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Ryan Porter

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4 papers

2 author rows

AIJ Journal 2008 Journal Article

Fault tolerant mechanism design

Ryan Porter
Amir Ronen
Yoav Shoham
Moshe Tennenholtz

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs of attempting the tasks but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present both, positive results in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational, and efficient, and negative results in the form of impossibility theorems.

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AAAI Conference 2004 Conference Paper

Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium

Ryan Porter

We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2player games and one for n-player games. We test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art– the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player games, and Simplicial Subdivision and Govindan-Wilson for n-player games.

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TARK Conference 2003 Conference Paper

Towards a general theory of non-cooperative computation

Robert McGrew 0001
Ryan Porter
Yoav Shoham

We generalize the framework of non-cooperative computation (NCC), recently introduced by Shoham and Tennenholtz, to apply to cryptographic situations. We consider functions whose inputs are held by separate, self-interested agents. We consider four components of each agent's utility function: (a) the wish to know the correct value of the function, (b) the wish to prevent others from knowing it, (c) the wish to prevent others from knowing one's own private input, and (d) the wish to know other agents' private inputs. We provide an exhaustive game theoretic analysis of all 2, 1 possible lexicographic orderings among these four considerations, for the case of Boolean functions (mercifully, these 24 cases collapse to four). In each case we identify the class of functions for which there exists an incentive-compatible mechanism for computing the function. In this article we only consider the situation in which the inputs of different agents are probabilistically independent.

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UAI Conference 2002 Conference Paper

Mechanism Design with Execution Uncertainty

Ryan Porter
Amir Ronen
Yoav Shoham
Moshe Tennenholtz

We introduce the notion of fault tolerant mechanism design, which extends the standard game theoretic framework of mechanism design to allow for uncertainty about execution. Specifically, we define the problem of task allocation in which the private information of the agents is not only their costs to attempt the tasks, but also their probabilities of failure. For several different instances of this setting we present technical results, including positive ones in the form of mechanisms that are incentive compatible, individually rational and efficient, and negative ones in the form of impossibility theorems.

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