Sharing a Reward Based on Peer Evaluations

We study a problem where a group of agents has to decidehow some fixed value should be shared among them. Weare interested in settings where the share that each agentreceives is based on how that agent is evaluated by othermembers of the group, where highly regarded agents receive a greater share compared to agents that are not wellregarded. We introduce two mechanisms for determiningagents' shares: the peer-evaluation mechanism, where eachagent gives a direct evaluation for every other member ofthe group, and the peer-prediction mechanism, where eachagent is asked to report how they believe group members willevaluate a particular agent. The sharing is based on the provided information. While both mechanisms are individuallyrational, the first mechanism is strategy-proof and budget-balanced, but it can be collusion-prone. Further, the secondmechanism is collusion-resistant and incentive-compatible.

Authors

• Arthur Carvalho
• Kate Larson University of Waterloo

Keywords

• Peer Evaluations
• Sharing Schemes
• Mechanism Design