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Xiaoting Lyu

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2 papers

1 author row

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

FRBAT: Conditionally-Visible Physical Backdoor Attack via Fluorescence

Yalun Wu
Liu Liu
Endong Tong
Yingxiao Xiang
Xiaoting Lyu
Zhen Han
Jiqiang Liu

Deep neural networks are increasingly vulnerable to physically deployable backdoor attacks, which manipulate real-world objects to induce targeted model failures. However, current physical backdoor attacks predominantly rely on perpetually visible triggers appended to target objects. These methods inevitably expose attack traces during the deployment phase, risking human suspicion prior to activation. In this paper, we propose a conditionally-visible physical backdoor attack, which can only be activated under specific optical conditions and thereby overcomes the risk of being detected after deployment and before the attack. Specifically, to ensure robust and reliable activation, we design irregular polygonal pattern as triggers to against across environmental variations. Moreover, we introduce a dual-phase mechanism (dormant and activated) to enable stealthy deployment. Our trigger remains invisible and dormant under non-attack conditions, leaving no physical traces. It activates instantaneously under specific illumination, inducing the target model to perform the desired behavior. We conduct experiments on traffic sign recognition tasks to compare our attack with six digital and seven physical attacks, and assess its performance against potential defenses. Extensive experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness, stealthiness, and robustness of our attack.

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AAAI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Poisoning with Cerberus: Stealthy and Colluded Backdoor Attack against Federated Learning

Xiaoting Lyu
Yufei Han
Wei Wang
Jingkai Liu
Bin Wang
Jiqiang Liu
Xiangliang Zhang

Are Federated Learning (FL) systems free from backdoor poisoning with the arsenal of various defense strategies deployed? This is an intriguing problem with significant practical implications regarding the utility of FL services. Despite the recent flourish of poisoning-resilient FL methods, our study shows that carefully tuning the collusion between malicious participants can minimize the trigger-induced bias of the poisoned local model from the poison-free one, which plays the key role in delivering stealthy backdoor attacks and circumventing a wide spectrum of state-of-the-art defense methods in FL. In our work, we instantiate the attack strategy by proposing a distributed backdoor attack method, namely Cerberus Poisoning (CerP). It jointly tunes the backdoor trigger and controls the poisoned model changes on each malicious participant to achieve a stealthy yet successful backdoor attack against a wide spectrum of defensive mechanisms of federated learning techniques. Our extensive study on 3 large-scale benchmark datasets and 13 mainstream defensive mechanisms confirms that Cerberus Poisoning raises a significantly severe threat to the integrity and security of federated learning practices, regardless of the flourish of robust Federated Learning methods.

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