Project games

We consider a strategic game, called project game, where each agent has to choose a project among her own list of available projects. The model includes positive weights expressing the capacity of a given agent to contribute to a given project. The realization of a project produces some reward that has to be allocated to the agents. The reward of a realized project is fully allocated to its contributors according to a simple proportional rule. Existence and computational complexity of pure Nash equilibria is addressed and their efficiency is investigated according to both the utilitarian and the egalitarian social function.

Authors

• Vittorio Bilò Università del Salento
• Laurent Gourvès Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE, 75016, Paris, France
• Jérôme Monnot University of Paris-Dauphine

Keywords

• Pure Nash equilibria
• Price of anarchy
• Price of stability