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Yier Jin

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

3 papers
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3

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

CoreGuard: Safeguarding Foundational Capabilities of LLMs Against Model Stealing in Edge Deployment

  • Qinfeng Li
  • Tianyue Luo
  • Xuhong Zhang
  • Yangfan Xie
  • Zhiqiang Shen
  • Lijun Zhang
  • Yier Jin
  • Hao Peng

Proprietary large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong generalization capabilities across diverse tasks and are increasingly deployed on edge devices for efficiency and privacy reasons. However, deploying proprietary LLMs at the edge without adequate protection introduces critical security threats. Attackers can extract model weights and architectures, enabling unauthorized copying and misuse. Even when protective measures prevent full extraction of model weights, attackers may still perform advanced attacks, such as fine-tuning, to further exploit the model. Existing defenses against these threats typically incur significant computational and communication overhead, making them impractical for edge deployment. To safeguard the edge-deployed LLMs, we introduce CoreGuard, a computation- and communication-efficient protection method. CoreGuard employs an efficient protection protocol to reduce computational overhead and minimize communication overhead via a propagation protocol. Extensive experiments show that CoreGuard achieves upper-bound security protection with negligible overhead.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Beyond Digital Domain: Fooling Deep Learning Based Recognition System in Physical World

  • Kaichen Yang
  • Tzungyu Tsai
  • Honggang Yu
  • Tsung-Yi Ho
  • Yier Jin

Adversarial examples that can fool deep neural network (DNN) models in computer vision present a growing threat. The current methods of launching adversarial attacks concentrate on attacking image classifiers by adding noise to digital inputs. The problem of attacking object detection models and adversarial attacks in physical world are rarely touched. Some prior works are proposed to launch physical adversarial attack against object detection models, but limited by certain aspects. In this paper, we propose a novel physical adversarial attack targeting object detection models. Instead of simply printing images, we manufacture real metal objects that could achieve the adversarial effect. In both indoor and outdoor experiments we show our physical adversarial objects can fool widely applied object detection models including SSD, YOLO and Faster R-CNN in various environments. We also test our attack in a variety of commercial platforms for object detection and demonstrate that our attack is still valid on these platforms. Consider the potential defense mechanisms our adversarial objects may encounter, we conduct a series of experiments to evaluate the effect of existing defense methods on our physical attack.

AAAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Robust Adversarial Objects against Deep Learning Models

  • Tzungyu Tsai
  • Kaichen Yang
  • Tsung-Yi Ho
  • Yier Jin

Previous work has shown that Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), including those currently in use in many fields, are extremely vulnerable to maliciously crafted inputs, known as adversarial examples. Despite extensive and thorough research of adversarial examples in many areas, adversarial 3D data, such as point clouds, remain comparatively unexplored. The study of adversarial 3D data is crucial considering its impact in real-life, high-stakes scenarios including autonomous driving. In this paper, we propose a novel adversarial attack against PointNet++, a deep neural network that performs classification and segmentation tasks using features learned directly from raw 3D points. In comparison to existing works, our attack generates not only adversarial point clouds, but also robust adversarial objects that in turn generate adversarial point clouds when sampled both in simulation and after construction in real world. We also demonstrate that our objects can bypass existing defense mechanisms designed especially against adversarial 3D data.

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