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Ziyun Chen

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4 papers
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4

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Improved Regret and Contextual Linear Extension for Pandora's Box and Prophet Inequality

  • Junyan Liu
  • Ziyun Chen
  • Kun Wang
  • Haipeng Luo
  • Lillian Ratliff

We study the Pandora’s Box problem in an online learning setting with semi-bandit feedback. In each round, the learner sequentially pays to open up to $n$ boxes with unknown reward distributions, observes rewards upon opening, and decides when to stop. The utility of the learner is the maximum observed reward minus the cumulative cost of opened boxes, and the goal is to minimize regret defined as the gap between the cumulative expected utility and that of the optimal policy. We propose a new algorithm that achieves $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{nT})$ regret after $T$ rounds, which improves the $\widetilde{O}(n\sqrt{T})$ bound of Agarwal et al. [2024] and matches the known lower bound up to logarithmic factors. To better capture real-life applications, we then extend our results to a natural but challenging contextual linear setting, where each box's expected reward is linear in some known but time-varying $d$-dimensional context and the noise distribution is fixed over time. We design an algorithm that learns both the linear function and the noise distributions, achieving $\widetilde{O}(nd\sqrt{T})$ regret. Finally, we show that our techniques also apply to the online Prophet Inequality problem, where the learner must decide immediately whether or not to accept a revealed reward. In both non-contextual and contextual settings, our approach achieves similar improvements and regret bounds.

FOCS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Stochastic Online Correlated Selection

  • Ziyun Chen
  • Zhiyi Huang 0002
  • Enze Sun 0001

We initiate the study of Stochastic Online Correlated Selection (SOCS), a family of online rounding algorithms for the general Non-IID model of Stochastic Online Submodular Welfare Maximization and its special cases such as Online Stochastic Matching, Stochastic Ad-Words, and Stochastic Display Ads. At each time step, the algorithm sees the type of an online item and a fractional allocation of the item, then immediately allocates the item to an agent. We propose a metric called the convergence rate that measures the quality of SOCS algorithms in the above special cases. This is cleaner than most metrics in the related Online Correlated Selection (OCS) literature and may be of independent interest. We propose a Type Decomposition framework that reduces the design of SOCS algorithms to the easier special case of two-way SOCS. First, we sample a surrogate type whose fractional allocation is half-integer. The rounding is trivial for a one-way surrogate type fully allocated to one agent. For a two-way surrogate type split equally between two agents, we round it using a two-way SOCS. We design the distribution of surrogate types to get two-way types as often as possible, while respecting the original fractional allocation in expectation. Following this framework, we make progress on nu-merous problems including two open questions related to AdWords.

FOCS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Simultaneous Auctions are Approximately Revenue-Optimal for Subadditive Bidders

  • Yang Cai 0001
  • Ziyun Chen
  • Jinzhao Wu

We study revenue maximization in multi-item auctions, where bidders have subadditive valuations over independent items [48]. Providing a simple mechanism that is approximately revenue-optimal in this setting is a major open problem in mechanism design [20]. In this paper, we present the first simple mechanism whose revenue is at least a constant fraction of the optimal revenue in multi-item auctions with subadditive bidders. Our mechanism is a simultaneous auction that incorporates either a personalized entry fee or a personalized reserve price per item. We prove that for any simultaneous auction that satisfies c-efficiency– a new property we propose, its revenue is at least an $O(c)$-approximation to the optimal revenue. We further show that both the simultaneous first-price and the simultaneous all-pay auction are $\frac{1}{2}$-efficient. Providing revenue guarantees for non-truthful simple mechanisms, e. g. , simultaneous auctions, in multi-dimensional environments has been recognized by Roughgarden et al. [47] as an important open question. Prior to our result, the only such revenue guarantees are due to Daskalakis et al. [30] for bidders who have additive valuations over independent items. Our result significantly extends the revenue guarantees of these non-truthful simple auctions to settings where bidders have combinatorial valuations.

v2026.09.13