Author name cluster

Yoav Kolumbus

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6 papers

1 author row

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Contracting with a Learning Agent

Yoav Kolumbus
Jon Schneider
Inbal Talgam-Cohen
Emmanouil-Vasileios Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis
Joshua R. Wang
S. M. Weinberg

Real-life contractual relations typically involve repeated interactions between the principal and agent, where, despite theoretical appeal, players rarely use complex dynamic strategies and instead manage uncertainty through learning algorithms. In this paper, we initiate the study of repeated contracts with learning agents, focusing on those achieving no-regret outcomes. For the canonical setting where the agent’s actions result in success or failure, we present a simple, optimal solution for the principal: Initially provide a linear contract with scalar $\alpha > 0$, then switch to a zero-scalar contract. This shift causes the agent to “free-fall” through their action space, yielding non-zero rewards for the principal at zero cost. Interestingly, despite the apparent exploitation, there are instances where our dynamic contract can make \emph{both} players better off compared to the best static contract. We then broaden the scope of our results to general linearly-scaled contracts, and, finally, to the best of our knowledge, we provide the first analysis of optimization against learning agents with uncertainty about the time horizon.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Asynchronous Proportional Response Dynamics: Convergence in Markets with Adversarial Scheduling

Yoav Kolumbus
Menahem Levy
Noam Nisan

We study Proportional Response Dynamics (PRD) in linear Fisher markets, where participants act asynchronously. We model this scenario as a sequential process in which at each step, an adversary selects a subset of the players to update their bids, subject to liveness constraints. We show that if every bidder individually applies the PRD update rule whenever they are included in the group of bidders selected by the adversary, then, in the generic case, the entire dynamic converges to a competitive equilibrium of the market. Our proof technique reveals additional properties of linear Fisher markets, such as the uniqueness of the market equilibrium for generic parameters and the convergence of associated no swap regret dynamics and best response dynamics under certain conditions.

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Explainable Reinforcement Learning via Model Transforms

Mira Finkelstein
Nitsan levy
Lucy Liu
Yoav Kolumbus
David C. Parkes
Jeffrey S Rosenschein
Sarah Keren

Understanding emerging behaviors of reinforcement learning (RL) agents may be difficult since such agents are often trained in complex environments using highly complex decision making procedures. This has given rise to a variety of approaches to explainability in RL that aim to reconcile discrepancies that may arise between the behavior of an agent and the behavior that is anticipated by an observer. Most recent approaches have relied either on domain knowledge, that may not always be available, on an analysis of the agent’s policy, or on an analysis of specific elements of the underlying environment, typically modeled as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Our key claim is that even if the underlying model is not fully known (e. g. , the transition probabilities have not been accurately learned) or is not maintained by the agent (i. e. , when using model-free methods), the model can nevertheless be exploited to automatically generate explanations. For this purpose, we suggest using formal MDP abstractions and transforms, previously used in the literature for expediting the search for optimal policies, to automatically produce explanations. Since such transforms are typically based on a symbolic representation of the environment, they can provide meaningful explanations for gaps between the anticipated and actual agent behavior. We formally define the explainability problem, suggest a class of transforms that can be used for explaining emergent behaviors, and suggest methods that enable efficient search for an explanation. We demonstrate the approach on a set of standard benchmarks.

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

How and Why to Manipulate Your Own Agent: On the Incentives of Users of Learning Agents

Yoav Kolumbus
Noam Nisan

The usage of automated learning agents is becoming increasingly prevalent in many online economic applications such as online auctions and automated trading. Motivated by such applications, this paper is dedicated to fundamental modeling and analysis of the strategic situations that the users of automated learning agents are facing. We consider strategic settings where several users engage in a repeated online interaction, assisted by regret-minimizing learning agents that repeatedly play a "game" on their behalf. We propose to view the outcomes of the agents' dynamics as inducing a "meta-game" between the users. Our main focus is on whether users can benefit in this meta-game from "manipulating" their own agents by misreporting their parameters to them. We define a general framework to model and analyze these strategic interactions between users of learning agents for general games and analyze the equilibria induced between the users in three classes of games. We show that, generally, users have incentives to misreport their parameters to their own agents, and that such strategic user behavior can lead to very different outcomes than those anticipated by standard analysis.

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AAAI Conference 2022 Short Paper

Reinforcement Learning Explainability via Model Transforms (Student Abstract)

Mira Finkelstein
Lucy Liu
Yoav Kolumbus
David C. Parkes
Jeffrey S. Rosenshein
Sarah Keren

Understanding the emerging behaviors of reinforcement learning agents may be difficult because such agents are often trained using highly complex and expressive models. In recent years, most approaches developed for explaining agent behaviors rely on domain knowledge or on an analysis of the agent’s learned policy. For some domains, relevant knowledge may not be available or may be insufficient for producing meaningful explanations. We suggest using formal model abstractions and transforms, previously used mainly for expediting the search for optimal policies, to automatically explain discrepancies that may arise between the behavior of an agent and the behavior that is anticipated by an observer. We formally define this problem of Reinforcement Learning Policy Explanation (RLPE), suggest a class of transforms which can be used for explaining emergent behaviors, and suggest methods for searching efficiently for an explanation. We demonstrate the approach on standard benchmarks.

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IJCAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Neural Networks for Predicting Human Interactions in Repeated Games

Yoav Kolumbus
Gali Noti

We consider the problem of predicting human players' actions in repeated strategic interactions. Our goal is to predict the dynamic step-by-step behavior of individual players in previously unseen games. We study the ability of neural networks to perform such predictions and the information that they require. We show on a dataset of normal-form games from experiments with human participants that standard neural networks are able to learn functions that provide more accurate predictions of the players' actions than established models from behavioral economics. The networks outperform the other models in terms of prediction accuracy and cross-entropy, and yield higher economic value. We show that if the available input is only of a short sequence of play, economic information about the game is important for predicting behavior of human agents. However, interestingly, we find that when the networks are trained with long enough sequences of history of play, action-based networks do well and additional economic details about the game do not improve their performance, indicating that the sequence of actions encode sufficient information for the success in the prediction task.

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