Coalition Formation with Logic-Based Agents

Abstract Coalition formation is studied in a setting where agents take part to a group decision-making scenario and where their preferences are expressed via weighted propositional logic, in particular by considering formulas consisting of conjunctions of literals only. Interactions among agents are constrained by an underlying social environment and each agent is associated with a specific social factor determining to which extent s/he prefers staying in a coalition with other agents. In particular, the utilities of the agents depend not only on their absolute preferences but also on the number of “neighbors” occurring with them in the coalition that emerged. Within this setting, the computational complexity of a number of relevant reasoning problems is studied, by charting a clear picture of the intrinsic difficulty of finding “agreements” in such social environments. Some restrictions leading to identify classes of tractable instances are discussed, too.

Authors

• Gianluigi Greco
• Antonella Guzzo

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