Schelling Games with Continuous Types

In most major cities and urban areas, residents form homogeneous neighborhoods along ethnic or socioeconomic lines. This phenomenon is widely known as residential segregation and has been studied extensively. Fifty years ago, Schelling proposed a landmark model that explains residential segregation in an elegant agent-based way. A recent stream of papers analyzed Schelling's model using game-theoretic approaches. However, all these works considered models with a given number of discrete types modeling different ethnic groups. We focus on segregation caused by non-categorical attributes, such as household income or position in a political left-right spectrum. For this, we consider agent types that can be represented as real numbers. This opens up a great variety of reasonable models and, as a proof of concept, we focus on several natural candidates. In particular, we consider agents that evaluate their location by the average type-difference or the maximum type-difference to their neighbors, or by having a certain tolerance range for type-values of neighboring agents. We study the existence and computation of equilibria and provide bounds on the Price of Anarchy and Stability. Also, we present simulation results that compare our models and shed light on the obtained equilibria for our variants.

Authors

• Davide Bilò University of L'Aquila
• Vittorio Bilò Università del Salento
• Michelle Döring Hasso Plattner Institute
• Pascal Lenzner University of Augsburg
• Louise Molitor
• Jonas Schmidt

Keywords

• Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Agent theories and models
• Agent-based and Multi-agent Systems: MAS: Agent-based simulation and emergence
• Game Theory and Economic Paradigms: GTEP: Noncooperative games