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#X10d; ek

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

5 papers
1 author row

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5

AAMAS Conference 2011 Conference Paper

A Double Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Security Games on Graphs

  • Manish Jain
  • Dmytro Korzhyk
  • Ond
  • #X159; ej Van
  • #X11b; k
  • Vincent Conitzer
  • Michal P
  • #X11b; chou

In response to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Mumbai police have started to schedule a limited number of inspection checkpoints on the road network throughout the city. Algorithms for similar security-related scheduling problems have been proposed in recent literature, but security scheduling in networked domains when targets have varying importance remains an open problem at large. In this paper, we cast the network security problem as an attackerdefender zero-sum game. The strategy spaces for both players are exponentially large, so this requires the development of novel, scalable techniques. We first show that existing algorithms for approximate solutions can be arbitrarily bad in general settings. We present RUGGED (Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender), the first scalable optimal solution technique for such network security games. Our technique is based on a double oracle approach and thus does not require the enumeration of the entire strategy space for either of the players. It scales up to realistic problem sizes, as is shown by our evaluation of maps of southern Mumbai obtained from GIS data.

AAMAS Conference 2011 Conference Paper

Computing Time-Dependent Policies for Patrolling Games with Mobile Targets

  • Branislav Bo
  • #X161; ansk
  • Viliam Lis
  • yacute;
  • Michal Jakob
  • Michal P
  • #X11b; chou
  • #X10d; ek

We study how a mobile defender should patrol an area to protect multiple valuable targets from being attacked by an attacker. In contrast to existing approaches, which assume stationary targets, we allow the targets to move through the area according to an a priori known, deterministic movement schedules. We represent the patrol area by a graph of arbitrary topology and do not put any restrictions on the movement schedules. We assume the attacker can observe the defender and has full knowledge of the strategy the defender employs. We construct a game-theoretic formulation and seek defender's optimal randomized strategy in a Stackelberg equilibrium of the game. We formulate the computation of the strategy as a mathematical program whose solution corresponds to an optimal time-dependent Markov policy for the defender. We also consider a simplified formulation allowing only stationary defender's policies which are generally less effective but are computationally significantly cheaper to obtain. We provide experimental evaluation examining this trade-off on a set of test problems covering various topologies of the patrol area and various movement schedules of the targets.

AAMAS Conference 2011 Conference Paper

Game Theoretical Adaptation Model for Intrusion Detection System

  • Martin Rehak
  • Michal P
  • #X11b; chou
  • #X10d; ek
  • Martin Grill
  • Jan Stiborek
  • Karel Bartos

We present a self-adaptation mechanism for Network Intrusion Detection System which uses a game-theoretical mechanism to increase system robustness against targeted attacks on IDS adaptation. We model the adaptation process as a strategy selection in sequence of single stage, two player games. The key innovation of our approach is a secure runtime game definition and numerical solution and real-time use of game solutions for dynamic system reconfiguration. Our approach is suited for realistic environments where we typically lack any ground truth information regarding traffic legitimacy/maliciousness and where the significant portion of system inputs may be shaped by the attacker in order to render the system ineffective. Therefore, we rely on the concept of challenge insertion: we inject a small sample of simulated attacks into the unknown traffic and use the system response to these attacks to define the game structure and utility functions. This approach is also advantageous from the security perspective, as the manipulation of the adaptive process by the attacker is far more difficult. Our experimental results suggest that the use of game-theoretical mechanism comes with little or no penalty when compared to traditional self-adaptation methods.

AAMAS Conference 2011 Conference Paper

Iterative Game-theoretic Route Selection for Hostile Area Transit and Patrolling

  • Ond
  • #X159; ej Van
  • #X11b; k
  • Michal Jakob
  • Viliam Lis
  • Branislav Bo
  • #X161; ansk
  • yacute;

A number of real-world security scenarios can be cast as a problem of transiting an area patrolled by a mobile adversary, where the transiting agent aims to choose its route so as to minimize the probability of encountering the patrolling agent, and vice versa. We model this problem as a twoplayer zero-sum game on a graph, termed the transit game. In contrast to the existing models of area transit, where one of the players is stationary, we assume both players are mobile. We also explicitly model the limited endurance of the patroller and the notion of a base to which the patroller has to repeatedly return. Noting the prohibitive size of the strategy spaces of both players, we employ iterative oracle-based algorithms including a newly proposed accelerated scheme, to obtain optimum route selection strategies for both players. We evaluate the developed approach on a range of transit game instances inspired by real-world security problems in the urban and naval security domains.