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Weibin Wu

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6 papers
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6

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

QRShield: Exploiting Vulnerabilities of Latent Diffusion Models for Preventing AI Art Plagiarism

  • Xunyue Mo
  • Weibin Wu
  • Qingrui Tu
  • Hang Wang
  • Junxi He
  • Zibin Zheng

Latent Diffusion Models (LDMs) have achieved remarkable success in image generation tasks, yet their low barrier to customization poses severe threats related to art plagiarism. As a countermeasure, adversarial methods have been proposed to protect artworks from plagiarism. However, current methods suffer from limited effectiveness, high cost, and complex optimization. Moreover, their exploration and exploitation of LDM vulnerabilities remain limited, restricting effectiveness and applicability. To address this issue, we analyze the VAE and U-Net components of LDMs, revealing their vulnerabilities. Specifically, we study the response of U-Net to specific structural and frequency patterns in the latent space and find that it is susceptible to high-frequency and periodic latent features. Furthermore, we observe channel correlations during the VAE encoding process. Inspired by these, we propose QRShield, an efficient protection method that exploits the vulnerabilities of LDMs. By constructing high-frequency and periodic features consistent across latent channels and combining them with a momentum-based translation-invariant attack strategy, QRShield achieves stronger and more efficient protection. QRShield significantly improves protection performance in various fine-tuning settings, with over 10% gains in multiple metrics, a threefold increase in generation speed, and nearly 50% reduction in memory usage. Therefore, our work offers a more practical method to prevent AI art plagiarism.

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Curvature-Invariant Adversarial Attacks for 3D Point Clouds

  • Jianping Zhang
  • Wenwei Gu
  • Yizhan Huang
  • Zhihan Jiang
  • Weibin Wu
  • Michael R. Lyu

Imperceptibility is one of the crucial requirements for adversarial examples. Previous adversarial attacks on 3D point cloud recognition suffer from noticeable outliers, resulting in low imperceptibility. We think that the drawbacks can be alleviated via taking the local curvature of the point cloud into consideration. Existing approaches introduce the local geometry distance into the attack objective function. However, their definition of the local geometry distance neglects different perceptibility of distortions along different directions. In this paper, we aim to enhance the imperceptibility of adversarial attacks on 3D point cloud recognition by better preserving the local curvature of the original 3D point clouds. To this end, we propose the Curvature-Invariant Method (CIM), which directly regularizes the back-propagated gradient during the generation of adversarial point clouds based on two assumptions. Specifically, we first decompose the back-propagated gradients into the tangent plane and the normal direction. Then we directly reduce the gradient along the large curvature direction on the tangent plane and only keep the gradient along the negative normal direction. Comprehensive experimental comparisons confirm the superiority of our approach. Notably, our strategy can achieve 7.2% and 14.5% improvements in Hausdorff distance and Gaussian curvature measurements of the imperceptibility.

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Improving the Adversarial Transferability of Vision Transformers with Virtual Dense Connection

  • Jianping Zhang
  • Yizhan Huang
  • Zhuoer Xu
  • Weibin Wu
  • Michael R. Lyu

With the great achievement of vision transformers (ViTs), transformer-based approaches have become the new paradigm for solving various computer vision tasks. However, recent research shows that similar to convolutional neural networks (CNNs), ViTs are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks. To explore the shared deficiency of models with different structures, researchers begin to analyze the cross-structure adversarial transferability, which is still under-explored. Therefore, in this work, we focus on the ViT attacks to improve the cross-structure transferability between the transformer-based and convolution-based models. Previous studies fail to thoroughly investigate the influence of the components inside the ViT models on adversarial transferability, leading to inferior performance. To overcome the drawback, we launch a motivating study by linearly down-scaling the gradients of components inside the ViT models to analyze their influence on adversarial transferability. Based on the motivating study, we find that the gradient of the skip connection most influences transferability and believe that back-propagating gradients from deeper blocks can enhance transferability. Therefore, we propose the Virtual Dense Connection method (VDC). Specifically, without changing the forward pass, we first recompose the original network to add virtual dense connections. Then we back-propagate gradients of deeper Attention maps and Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) blocks via virtual dense connections when generating adversarial samples. Extensive experiments confirm the superiority of our proposed method over the state-of-the-art baselines, with an 8.2% improvement in transferability between ViT models and a 7.2% improvement in cross-structure transferability from ViTs to CNNs.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Blurred-Dilated Method for Adversarial Attacks

  • Yang Deng
  • Weibin Wu
  • Jianping Zhang
  • Zibin Zheng

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which lead to incorrect predictions. In black-box settings, transfer attacks can be conveniently used to generate adversarial examples. However, such examples tend to overfit the specific architecture and feature representations of the source model, resulting in poor attack performance against other target models. To overcome this drawback, we propose a novel model modification-based transfer attack: Blurred-Dilated method (BD) in this paper. In summary, BD works by reducing downsampling while introducing BlurPool and dilated convolutions in the source model. Then BD employs the modified source model to generate adversarial samples. We think that BD can more comprehensively preserve the feature information than the original source model. It thus enables more thorough destruction of the image features, which can improve the transferability of the generated adversarial samples. Extensive experiments on the ImageNet dataset show that adversarial examples generated by BD achieve significantly higher transferability than the state-of-the-art baselines. Besides, BD can be conveniently combined with existing black-box attack techniques to further improve their performance.

AAAI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

CDTA: A Cross-Domain Transfer-Based Attack with Contrastive Learning

  • Zihan Li
  • Weibin Wu
  • Yuxin Su
  • Zibin Zheng
  • Michael R. Lyu

Despite the excellent performance, deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. Besides, these examples are often transferable among different models. In other words, the same adversarial example can fool multiple models with different architectures at the same time. Based on this property, many black-box transfer-based attack techniques have been developed. However, current transfer-based attacks generally focus on the cross-architecture setting, where the attacker has access to the training data of the target model, which is not guaranteed in realistic situations. In this paper, we design a Cross-Domain Transfer-Based Attack (CDTA), which works in the cross-domain scenario. In this setting, attackers have no information about the target model, such as its architecture and training data. Specifically, we propose a contrastive spectral training method to train a feature extractor on a source domain (e.g., ImageNet) and use it to craft adversarial examples on target domains (e.g., Oxford 102 Flower). Our method corrupts the semantic information of the benign image by scrambling the outputs of both the intermediate feature layers and the final layer of the feature extractor. We evaluate CDTA with 16 target deep models on four datasets with widely varying styles. The results confirm that, in terms of the attack success rate, our approach can consistently outperform the state-of-the-art baselines by an average of 11.45% across all target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/LiulietLee/CDTA.

IJCAI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Towards Semantics- and Domain-Aware Adversarial Attacks

  • Jianping Zhang
  • Yung-Chieh Huang
  • Weibin Wu
  • Michael R. Lyu

Language models are known to be vulnerable to textual adversarial attacks, which add human-imperceptible perturbations to the input to mislead DNNs. It is thus imperative to devise effective attack algorithms to identify the deficiencies of DNNs before real-world deployment. However, existing word-level attacks have two major deficiencies: (1) They may change the semantics of the original sentence. (2) The generated adversarial sample can appear unnatural to humans due to the introduction of out-of-domain substitute words. In this paper, to address such drawbacks, we propose a semantics- and domain-aware word-level attack method. Specifically, we greedily replace the important words in a sentence with the ones suggested by a language model. The language model is trained to be semantics- and domain-aware via contrastive learning and in-domain pre-training. Furthermore, to balance the quality of adversarial examples and the attack success rate, we propose an iterative updating framework to optimize the contrastive learning loss and the in-domain pre-training loss in circular order. Comprehensive experimental comparisons confirm the superiority of our approach. Notably, compared with state-of-the-art benchmarks, our strategy can achieve over 3\% improvement in attack success rates and 9. 8\% improvement in the quality of adversarial examples.

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