Mechanism Design for Efficient Task Allocation

Task allocation involves a group of agents contributing to various tasks and has been well-studied in resource allocation and related fields. Inmanyscenarios, tasksaredistributedacrossdifferentareas, such as medical jobs in urban and rural regions, and sometimes different tasks require different skill sets. A key challenge is the tendency of agents to choose easier tasks or more prosperous areas for their own benefit. This self-interest can create imbalances, leaving challenging tasks undone or leading to uneven resource distribution, such as the shortage of rural doctors. To address this problem, we study task allocation using a gametheoretic approach. We model the problem as task allocation games with different tasks and a group of rational, identical agents who strategically select tasks to minimize their workloads. Our goal is to design mechanisms that ensure all workloads are completed in every Nash equilibrium. We show that achieving this requires implementing positive or negative incentives. We then propose effective mechanisms that leverage both types of incentives and extend our results to scenarios with multiple tasks and heterogeneous agents.

Authors

• Zifan Gong City University of Hong Kong
• Minming Li City University of Hong Kong
• Houyu Zhou UNSW Sydney

Keywords

• Nash equilibrium
• Task allocation
• Mechanism design