As Soon as Possible but Rationally: Rational Synthesis for Reachability on Weighted Graphs

This talk addresses complexity problems in rational verification and synthesis for multi-player games played on weighted graphs, where the objective of each player is to minimize the cost of reaching a specific set of target vertices. In these games, one player, referred to as the system, declares his strategy upfront. The other players, composing the environment, then rationally make their moves according to their objectives. The rational behavior of these responding players is captured through two models: they opt for strategies that either represent a Nash equilibrium or lead to a play with a Pareto-optimal cost tuple. This is joint work with Véronique Bruyère et Jean-François Raskin, part of a paper that will be published in CONCUR 2024.

Authors

• Christophe Grandmont

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