An Even More Leibnizian Version of Gödel's Ontological Argument.

We propose a modification of Gödel’s ontological argument for God’s existence from his ‘Ontologischer Beweis’ manuscript (1970). We follow a Leibnizian onto-theology, especially two of Leibniz’s letters from 1676 and 1677, to which Gödel could relate. We consider two differences between Gödel and Leibniz. We argue for the superiority of Leibniz’s ideas, while preserving the main structure of the Gödelian argument. Our first aim is to bring Gödel’s concept of positiveness closer to the idea of a Leibnizian perfectio which should not be understood via negations. Our second goal is to analyze the concept of being necessary in terms of a Leibnizian demonstrability. To this end, we formulate an S4 version of Gödel’s argument without using negative predicate terms. We sketch a model for our theory that allows us to express a few specific properties of the Leibnizian God.

Authors

• Kordula Swietorzecka
• Marcin Lyczak

Keywords

• ontological argument
• existence of God
• Gödel
• Leibniz
• logical philoso-