On the Optimal Fixed-Price Mechanism in Bilateral Trade

We study the problem of social welfare maximization in bilateral trade, where two agents, a buyer and a seller, trade an indivisible item. The seminal result of Myerson and Satterthwaite shows that no incentive compatible and budget balanced (i.e., the mechanism does not run a deficit) mechanism can achieve the optimal social welfare in bilateral trade. Motivated by this impossibility result, we focus on approximating the optimal social welfare. We consider arguably the simplest form of mechanisms – the fixed-price mechanisms, where the designer offers trade at a fixed price to the seller and buyer. Besides the simple form, fixed-price mechanisms are also the only dominant strategy incentive compatible and budget balanced mechanisms in bilateral trade.

Authors

• Yang Cai 0001
• Jinzhao Wu

Keywords

• fixed-price mechanism
• learning mechanisms with finitely many samples
• mechanism design with limited information
• welfare maximization in bilateral trade