Efficient Inverse Multiagent Learning

In this paper, we study inverse game theory (resp. inverse multiagent learning) in which the goal is to find parameters of a game’s payoff functions for which the expected (resp. sampled) behavior is an equilibrium. We formulate these problems as generative-adversarial (i.e., min-max) optimization problems, which we develop polynomial-time algorithms to solve, the former of which relies on an exact first- order oracle, and the latter, a stochastic one. We extend our approach to solve inverse multiagent simulacral learning in polynomial time and number of samples. In these problems, we seek a simulacrum, meaning parameters and an associated equilibrium that replicate the given observations in expectation. We find that our approach outperforms the widely-used ARIMA method in predicting prices in Spanish electricity markets based on time-series data.

Authors

• Denizalp Goktas
• Amy Greenwald
• Sadie Zhao
• Alec Koppel
• Sumitra Ganesh

Keywords

• Inverse Game Theory
• Inverse Multiagent Reinforcement Learning