Compact preference representation and Boolean games

Abstract Game theory is a widely used formal model for studying strategical interactions between agents. Boolean games (Harrenstein, Logic in conflict, PhD thesis, 2004; Harrenstein et al. , Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge, pp. 287–298, San Francisco Morgan Kaufmann, 2001) yield a compact representation of 2-player zero-sum static games with binary preferences: an agent’s strategy consists of a truth assignment of the propositional variables she controls, and a player’s preferences are expressed by a plain propositional formula. These restrictions (2-player, zero-sum, binary preferences) strongly limit the expressivity of the framework. We first generalize the framework to n -player games which are not necessarily zero-sum. We give simple characterizations of Nash equilibria and dominated strategies, and investigate the computational complexity of the associated problems. Then, we relax the last restriction by coupling Boolean games with a representation, namely, CP-nets.

Authors

• Elise Bonzon
• Marie-Christine Lagasquie-Schiex
• Bruno Zanuttini Normandie Univ.; UNICAEN, ENSICAEN, CNRS, GREYC, 14 000 Caen, France

Keywords

• Game theory
• Propositional logic
• Preference representation
• CP-nets