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Yan Teng

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6 papers
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6

TMLR Journal 2026 Journal Article

Improving Foundation Model Group Robustness with Auxiliary Sentence Embeddings

  • Sisuo Lyu
  • Hong Liu
  • Jie Li
  • Yan Teng
  • Yingchun Wang

This paper addresses the critical challenge of mitigating group-based biases in vision-language foundation models, a pressing issue for ensuring trustworthy AI deployment. We introduce DoubleCCA, a novel and computationally efficient framework that systematically enriches textual representations to enhance group robustness. Our key innovation is to leverage an auxiliary large sentence embedding model to capture diverse semantic perspectives, counteracting biased representations induced by limited training data. To this end, we propose a two-stage Canonical Correlation Analysis (DoubleCCA) technique: first, aligning augmented and original embeddings in a shared space; second, reconstructing invariant features to align with visual representations, thus enhancing the model's group robustness. We further propose a simple sentence augmentation approach, which aims to improve the robustness of CCA-induced subspaces. Our method is simple to implement and can be easily integrated into existing models, making it a practical solution for improving the robustness of vision-language foundation models to group-based biases. The experiments on a variety of datasets demonstrate that our method outperforms existing methods in terms of both performance and robustness. Our code is available at https://github.com/sisuolv/doublecca.

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

The Other Mind: How Language Models Exhibit Human Temporal Cognition

  • Lingyu Li
  • Yang Yao
  • Yixu Wang
  • Chunbo Li
  • Yan Teng
  • Yingchun Wang

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, they exhibit certain cognitive patterns similar to those of humans that are not directly specified in training data. This study investigates this phenomenon by focusing on temporal cognition in LLMs. Leveraging the similarity judgment task, we find that larger models spontaneously establish a subjective temporal reference point and adhere to the Weber-Fechner law, whereby the perceived distance logarithmically compresses as years recede from this reference point. To uncover the mechanisms behind this behavior, we conducted multiple analyses across neuronal, representational, and informational levels. We first identify a set of temporal-preferential neurons and find that this group exhibits minimal activation at the subjective reference point and implements a logarithmic coding scheme convergently found in biological systems. Probing representations of years reveals a hierarchical construction process, where years evolve from basic numerical values in shallow layers to abstract temporal orientation in deep layers. Finally, using pre-trained embedding models, we found that the training corpus itself possesses an inherent, non-linear temporal structure, which provides the raw material for the model's internal construction. In discussion, we propose an experientialist perspective for understanding these findings, where the LLMs' cognition is viewed as a subjective construction of the external world by its internal representational system. This nuanced perspective implies the potential emergence of alien cognitive frameworks that humans cannot intuitively predict, pointing toward a direction for AI alignment that focuses on guiding internal constructions.

AAAI Conference 2025 Conference Paper

HoneypotNet: Backdoor Attacks Against Model Extraction

  • Yixu Wang
  • Tianle Gu
  • Yan Teng
  • Yingchun Wang
  • Xingjun Ma

Model extraction attacks are one type of inference-time attacks that approximate the functionality and performance of a black-box victim model by launching a certain number of queries to the model and then leveraging the model's predictions to train a substitute model. These attacks pose severe security threats to production models and MLaaS platforms and could cause significant monetary losses to the model owners. A body of work has proposed to defend machine learning models against model extraction attacks, including both active defense methods that modify the model's outputs or increase the query overhead to avoid extraction and passive defense methods that detect malicious queries or leverage watermarks to perform post-verification. In this work, we introduce a new defense paradigm called attack as defense which modifies the model's output to be poisonous such that any malicious users that attempt to use the output to train a substitute model will be poisoned. To this end, we propose a novel lightweight backdoor attack method dubbed HoneypotNet that replaces the classification layer of the victim model with a honeypot layer and then fine-tunes the honeypot layer with a shadow model (to simulate model extraction) via bi-level optimization to modify its output to be poisonous while remaining the original performance. We empirically demonstrate on four commonly used benchmark datasets that HoneypotNet can inject backdoors into substitute models with a high success rate. The injected backdoor not only facilitates ownership verification but also disrupts the functionality of substitute models, serving as a significant deterrent to model extraction attacks.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

JailBound: Jailbreaking Internal Safety Boundaries of Vision-Language Models

  • Jiaxin Song
  • Yixu Wang
  • Jie Li
  • Xuan Tong
  • rui yu
  • Yan Teng
  • Xingjun Ma
  • Yingchun Wang

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) exhibit impressive performance, yet the integration of powerful vision encoders has significantly broadened their attack surface, rendering them increasingly susceptible to jailbreak attacks. However, lacking well-defined attack objectives, existing jailbreak methods often struggle with gradient-based strategies prone to local optima and lacking precise directional guidance, and typically decouple visual and textual modalities, thereby limiting their effectiveness by neglecting crucial cross-modal interactions. Inspired by the Eliciting Latent Knowledge (ELK) framework, we posit that VLMs encode safety-relevant information within their internal fusion-layer representations, revealing an implicit safety decision boundary in the latent space. This motivates exploiting boundary to steer model behavior. Accordingly, we propose \textbf{JailBound}, a novel latent space jailbreak framework comprising two stages: (1) \textbf{Safety Boundary Probing}, which addresses the guidance issue by approximating decision boundary within fusion layer's latent space, thereby identifying optimal perturbation directions towards the target region; and (2) \textbf{Safety Boundary Crossing}, which overcomes the limitations of decoupled approaches by jointly optimizing adversarial perturbations across both image and text inputs. This latter stage employs an innovative mechanism to steer the model's internal state towards policy-violating outputs while maintaining cross-modal semantic consistency. Extensive experiments on six diverse VLMs demonstrate JailBound's efficacy, achieves 94. 32\% white-box and 67. 28\% black-box attack success averagely, which are 6. 17\% and 21. 13\% higher than SOTA methods, respectively. Our findings expose a overlooked safety risk in VLMs and highlight the urgent need for more robust defenses. \textcolor{red}{Warning: This paper contains potentially sensitive, harmful and offensive content. }

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

SafeVid: Toward Safety Aligned Video Large Multimodal Models

  • Yixu Wang
  • Jiaxin Song
  • Yifeng Gao
  • Xin Wang
  • Yang Yao
  • Yan Teng
  • Xingjun Ma
  • Yingchun Wang

As Video Large Multimodal Models (VLMMs) rapidly advance, their inherent complexity introduces significant safety challenges, particularly the issue of mismatched generalization where static safety alignments fail to transfer to dynamic video contexts. We introduce SafeVid, a framework designed to instill video-specific safety principles in VLMMs. SafeVid uniquely transfers robust textual safety alignment capabilities to the video domain by employing detailed textual video descriptions as an interpretive bridge, facilitating LLM-based rule-driven safety reasoning. This is achieved through a closed-loop system comprising: 1) generation of SafeVid-350K, a novel 350, 000-pair video-specific safety preference dataset; 2) targeted alignment of VLMMs using Direct Preference Optimization (DPO); and 3) comprehensive evaluation via our new SafeVidBench benchmark. Alignment with SafeVid-350K significantly enhances VLMM safety, with models like LLaVA-NeXT-Video demonstrating substantial improvements (e. g. , up to 42. 39%) on SafeVidBench. SafeVid provides critical resources and a structured approach, demonstrating that leveraging textual descriptions as a conduit for safety reasoning markedly improves the safety alignment of VLMMs in complex multimodal scenarios.

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

MLLMGuard: A Multi-dimensional Safety Evaluation Suite for Multimodal Large Language Models

  • Tianle Gu
  • Zeyang Zhou
  • Kexin Huang
  • Dandan Liang
  • Yixu Wang
  • Haiquan Zhao
  • Yuanqi Yao
  • Xingge Qiao

Powered by remarkable advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs), Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) demonstrate impressive capabilities in manifold tasks. However, the practical application scenarios of MLLMs are intricate, exposing them to potential malicious instructions and thereby posing safety risks. While current benchmarks do incorporate certain safety considerations, they often lack comprehensive coverage and fail to exhibit the necessary rigor and robustness. For instance, the common practice of employing GPT-4V as both the evaluator and a model to be evaluated lacks credibility, as it tends to exhibit a bias toward its own responses. In this paper, we present MLLMGuard, a multi-dimensional safety evaluation suite for MLLMs, including a bilingual image-text evaluation dataset, inference utilities, and a lightweight evaluator. MLLMGuard's assessment comprehensively covers two languages (English and Chinese) and five important safety dimensions (Privacy, Bias, Toxicity, Truthfulness, and Legality), each with corresponding rich subtasks. Focusing on these dimensions, our evaluation dataset is primarily sourced from platforms such as social media, and it integrates text-based and image-based red teaming techniques with meticulous annotation by human experts. This can prevent inaccurate evaluation caused by data leakage when using open-source datasets and ensures the quality and challenging nature of our benchmark. Additionally, a fully automated lightweight evaluator termed GuardRank is developed, which achieves significantly higher evaluation accuracy than GPT-4. Our evaluation results across 13 advanced models indicate that MLLMs still have a substantial journey ahead before they can be considered safe and responsible.

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