Facility Location Games with Optional Preference

In this paper, we propose the optional preference model for the facility location game with two heterogeneous facilities on a line. Agents in this new model are allowed to have optional preference, which gives more flexibility for agents to report. Aiming at minimizing maximum cost or sum cost of agents, we propose different deterministic strategy-proof mechanisms without monetary transfers. Depending on which facility the agent with optional preference cares for, we consider two variants of the optional preference model: Min (caring for the closer one) and Max (caring for the further one). For the Min variant, we propose a 2-approximation mechanism for the maximum cost objective, as well as a lower bound of 4/3, and a ( n/2+1) -approximation mechanism for the sum cost objective, as well as a lower bound of 2. For Max variant, we propose an optimal mechanism for the maximum cost objective and a 2-approximation mechanism for the sum cost objective.

Authors

• Hongning Yuan
• Kai Wang 0018
• Ken C. K. Fong
• Yong Zhang 0001
• Minming Li

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