregated) performance in social welfare. Our theoretical results match recent empirical findings that a higher level of non-uniform bid-scaling leads to lower welfare performance in first-price auctions.

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Efficiency of the First-Price Auction in the Autobidding World

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Hanrui Zhang
  • Song Zuo

We study the price of anarchy of first-price auctions in the autobidding world, where bidders can be either utility maximizers (i. e. , traditional bidders) or value maximizers (i. e. , autobidders). We show that with autobidders only, the price of anarchy of first-price auctions is $1/2$, and with both kinds of bidders, the price of anarchy degrades to about $0. 457$ (the precise number is given by an optimization). These results complement the recent result by [Jin and Lu, 2022] showing that the price of anarchy of first-price auctions with traditional bidders is $1 - 1/e^2$. We further investigate a setting where the seller can utilize machine-learned advice to improve the efficiency of the auctions. There, we show that as the accuracy of the advice increases, the price of anarchy improves smoothly from about $0. 457$ to $1$.

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Multi-channel Autobidding with Budget and ROI Constraints

  • Yuan Deng
  • Negin Golrezaei
  • Patrick Jaillet
  • Jason Cheuk Nam Liang
  • Vahab Mirrokni

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc. , each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e. g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser’s global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem.

SODA Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Optimal Pricing Schemes for an Impatient Buyer

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Balasubramanian Sivan
  • Kangning Wang 0001

A patient seller aims to sell a good to an impatient buyer (i. e. , one who discounts utility over time). The buyer will remain in the market for a period of time T, and her private value is drawn from a publicly known distribution. What is the revenue-optimal pricing-curve (sequence of (price, time) pairs) for the seller? Is randomization of help here? Is the revenue-optimal pricing-curve computable in polynomial time? We answer these questions in this paper. We give an efficient algorithm for computing the revenue-optimal pricing curve. We show that pricing curves, that post a price at each point of time and let the buyer pick her utility maximizing time to buy, are revenue-optimal among a much broader class of sequential lottery mechanisms: namely, mechanisms that allow the seller to post a menu of lotteries at each point of time cannot get any higher revenue than pricing curves. We also show that the even broader class of mechanisms that allow the menu of lotteries to be adaptively set, can earn strictly higher revenue than that of pricing curves, and the revenue gap can be as big as the support size of the buyer's value distribution. * The full version of the paper can be accessed at https: //arxiv. org/abs/2106. 02149.

STOC Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Approximately efficient bilateral trade

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Balasubramanian Sivan
  • Kangning Wang 0001

We study bilateral trade between two strategic agents. The celebrated result of Myerson and Satterthwaite states that in general, no incentive-compatible, individually rational and weakly budget balanced mechanism can be efficient. I.e., no mechanism with these properties can guarantee a trade whenever buyer value exceeds seller cost. Given this, a natural question is whether there exists a mechanism with these properties that guarantees a constant fraction of the first-best gains-from-trade, namely a constant fraction of the gains-from-trade attainable whenever buyer’s value weakly exceeds seller’s cost. In this work, we positively resolve this long-standing open question on constant-factor approximation, mentioned in several previous works, using a simple mechanism that obtains a 1/8.23 ≈ 0.121 fraction of the first-best.

NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Posted Pricing and Dynamic Prior-independent Mechanisms with Value Maximizers

  • Yuan Deng
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Hanrui Zhang

We study posted price auctions and dynamic prior-independent mechanisms for (ROI-constrained) value maximizers. In contrast to classic (quasi-linear) utility maximizers, these agents aim to maximize their total value subject to a minimum ratio of value per unit of payment made. When personalized posted prices are allowed, posted price auctions for value maximizers can be reduced to posted price auctions for utility maximizers. However, for anonymous posted prices, the well-known $\frac 1 2$ approximation for utility maximizers is impossible for value maximizers and we provide a posted price mechanism with $\frac12(1 - 1/e)$ approximation. Moreover, we demonstrate how to apply our results to design prior-independent mechanisms in a dynamic environment; and to the best of our knowledge, this gives the first constant revenue approximation with multiple value maximizers. Finally, we provide an extension to combinatorial auctions with submodular / XOS agents.

AIJ Journal 2021 Journal Article

Coalitional permutation manipulations in the Gale-Shapley algorithm

  • Weiran Shen
  • Yuan Deng
  • Pingzhong Tang

In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women in the men-proposing version of the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admissions process in China. Our results also answer an open problem on what can be achieved by permutation manipulations. We present an efficient algorithm to find a strategy profile such that the induced matching is stable and Pareto-optimal (in the set of all achievable stable matchings) while the strategy profile itself is inconspicuous. Surprisingly, we show that such a strategy profile actually forms a Nash equilibrium of the manipulation game. In the end, we show that it is NP-complete to find a manipulation that is strictly better for all members of the coalition. This result demonstrates a sharp contrast between weakly better off outcomes and strictly better-off outcomes.

SODA Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Online Combinatorial Auctions

  • Yuan Deng
  • Debmalya Panigrahi
  • Hanrui Zhang 0001

We study combinatorial auctions in online environments with the goal of maximizing social welfare. In this problem, new items become available on each day and must be sold before their respective expiration dates. We design online auctions for the widely studied classes of submodular and XOS valuations, and show the following results: – For submodular valuations, we give an O (log m )-competitive mechanism for adversarial valuations and an O (1)-competitive mechanism for Bayesian valuations, where m is the total number of items. Both these mechanisms are computationally efficient and universally truthful for myopic agents, i. e. , agents with no knowledge of the future. – For XOS valuations, we show that there is no online mechanism that can achieve a competitive ratio of o (( m/ log m ) 1/3 ) even in a Bayesian setting. Our lower bound holds even if we do not require truthfulness and/or computational efficiency of the mechanism. This establishes a sharp separation between XOS valuations and its subclass of submodular valuations for online combinatorial auctions. In contrast, no such separation exists for offline auctions, where the best bounds for both submodular and XOS valuations are O ((log log m ) 3 ) for adversarial settings (Assadi and Singla, FOCS 2019) and O (1) for Bayesian settings (Dütting et al. , FOCS 2017). In contrast to the above, if items do not expire and only need to be sold before the market closes, then we give a reduction from offline to online mechanisms that preserves the competitive ratio for all subadditive valuations (that includes XOS and submodular valuations), thereby achieving the same bounds as the respective best offline mechanisms.

NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer

  • Yuan Deng
  • Hanrui Zhang

We study prior-independent dynamic auction design with production costs for a value-maximizing buyer, a paradigm that is becoming prevalent recently following the development of automatic bidding algorithms in advertising platforms. In contrast to a utility-maximizing buyer, who maximizes the difference between her total value and total payment, a value-maximizing buyer aims to maximize her total value subject to a return on investment (ROI) constraint. Our main result is a dynamic mechanism with regret $\tilde{O}(T^{2/3})$, where $T$ is the time horizon, against the first-best benchmark, i. e. , the maximum amount of revenue the seller can extract assuming all values of the buyer are publicly known.

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing

  • Yuan Deng
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Song Zuo

Online advertisements are primarily sold via repeated auctions with reserve prices. In this paper, we study how to set reserves to boost revenue based on the historical bids of strategic buyers, while controlling the impact of such a policy on the incentive compatibility of the repeated auctions. Adopting an incentive compatibility metric which quantifies the incentives to shade bids, we propose a novel class of reserve pricing policies and provide analytical tradeoffs between their revenue performance and bid-shading incentives. The policies are inspired by the exponential mechanism from the literature on differential privacy, but our study uncovers mechanisms with significantly better revenue-incentive tradeoffs than the exponential mechanism in practice. We further empirically evaluate the tradeoffs on synthetic data as well as real ad auction data from a major ad exchange to verify and support our theoretical findings.

NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Robust Auction Design in the Auto-bidding World

  • Santiago Balseiro
  • Yuan Deng
  • Jieming Mao
  • Vahab Mirrokni
  • Song Zuo

In classic auction theory, reserve prices are known to be effective for improving revenue for the auctioneer against quasi-linear utility maximizing bidders. The introduction of reserve prices, however, usually do not help improve total welfare of the auctioneer and the bidders. In this paper, we focus on value maximizing bidders with return on spend constraints---a paradigm that has drawn considerable attention recently as more advertisers adopt auto-bidding algorithms in advertising platforms---and show that the introduction of reserve prices has a novel impact on the market. Namely, by choosing reserve prices appropriately the auctioneer can improve not only the total revenue but also the total welfare. Our results also demonstrate that reserve prices are robust to bidder types, i. e. , reserve prices work well for different bidder types, such as value maximizers and utility maximizers, without using bidder type information. We generalize these results for a variety of auction mechanisms such as VCG, GSP, and first-price auctions. Moreover, we show how to combine these results with additive boosts to improve the welfare of the outcomes of the auction further. Finally, we complement our theoretical observations with an empirical study confirming the effectiveness of these ideas using data from online advertising auctions.

ICML Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Robust Pricing in Dynamic Mechanism Design

  • Yuan Deng
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Motivated by the repeated sale of online ads via auctions, optimal pricing in repeated auctions has attracted a large body of research. While dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by optimizing auctions across different items, their reliance on exact distributional information of buyers’ valuations (present and future) limits their use in practice. In this paper, we propose robust dynamic mechanism design. We develop a new framework to design dynamic mechanisms that are robust to both estimation errors in value distributions and strategic behavior. We apply the framework in learning environments, leading to the first policy that achieves provably low regret against the optimal dynamic mechanism in contextual auctions, where the dynamic benchmark has full and accurate distributional information.

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

A Robust Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism for Contextual Auctions

  • Yuan Deng
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Vahab Mirrokni

Dynamic mechanisms offer powerful techniques to improve on both revenue and efficiency by linking sequential auctions using state information, but these techniques rely on exact distributional information of the buyers’ valuations (present and future), which limits their use in learning settings. In this paper, we consider the problem of contextual auctions where the seller gradually learns a model of the buyer's valuation as a function of the context (e. g. , item features) and seeks a pricing policy that optimizes revenue. Building on the concept of a bank account mechanism---a special class of dynamic mechanisms that is known to be revenue-optimal---we develop a non-clairvoyant dynamic mechanism that is robust to both estimation errors in the buyer's value distribution and strategic behavior on the part of the buyer. We then tailor its structure to achieve a policy with provably low regret against a constant approximation of the optimal dynamic mechanism in contextual auctions. Our result substantially improves on previous results that only provide revenue guarantees against static benchmarks.

IJCAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Preferred Deals in General Environments

  • Yuan Deng
  • Sébastien Lahaie
  • Vahab Mirrokni

A preferred deal is a special contract for selling impressions of display ad inventory. By accepting a deal, a buyer agrees to buy a minimum amount of impressions at a fixed price per impression, and is granted priority access to the impressions before they are sent to an open auction on an ad exchange. We consider the problem of designing preferred deals (inventory, price, quantity) in the presence of general convex constraints, including budget constraints, and propose an approximation algorithm to maximize the revenue obtained from the deals. We then evaluate our algorithm using auction data from a major advertising exchange and our empirical results show that the algorithm achieves around 95% of the optimal revenue.

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret Buyers

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jon Schneider
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

We study the problem of how to repeatedly sell to a buyer running a no-regret, mean-based algorithm. Previous work [Braverman et al. , 2018] shows that it is possible to design effective mechanisms in such a setting that extract almost all of the economic surplus, but these mechanisms require the buyer's values each round to be drawn independently and identically from a fixed distribution. In this work, we do away with this assumption and consider the prior-free setting where the buyer's value each round is chosen adversarially (possibly adaptively). We show that even in this prior-free setting, it is possible to extract a $(1-\varepsilon)$-approximation of the full economic surplus for any $\varepsilon > 0$. The number of options offered to a buyer in any round scales independently of the number of rounds $T$ and polynomially in $\varepsilon$. We show that this is optimal up to a polynomial factor; any mechanism achieving this approximation factor, even when values are drawn stochastically, requires at least $\Omega(1/\varepsilon)$ options. Finally, we examine what is possible when we constrain our mechanism to a natural auction format where overbidding is dominated. Braverman et al. [2018] show that even when values are drawn from a known stochastic distribution supported on $[1/H, 1]$, it is impossible in general to extract more than $O(\log\log H / \log H)$ of the economic surplus. We show how to achieve the same approximation factor in the prior-independent setting (where the distribution is unknown to the seller), and an approximation factor of $O(1 / \log H)$ in the prior-free setting (where the values are chosen adversarially).

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Strategizing against No-regret Learners

  • Yuan Deng
  • Jon Schneider
  • Balasubramanian Sivan

How should a player who repeatedly plays a game against a no-regret learner strategize to maximize his utility? We study this question and show that under some mild assumptions, the player can always guarantee himself a utility of at least what he would get in a Stackelberg equilibrium. When the no-regret learner has only two actions, we show that the player cannot get any higher utility than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. But when the no-regret learner has more than two actions and plays a mean-based no-regret strategy, we show that the player can get strictly higher than the Stackelberg equilibrium utility. We construct the optimal game-play for the player against a mean-based no-regret learner who has three actions. When the no-regret learner's strategy also guarantees him a no-swap regret, we show that the player cannot get anything higher than a Stackelberg equilibrium utility.

AAAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Coalition Manipulation of Gale-Shapley Algorithm

  • Weiran Shen
  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Yuan Deng

It is well-known that the Gale-Shapley algorithm is not truthful for all agents. Previous studies in this category concentrate on manipulations using incomplete preference lists by a single woman and by the set of all women. Little is known about manipulations by a subset of women. In this paper, we consider manipulations by any subset of women with arbitrary preferences. We show that a strong Nash equilibrium of the induced manipulation game always exists among the manipulators and the equilibrium outcome is unique and Pareto-dominant. In addition, the set of matchings achievable by manipulations has a lattice structure. We also examine the super-strong Nash equilibrium in the end.

AAMAS Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Coalitional Permutation Manipulations in the Gale-Shapley Algorithm

  • Yuan Deng
  • Weiran Shen
  • Pingzhong Tang

In this paper, we consider permutation manipulations by any subset of women in the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This paper is motivated by the college admissions process in China. Our results also answer an open problem on what can be achieved by permutation manipulations. We present an efficient algorithm to find a strategy profile such that the induced matching is stable and Pareto-optimal while the strategy profile itself is inconspicuous. Surprisingly, we show that such a strategy profile actually forms a Nash equilibrium of the manipulation game. In the end, we show that it is NP-complete to find a manipulation that is strictly better for all members of the coalition. This result demonstrates a sharp contrast between weakly better-off outcomes and strictly better-off outcomes.

AAAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Disarmament Games With Resource

  • Yuan Deng
  • Vincent Conitzer

A paper by Deng and Conitzer in AAAI’17 introduces disarmament games, in which players alternatingly commit not to play certain pure strategies. However, in practice disarmament usually does not consist in removing a strategy, but rather in removing a resource (and doing so rules out all the strategies in which that resource is used simultaneously). In this paper, we introduce a model of disarmament games in which resources, rather than strategies, are removed. We prove NP-completeness of several formulations of the problem of achieving desirable outcomes via disarmament. We then study the case where resources can be fractionally removed, and prove a result analogous to the folk theorem that all desirable outcomes can be achieved. We show that we can approximately achieve any desirable outcome in a polynomial number of rounds, though determining whether a given outcome can be obtained in a given number of rounds remains NP-complete.

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Disarmament Games

  • Yuan Deng
  • Vincent Conitzer

Much recent work in the AI community concerns algorithms for computing optimal mixed strategies to commit to, as well as the deployment of such algorithms in real security applications. Another possibility is to commit not to play certain actions. If only one player makes such a commitment, then this is generally less powerful than completely committing to a single mixed strategy. However, if players can alternatingly commit not to play certain actions and thereby iteratively reduce their strategy spaces, then desirable outcomes can be obtained that would not have been possible with just a single player committing to a mixed strategy. We refer to such a setting as a disarmament game. In this paper, we study disarmament for two-player normal-form games. We show that deciding whether an outcome can be obtained with disarmament is NP-complete (even for a fixed number of rounds), if only pure strategies can be removed. On the other hand, for the case where mixed strategies can be removed, we provide a folk theorem that shows that all desirable utility profiles can be obtained, and give an efficient algorithm for (approximately) obtaining them.

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Moral Decision Making Frameworks for Artificial Intelligence

  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Walter Sinnott-Armstrong
  • Jana Schaich Borg
  • Yuan Deng
  • Max Kramer

The generality of decision and game theory has enabled domain-independent progress in AI research. For example, a better algorithm for finding good policies in (PO)MDPs can be instantly used in a variety of applications. But such a general theory is lacking when it comes to moral decision making. For AI applications with a moral component, are we then forced to build systems based on many ad-hoc rules? In this paper we discuss possible ways to avoid this conclusion.

YNIMG Journal 2017 Journal Article

Neural signatures of phonological deficits in Chinese developmental dyslexia

  • Fan Cao
  • Xin Yan
  • Zhao Wang
  • Yanni Liu
  • Jin Wang
  • Gregory J. Spray
  • Yuan Deng

There has been debate on whether phonological deficits explain reading difficulty in Chinese, since Chinese is a logographic language which does not employ grapheme-phoneme-correspondence rules and remote memorization seems to be the main method to acquire reading. In the current study, we present neuroimaging evidence that the phonological deficit is also a signature of Chinese dyslexia. Specifically, we found that Chinese children with dyslexia (DD) showed reduced brain activation in the left dorsal inferior frontal gyrus (dIFG) when compared to both age-matched controls (AC) and reading-matched controls (RC) during an auditory rhyming judgment task. This suggests that the phonological processing deficit in this region may be a signature of dyslexia in Chinese, rather than a difference due to task performance or reading ability, which was matched on DD and RC. At exactly the same region of the left dIFG, we found a positive correlation between brain activation and reading skill in DD, suggesting that the phonological deficit is associated with the severity of dyslexia. We also found increased brain activation in the right precentral gyrus in DD than both AC and RC, suggesting a compensation of reliance on articulation. Functional connectivity analyses revealed that DD had a weaker connection between the left superior temporal gyrus (STG) and fusiform gyrus (FG) than the two control groups, suggesting that the reduced connection between phonology and orthography is another neural signature of dyslexia. In contrast, DD showed greater connectivity between the left dIFG and the left inferior parietal lobule (IPL) than both control groups, suggesting a reduced segregation between the language network and default mode network in dyslexic children. We also found that connectivity between the left STG and the left dIFG was sensitive to task performance and/or reading skill rather than being dyslexic or not, because AC was greater than both RC and DD, while the connectivity between the left middle occipital gyrus (MOG) and left STG was sensitive to age, because both AC and DD were greater than RC. In summary, our study provides the very first neurological evidence of phonological deficits in Chinese developmental dyslexia and we successfully distinguished variations of brain activity/functional connectivity due to age, performance, and dyslexia by comparing AC, RC, and DD.

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

The Complexity of Stable Matchings under Substitutable Preferences

  • Yuan Deng
  • Debmalya Panigrahi
  • Bo Waggoner

In various matching market settings, such as hospital-doctor matching markets (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005), the existence of stable outcomes depends on substitutability of preferences. But can these stable matchings be computed efficiently, as in the one-to-one matching case? The algorithm of (Hatfield and Milgrom 2005) requires efficient implementation of a choice function over substitutable preferences. We show that even given efficient access to a value oracle or preference relation satisfying substitutability, exponentially many queries may be required in the worst case to implement a choice function. Indeed, this extends to examples where a stable matching requires exponential time to compute. We characterize the computational complexity of stable matchings by showing that efficient computation of a choice function is equivalent to efficient verification—determining whether or not, for a given set, the most preferred subset is the entire set itself. Clearly, verification is necessary for computation, but we show that it is also sufficient: specifically, given a verifier, we design a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a choice function, implying an efficient algorithm for stable matching. We then show that a verifier can be implemented efficiently for various classes of functions, such as submodular functions, implying efficient stable matching algorithms for a broad range of settings. We also investigate the effect of ties in the preference order, which causes complications both in defining substitutes and in computation. In this case, we tightly connect the computational complexity of the choice function to a measure on the number of ties.

AAMAS Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Complexity and Algorithms of K-implementation

  • Yuan Deng
  • Pingzhong Tang
  • Shuran Zheng

This paper settles the complexity of K-implementation, a ten-year open problem in AI. The problem is for a designer to modify an existing normal-form game, in a cost-optimal way, so as to ensure the solutions of the modified game fall into a given set of outcomes. We first prove that the problem is NP-complete for general games with respect to dominance by pure strategies, and then provide an alternative proof showing that the problem is NP-complete even for twoplayer games with respect to dominance by mixed strategies. We then consider a related but different objective, show its hardness and develop computationally efficient algorithms for a class of well-known games called supermodular games. For this objective, we are able to provide an optimal algorithm based on mixed-integer linear program. Interestingly, this algorithm also provides a lower-bound approximation guarantee for the original K-implementation problem and approximates the optimal solution well in experiments. General Terms Algorithms; Economics; Theory;

YNIMG Journal 2012 Journal Article

Neural basis of phonological processing in second language reading: An fMRI study of Chinese regularity effect

  • Jing Zhao
  • Qing-Lin Li
  • Jiu-Ju Wang
  • Yang Yang
  • Yuan Deng
  • Hong-Yan Bi

The present study examined the neural basis of phonological processing in Chinese later acquired as a second language (L2). The regularity effect of Chinese was selected to elucidate the addressed phonological processing. We recruited a group of alphabetic language speakers who had been learning Chinese as L2 for at least one year, and a control group of native Chinese speakers. Participants from both groups exhibited a regularity effect in a pilot behavioral test. Neuroimaging results revealed that L2 learners exhibited stronger activation than native Chinese speakers in the right occipitotemporal region (i. e. right lingual gyrus and right fusiform gyrus). Moreover, L2 learners exhibited greater activations in the ventral aspects of the left inferior parietal lobule (LIPL) and the left inferior frontal gyrus (LIFG) for irregular character reading minus regular character reading. In contrast, native Chinese speakers exhibited more dorsal activations in the LIPL and LIFG. According to the “accommodation/assimilation” hypothesis of second language reading, the current findings suggest that native speakers of alphabetic languages utilized an accommodation pattern for the specific requirements of the visual form of Chinese characters, and an assimilation pattern for orthography-to-phonology transformation in Chinese reading.

v2026.09.13