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FOCS 2005

Nash Equilibria in Random Games

Conference Paper Session 3 Machtey Award Algorithms and Complexity · Theoretical Computer Science

Abstract

We consider Nash equilibria in 2-player random games and analyze a simple Las Vegas algorithm for finding an equilibrium. The algorithm is combinatorial and always finds a Nash equilibrium; on m /spl times/ n payoff matrices, it runs in time O(m/sup 2/n log log n + n/sup 2/m log log m) with high probability. Our main tool is a polytope formulation of equilibria.

Authors

Keywords

  • Nash equilibrium
  • Game theory
  • Probability distribution
  • Mathematics
  • Polynomials
  • Algorithm design and analysis
  • Educational institutions
  • Symmetric matrices
  • Gaussian distribution
  • Linear programming
  • Equilibrium Of The Game
  • High Probability
  • Payoff Matrix
  • Normal Distribution
  • Uniform Distribution
  • Running Time
  • Best Response
  • Random Points
  • Convex Hull
  • Mixed Strategy
  • Integrand
  • General Position
  • Spherically Symmetric
  • Points In Dimension
  • Pure Strategy
  • Support Size
  • Pairing Scheme
  • Unit Cube
  • Non-negative Vector
  • Number Of Equilibria

Context

Venue
IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Archive span
1975-2025
Indexed papers
3809
Paper id
1114080948591685197
v2026.09.13