We introduce planning games, a study of interactions of self-motivated agents in automated planning settings. Planning games extend STRIPS-like models of single-agent planning to systems of multiple self-interested agents, providing a rich class of structured games that capture subtle forms of local interactions. We consider two basic models of planning games and adapt game-theoretic solution concepts to these models. In both models, agents may need to cooperate in order to achieve their goals, but are assumed to do so only in order to increase their net benefit. For each model we study the computational problem of finding a stable solution and provide efficient algorithms for systems exhibiting acyclic interaction structure.

Authors

• Ronen I. Brafman Ben-Gurion University
• Carmel Domshlak
• Yagil Engel Microsoft Research
• Moshe Tennenholtz Technion - Israel Institute of Technology

Keywords

No keywords are indexed for this paper.