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Yuqing Kong

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9 papers
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9

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Benchmarking LLMs' Judgments with No Gold Standard

  • Shengwei Xu
  • Yuxuan Lu 0001
  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Yuqing Kong

We introduce the GEM (Generative Estimator for Mutual Information), an evaluation metric for assessing language generation by large language models (LLMs), particularly in generating informative judgments, without the need for a gold standard reference. GEM broadens the scenarios where we can benchmark LLM generation performance-from traditional ones, like machine translation and summarization, where gold standard references are readily available, to subjective tasks without clear gold standards, such as academic peer review. GEM uses a generative model to estimate mutual information between candidate and reference responses, without requiring the reference to be a gold standard. In experiments on two human-annotated datasets, GEM demonstrates competitive correlations with human scores compared to the state-of-the-art GPT-4o Examiner, and outperforms all other baselines. Additionally, GEM is more robust against strategic manipulation, such as rephrasing or elongation, which can artificially inflate scores under a GPT-4o Examiner. We also present GRE-bench (Generating Review Evaluation Benchmark) which evaluates LLMs based on how well they can generate high-quality peer reviews for academic research papers. Because GRE-bench is based upon GEM, it inherits its robustness properties. Additionally, GRE-bench circumvents data contamination problems (or data leakage) by using the continuous influx of new open-access research papers and peer reviews each year. We show GRE-bench results of various popular LLMs on their peer review capabilities using the ICLR2023 dataset.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Calibrating “Cheap Signals” in Peer Review without a Prior

  • Yuxuan Lu
  • Yuqing Kong

Peer review lies at the core of the academic process, but even well-intentioned reviewers can still provide noisy ratings. While ranking papers by average ratings may reduce noise, varying noise levels and systematic biases stemming from ``cheap'' signals (e. g. author identity, proof length) can lead to unfairness. Detecting and correcting bias is challenging, as ratings are subjective and unverifiable. Unlike previous works relying on prior knowledge or historical data, we propose a one-shot noise calibration process without any prior information. We ask reviewers to predict others' scores and use these predictions for calibration. Assuming reviewers adjust their predictions according to the noise, we demonstrate that the calibrated score results in a more robust ranking compared to average ratings, even with varying noise levels and biases. In detail, we show that the error probability of the calibrated score approaches zero as the number of reviewers increases and is significantly lower compared to average ratings when the number of reviewers is small.

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Learning to Bid in Repeated First-Price Auctions with Budgets

  • Qian Wang 0025
  • Zongjun Yang
  • Xiaotie Deng
  • Yuqing Kong

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an $\widetilde{O}(\sqrt{T})$ regret with mild assumptions on the bidder’s value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Eliciting Thinking Hierarchy without a Prior

  • Yuqing Kong
  • Yunqi Li
  • Yubo Zhang
  • Zhihuan Huang
  • Jinzhao Wu

When we use the wisdom of the crowds, we usually rank the answers according to their popularity, especially when we cannot verify the answers. However, this can be very dangerous when the majority make systematic mistakes. A fundamental question arises: can we build a hierarchy among the answers without any prior where the higher-ranking answers, which may not be supported by the majority, are from more sophisticated people? To address the question, we propose 1) a novel model to describe people's thinking hierarchy; 2) two algorithms to learn the thinking hierarchy without any prior; 3) a novel open-response based crowdsourcing approach based on the above theoretic framework. In addition to theoretic justifications, we conduct four empirical crowdsourcing studies and show that a) the accuracy of the top-ranking answers learned by our approach is much higher than that of plurality voting (In one question, the plurality answer is supported by 74 respondents but the correct answer is only supported by 3 respondents. Our approach ranks the correct answer the highest without any prior); b) our model has a high goodness-of-fit, especially for the questions where our top-ranking answer is correct. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose a thinking hierarchy model with empirical validations in the general problem-solving scenarios; and the first to propose a practical open-response-based crowdsourcing approach that beats plurality voting without any prior.

IJCAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

SURPRISE! and When to Schedule It.

  • Zhihuan Huang
  • Shengwei Xu
  • You Shan
  • Yuxuan Lu
  • Yuqing Kong
  • Tracy Xiao Liu
  • Grant Schoenebeck

Information flow measures, over the duration of a game, the audience’s belief of who will win, and thus can reflect the amount of surprise in a game. To quantify the relationship between information flow and audiences' perceived quality, we conduct a case study where subjects watch one of the world’s biggest esports events, LOL S10. In addition to eliciting information flow, we also ask subjects to report their rating for each game. We find that the amount of surprise in the end of the game plays a dominant role in predicting the rating. This suggests the importance of incorporating when the surprise occurs, in addition to the amount of surprise, in perceived quality models. For content providers, it implies that everything else being equal, it is better for twists to be more likely to happen toward the end of a show rather than uniformly throughout.

SODA Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Dominantly Truthful Multi-task Peer Prediction with a Constant Number of Tasks

  • Yuqing Kong

In the setting where participants are asked multiple similar possibly subjective multi-choice questions (e. g. Do you like Panda Express? Y/N; do you like Chick-fil-A? Y/N), a series of peer prediction mechanisms are designed to incentivize honest reports and some of them achieve dominantly truthfulness: truth-telling is a dominant strategy and strictly dominate other “non-permutation strategy” with some mild conditions. However, a major issue hinders the practical usage of those mechanisms: they require the participants to perform an infinite number of tasks. When the participants perform a finite number of tasks, these mechanisms only achieve approximated dominant truthfulness. The existence of a dominantly truthful multi-task peer prediction mechanism that only requires a finite number of tasks remains to be an open question that may have a negative result, even with full prior knowledge. This paper answers this open question by proposing a new mechanism, Determinant based Mutual Information Mechanism (DMI-Mechanism), that is dominantly truthful when the number of tasks is ≥ 2 C. C is the number of choices for each question ( C = 2 for binary-choice questions). DMI-Mechanism also pays truth-telling higher than any strategy profile and strictly higher than uninformative strategy profiles (informed truthfulness). In addition to the truthfulness properties, DMI-Mechanism is also easy to implement since it does not require any prior knowledge (detail-free) and only requires ≥ 2 participants. The core of DMI-Mechanism is a novel information measure, Determinant based Mutual Information (DMI). DMI generalizes Shannon's mutual information and the square of DMI has a simple unbiased estimator. In addition to incentivizing honest reports, DMI-Mechanism can also be transferred into an information evaluation rule that identifies high-quality information without verification when there are ≥ 3 participants. To the best of our knowledge, DMI -Mechanism is both the first detail-free informed-truthful mechanism and the first dominantly truthful mechanism that works for a finite number of tasks, not to say a small constant number of tasks.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation

  • Yuqing Kong
  • Grant Schoenebeck
  • Biaoshuai Tao
  • Fang-Yi Yu

We study learning statistical properties from strategic agents with private information. In this problem, agents must be incentivized to truthfully reveal their information even when it cannot be directly verified. Moreover, the information reported by the agents must be aggregated into a statistical estimate. We study two fundamental statistical properties: estimating the mean of an unknown Gaussian, and linear regression with Gaussian error. The information of each agent is one point in a Euclidean space. Our main results are two mechanisms for each of these problems which optimally aggregate the information of agents in the truth-telling equilibrium: • A minimal (non-revelation) mechanism for large populations — agents only need to report one value, but that value need not be their point. • A mechanism for small populations that is non-minimal — agents need to answer more than one question. These mechanisms are “informed truthful” mechanisms where reporting unaltered data (truth-telling) 1) forms a strict Bayesian Nash equilibrium and 2) has strictly higher welfare than any oblivious equilibrium where agents’ strategies are independent of their private signals. We also show a minimal revelation mechanism (each agent only reports her signal) for a restricted setting and use an impossibility result to prove the necessity of this restriction. We build upon the peer prediction literature in the singlequestion setting; however, most previous work in this area focuses on discrete signals, whereas our setting is inherently continuous, and we further simplify the agents’ reports.

AAAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

f-Similarity Preservation Loss for Soft Labels: A Demonstration on Cross-Corpus Speech Emotion Recognition

  • Biqiao Zhang
  • Yuqing Kong
  • Georg Essl
  • Emily Mower Provost

In this paper, we propose a Deep Metric Learning (DML) approach that supports soft labels. DML seeks to learn representations that encode the similarity between examples through deep neural networks. DML generally presupposes that data can be divided into discrete classes using hard labels. However, some tasks, such as our exemplary domain of speech emotion recognition (SER), work with inherently subjective data, data for which it may not be possible to identify a single hard label. We propose a family of loss functions, f- Similarity Preservation Loss (f-SPL), based on the dual form of f-divergence for DML with soft labels. We show that the minimizer of f-SPL preserves the pairwise label similarities in the learned feature embeddings. We demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed loss function on the task of cross-corpus SER with soft labels. Our approach, which combines f-SPL and classification loss, significantly outperforms a baseline SER system with the same structure but trained with only classification loss in most experiments. We show that the presented techniques are more robust to over-training and can learn an embedding space in which the similarity between examples is meaningful.

NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

L_DMI: A Novel Information-theoretic Loss Function for Training Deep Nets Robust to Label Noise

  • Yilun Xu
  • Peng Cao
  • Yuqing Kong
  • Yizhou Wang

Accurately annotating large scale dataset is notoriously expensive both in time and in money. Although acquiring low-quality-annotated dataset can be much cheaper, it often badly damages the performance of trained models when using such dataset without particular treatment. Various methods have been proposed for learning with noisy labels. However, most methods only handle limited kinds of noise patterns, require auxiliary information or steps (e. g. , knowing or estimating the noise transition matrix), or lack theoretical justification. In this paper, we propose a novel information-theoretic loss function, L DMI, for training deep neural networks robust to label noise. The core of L DMI is a generalized version of mutual information, termed Determinant based Mutual Information (DMI), which is not only information-monotone but also relatively invariant. To the best of our knowledge, L DMI is the first loss function that is provably robust to instance-independent label noise, regardless of noise pattern, and it can be applied to any existing classification neural networks straightforwardly without any auxiliary information. In addition to theoretical justification, we also empirically show that using L DMI outperforms all other counterparts in the classification task on both image dataset and natural language dataset include Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, Dogs vs. Cats, MR with a variety of synthesized noise patterns and noise amounts, as well as a real-world dataset Clothing1M.

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