Kant'sLogicRevisited.

Kant considers his Critique of Pure Reason to be founded on the act of judging and the different forms of judgement, hence, take pride of place in his argumentation. The consensus view is that this aspect of the Critique of Pure Reason is a failure because Kant’s logic is far too weak to bear such a weight. Here we show that the consensus view is mistaken and that Kant’s logic should be identified with geometric logic, a fragment of intuitionistic logic of great foundational significance. 1 Preview Below the reader will find a condensed revisionist account of Kant’s so-called ‘general logic’, usually thought to be substandard, even when compared with the traditional logic of his day [4].1 Ultimately our interest is in the formalisation of Kant’s ‘transcendental logic’ (for which see [1]), but since transcendental logic takes its starting The paper was originally presented at the conference “Philosophy, Mathematics, Linguistics: Aspects of Interaction 2012” (PhML-2012), held on May 22–25, 2012 at the Euler International Mathematical Institute, St. Petersburg. We are grateful to the referees for insightful comments. 1 Not to mention the scathing verdicts from the standpoint of modern logic which we take to have started with Frege and Strawson.

Authors

• Theodora Achourioti
• Michiel van Lambalgen

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