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AAAI 2022

The Complexity of Learning Approval-Based Multiwinner Voting Rules

Conference Paper AAAI Technical Track on Game Theory and Economic Paradigms Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

We study the PAC learnability of multiwinner voting, focusing on the class of approval-based committee scoring (ABCS) rules. These are voting rules applied on profiles with approval ballots, where each voter approves some of the candidates. According to ABCS rules, each committee of k candidates collects from each voter a score, that depends on the size of the voter’s ballot and on the size of its intersection with the committee. Then, committees of maximum score are the winning ones. Our goal is to learn a target rule (i. e. , to learn the corresponding scoring function) using information about the winning committees of a small number of sampled profiles. Despite the existence of exponentially many outcomes compared to single-winner elections, we show that the sample complexity is still low: a polynomial number of samples carries enough information for learning the target rule with high confidence and accuracy. Unfortunately, even simple tasks that need to be solved for learning from these samples are intractable. We prove that deciding whether there exists some ABCS rule that makes a given committee winning in a given profile is a computationally hard problem. Our results extend to the class of sequential Thiele rules, which have received attention due to their simplicity.

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Context

Venue
AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Archive span
1980-2026
Indexed papers
28718
Paper id
613385849475891950
v2026.09.13