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Tanner Fiez

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12 papers

2 author rows

NeurIPS Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Adaptive Experimentation When You Can't Experiment

Yao Zhao
Kwang-Sung Jun
Tanner Fiez
Lalit Jain

This paper introduces the confounded pure exploration transductive linear bandit (CPET-LB) problem. As a motivating example, often online services cannot directly assign users to specific control or treatment experiences either for business or practical reasons. In these settings, naively comparing treatment and control groups that may result from self-selection can lead to biased estimates of underlying treatment effects. Instead, online services can employ a properly randomized encouragement that incentivizes users toward a specific treatment. Our methodology provides online services with an adaptive experimental design approach for learning the best-performing treatment for such encouragement designs. We consider a more general underlying model captured by a linear structural equation and formulate pure exploration linear bandits in this setting. Though pure exploration has been extensively studied in standard adaptive experimental design settings, we believe this is the first work considering a setting where noise is confounded. Elimination-style algorithms using experimental design methods in combination with a novel finite-time confidence interval on an instrumental variable style estimator are presented with sample complexity upper bounds nearly matching a minimax lower bound. Finally, experiments are conducted that demonstrate the efficacy of our approach.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Experimental Designs for Heteroskedastic Variance

Justin Weltz
Tanner Fiez
Alexander Volfovsky
Eric Laber
Blake Mason
Houssam Nassif
Lalit Jain

Most linear experimental design problems assume homogeneous variance, while the presence of heteroskedastic noise is present in many realistic settings. Let a learner have access to a finite set of measurement vectors $\mathcal{X}\subset \mathbb{R}^d$ that can be probed to receive noisy linear responses of the form $y=x^{\top}\theta^{\ast}+\eta$. Here $\theta^{\ast}\in \mathbb{R}^d$ is an unknown parameter vector, and $\eta$ is independent mean-zero $\sigma_x^2$-sub-Gaussian noise defined by a flexible heteroskedastic variance model, $\sigma_x^2 = x^{\top}\Sigma^{\ast}x$. Assuming that $\Sigma^{\ast}\in \mathbb{R}^{d\times d}$ is an unknown matrix, we propose, analyze and empirically evaluate a novel design for uniformly bounding estimation error of the variance parameters, $\sigma_x^2$. We demonstrate this method on two adaptive experimental design problems under heteroskedastic noise, fixed confidence transductive best-arm identification and level-set identification and prove the first instance-dependent lower bounds in these settings. Lastly, we construct near-optimal algorithms and demonstrate the large improvements in sample complexity gained from accounting for heteroskedastic variance in these designs empirically.

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ICLR Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Minimax Optimization with Smooth Algorithmic Adversaries

Tanner Fiez
Chi Jin 0001
Praneeth Netrapalli
Lillian J. Ratliff

This paper considers minimax optimization $\min_x \max_y f(x, y)$ in the challenging setting where $f$ can be both nonconvex in $x$ and nonconcave in $y$. Though such optimization problems arise in many machine learning paradigms including training generative adversarial networks (GANs) and adversarially robust models, from a theoretical point of view, two fundamental issues remain: (i) the absence of simple and efficiently computable optimality notions, and (ii) cyclic or diverging behavior of existing algorithms. This paper proposes a new theoretical framework for nonconvex-nonconcave minimax optimization that addresses both of the above issues. The starting point of this paper is the observation that, under a computational budget, the max-player can not fully maximize $f(x,\cdot)$ since nonconcave maximization is NP-hard in general. So, we propose a new framework, and a corresponding algorithm, for the min-player to play against \emph{smooth algorithms} deployed by the adversary (i.e., the max-player) instead of against full maximization. Our algorithm is guaranteed to make monotonic progress (thus having no limit cycles or diverging behavior), and to find an appropriate ``stationary point'' in a polynomial number of iterations. Our framework covers practically relevant settings where the smooth algorithms deployed by the adversary are multi-step stochastic gradient ascent, and its accelerated version. We further present experimental results that confirm our theoretical findings and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach in practice on simple, conceptual settings.

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AAAI Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Stackelberg Actor-Critic: Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning Algorithms

Liyuan Zheng
Tanner Fiez
Zane Alumbaugh
Benjamin Chasnov
Lillian J. Ratliff

The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint and model the actor and critic interaction as a twoplayer general-sum game with a leader-follower structure known as a Stackelberg game. Given this abstraction, we propose a meta-framework for Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms where the leader player follows the total derivative of its objective instead of the usual individual gradient. From a theoretical standpoint, we develop a policy gradient theorem for the refined update and provide a local convergence guarantee for the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. From an empirical standpoint, we demonstrate via simple examples that the learning dynamics we study mitigate cycling and accelerate convergence compared to the usual gradient dynamics given cost structures induced by actor-critic formulations. Finally, experiments on OpenAI gym environments show that Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms always perform at least as well and often significantly outperform the standard actor-critic algorithm counterparts.

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AAAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Evolutionary Game Theory Squared: Evolving Agents in Endogenously Evolving Zero-Sum Games

Stratis Skoulakis
Tanner Fiez
Ryann Sim
Georgios Piliouras
Lillian Ratliff

The predominant paradigm in evolutionary game theory and more generally online learning in games is based on a clear distinction between a population of dynamic agents that interact given a fixed, static game. In this paper, we move away from the artificial divide between dynamic agents and static games, to introduce and analyze a large class of competitive settings where both the agents and the games they play evolve strategically over time. We focus on arguably the most archetypal game-theoretic setting—zero-sum games (as well as network generalizations)—and the most studied evolutionary learning dynamic—replicator, the continuous-time analogue of multiplicative weights. Populations of agents compete against each other in a zero-sum competition that itself evolves adversarially to the current population mixture. Remarkably, despite the chaotic coevolution of agents and games, we prove that the system exhibits a number of regularities. First, the system has conservation laws of an information-theoretic flavor that couple the behavior of all agents and games. Secondly, the system is Poincaré recurrent, with effectively all possible initializations of agents and games lying on recurrent orbits that come arbitrarily close to their initial conditions infinitely often. Thirdly, the time-average agent behavior and utility converge to the Nash equilibrium values of the time-average game. Finally, we provide a polynomial time algorithm to efficiently predict this time-average behavior for any such coevolving network game.

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NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Global Convergence to Local Minmax Equilibrium in Classes of Nonconvex Zero-Sum Games

Tanner Fiez
Lillian Ratliff
Eric Mazumdar
Evan Faulkner
Adhyyan Narang

We study gradient descent-ascent learning dynamics with timescale separation ($\tau$-GDA) in unconstrained continuous action zero-sum games where the minimizing player faces a nonconvex optimization problem and the maximizing player optimizes a Polyak-Lojasiewicz (PL) or strongly-concave (SC) objective. In contrast to past work on gradient-based learning in nonconvex-PL/SC zero-sum games, we assess convergence in relation to natural game-theoretic equilibria instead of only notions of stationarity. In pursuit of this goal, we prove that the only locally stable points of the $\tau$-GDA continuous-time limiting system correspond to strict local minmax equilibria in each class of games. For these classes of games, we exploit timescale separation to construct a potential function that when combined with the stability characterization and an asymptotic saddle avoidance result gives a global asymptotic almost-sure convergence guarantee for the discrete-time gradient descent-ascent update to a set of the strict local minmax equilibrium. Moreover, we provide convergence rates for the gradient descent-ascent dynamics with timescale separation to approximate stationary points.

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ICLR Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Local Convergence Analysis of Gradient Descent Ascent with Finite Timescale Separation

Tanner Fiez
Lillian J. Ratliff

We study the role that a finite timescale separation parameter $\tau$ has on gradient descent-ascent in non-convex, non-concave zero-sum games where the learning rate of player 1 is denoted by $\gamma_1$ and the learning rate of player 2 is defined to be $\gamma_2=\tau\gamma_1$. We provide a non-asymptotic construction of the finite timescale separation parameter $\tau^{\ast}$ such that gradient descent-ascent locally converges to $x^{\ast}$ for all $\tau \in (\tau^{\ast}, \infty)$ if and only if it is a strict local minmax equilibrium. Moreover, we provide explicit local convergence rates given the finite timescale separation. The convergence results we present are complemented by a non-convergence result: given a critical point $x^{\ast}$ that is not a strict local minmax equilibrium, we present a non-asymptotic construction of a finite timescale separation $\tau_{0}$ such that gradient descent-ascent with timescale separation $\tau\in (\tau_0, \infty)$ does not converge to $x^{\ast}$. Finally, we extend the results to gradient penalty regularization methods for generative adversarial networks and empirically demonstrate on CIFAR-10 and CelebA the significant impact timescale separation has on training performance.

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NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Online Learning in Periodic Zero-Sum Games

Tanner Fiez
Ryann Sim
Stratis Skoulakis
Georgios Piliouras
Lillian Ratliff

A seminal result in game theory is von Neumann's minmax theorem, which states that zero-sum games admit an essentially unique equilibrium solution. Classical learning results build on this theorem to show that online no-regret dynamics converge to an equilibrium in a time-average sense in zero-sum games. In the past several years, a key research direction has focused on characterizing the transient behavior of such dynamics. General results in this direction show that broad classes of online learning dynamics are cyclic, and formally Poincar\'{e} recurrent, in zero-sum games. We analyze the robustness of these online learning behaviors in the case of periodic zero-sum games with a time-invariant equilibrium. This model generalizes the usual repeated game formulation while also being a realistic and natural model of a repeated competition between players that depends on exogenous environmental variations such as time-of-day effects, week-to-week trends, and seasonality. Interestingly, time-average convergence may fail even in the simplest such settings, in spite of the equilibrium being fixed. In contrast, using novel analysis methods, we show that Poincar\'{e} recurrence provably generalizes despite the complex, non-autonomous nature of these dynamical systems.

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UAI Conference 2020 Conference Paper

A SUPER* Algorithm to Optimize Paper Bidding in Peer Review

Tanner Fiez
Nihar B. Shah
Lillian J. Ratliff

A number of applications involve sequential arrival of users, and require showing each user an ordering of items. A prime example is the bidding process in conference peer review where reviewers enter the system sequentially, each reviewer needs to be shown the list of submitted papers, and the reviewer then "bids" to review some papers. The order of the papers shown has a significant impact on the bids due to primacy effects. In deciding on the ordering of the list of papers to show, there are two competing goals: (i) obtaining sufficiently many bids for each paper, and (ii) satisfying reviewers by showing them relevant items. In this paper, we develop a framework to study this problem in a principled manner. We present an algorithm called SUPER*, inspired by the A* algorithm, for this goal. Theoretically, we show a local optimality guarantee of our algorithm and prove that popular baselines are considerably suboptimal. Moreover, under a community model for the similarities, we prove that SUPER* is near-optimal whereas the popular baselines are considerably suboptimal. In experiments on real data from ICLR 2018 and synthetic data, we find that SUPER* considerably outperforms baselines deployed in existing systems, consistently reducing the number of papers with fewer than requisite bids by 50-75% or more, and is also robust to various real world complexities.

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ICML Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Implicit Learning Dynamics in Stackelberg Games: Equilibria Characterization, Convergence Analysis, and Empirical Study

Tanner Fiez
Benjamin Chasnov
Lillian J. Ratliff

Contemporary work on learning in continuous games has commonly overlooked the hierarchical decision-making structure present in machine learning problems formulated as games, instead treating them as simultaneous play games and adopting the Nash equilibrium solution concept. We deviate from this paradigm and provide a comprehensive study of learning in Stackelberg games. This work provides insights into the optimization landscape of zero-sum games by establishing connections between Nash and Stackelberg equilibria along with the limit points of simultaneous gradient descent. We derive novel gradient-based learning dynamics emulating the natural structure of a Stackelberg game using the implicit function theorem and provide convergence analysis for deterministic and stochastic updates for zero-sum and general-sum games. Notably, in zero-sum games using deterministic updates, we show the only critical points the dynamics converge to are Stackelberg equilibria and provide a local convergence rate. Empirically, our learning dynamics mitigate rotational behavior and exhibit benefits for training generative adversarial networks compared to simultaneous gradient descent.

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NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Sequential Experimental Design for Transductive Linear Bandits

Tanner Fiez
Lalit Jain
Kevin Jamieson
Lillian Ratliff

In this paper we introduce the pure exploration transductive linear bandit problem: given a set of measurement vectors $\mathcal{X}\subset \mathbb{R}^d$, a set of items $\mathcal{Z}\subset \mathbb{R}^d$, a fixed confidence $\delta$, and an unknown vector $\theta^{\ast}\in \mathbb{R}^d$, the goal is to infer $\arg\max_{z\in \mathcal{Z}} z^\top\theta^\ast$ with probability $1-\delta$ by making as few sequentially chosen noisy measurements of the form $x^\top\theta^{\ast}$ as possible. When $\mathcal{X}=\mathcal{Z}$, this setting generalizes linear bandits, and when $\mathcal{X}$ is the standard basis vectors and $\mathcal{Z}\subset \{0, 1\}^d$, combinatorial bandits. The transductive setting naturally arises when the set of measurement vectors is limited due to factors such as availability or cost. As an example, in drug discovery the compounds and dosages $\mathcal{X}$ a practitioner may be willing to evaluate in the lab in vitro due to cost or safety reasons may differ vastly from those compounds and dosages $\mathcal{Z}$ that can be safely administered to patients in vivo. Alternatively, in recommender systems for books, the set of books $\mathcal{X}$ a user is queried about may be restricted to known best-sellers even though the goal might be to recommend more esoteric titles $\mathcal{Z}$. In this paper, we provide instance-dependent lower bounds for the transductive setting, an algorithm that matches these up to logarithmic factors, and an evaluation. In particular, we present the first non-asymptotic algorithm for linear bandits that nearly achieves the information-theoretic lower bound.

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UAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Combinatorial Bandits for Incentivizing Agents with Dynamic Preferences

Tanner Fiez
Shreyas Sekar
Liyuan Zheng
Lillian J. Ratliff

The design of personalized incentives or recommendations to improve user engagement is gaining prominence as digital platform providers continually emerge. We propose a multi-armed bandit framework for matching incentives to users, whose preferences are unknown a priori and evolving dynamically in time, in a resource constrained environment. We design an algorithm that combines ideas from three distinct domains: (i) a greedy matching paradigm, (ii) the upper confidence bound algorithm (UCB) for bandits, and (iii) mixing times from the theory of Markov chains. For this algorithm, we provide theoretical bounds on the regret and demonstrate its performance via both synthetic and realistic (matching supply and demand in a bike-sharing platform) examples.

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