Envy-Free House Allocation under Uncertain Preferences

Envy-freeness is one of the most important fairness concerns when allocating items. We study envy-free house allocation when agents have uncertain preferences over items and consider several well-studied preference uncertainty models. The central problem that we focus on is computing an allocation that has the highest probability of being envy-free. We show that each model leads to a distinct set of algorithmic and complexity results, including detailed results on (in-)approximability. En route, we consider two related problems of checking whether there exists an allocation that is possibly or necessarily envy-free. We give a complete picture of the computational complexity of these two problems for all the uncertainty models we consider.

Authors

• Haris Aziz UNSW Sydney
• Isaiah Iliffe UNSW Sydney
• Bo Li vivo Mobile Communication Co., Ltd
• Angus Ritossa UNSW Sydney
• Ankang Sun The Hong Kong Polytechnic University
• Mashbat Suzuki UNSW Sydney

Keywords

• GTEP: Fair Division
• GTEP: Social Choice / Voting