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Tal Rabin

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

7 papers
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Possible papers

7

STOC Conference 2006 Conference Paper

Information-theoretically secure protocols and security under composition

  • Eyal Kushilevitz
  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Tal Rabin

We investigate the question of whether security of protocols in the information-theoretic setting (where the adversary is computationally unbounded) implies security under concurrent composition. This question is motivated by the folklore that all known protocols that are secure in the information-theoretic setting are indeed secure under concurrent composition. We provide answers to this question for a number of different settings (i.e., considering perfect versus statistical security, and concurrent composition with adaptive versus fixed inputs). Our results enhance the understanding of what is necessary for obtaining security under composition, as well as providing tools (i.e., composition theorems) that can be used for proving the security of protocols under composition while considering only the standard stand-alone definitions of security.

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STOC Conference 2002 Conference Paper

On the composition of authenticated byzantine agreement

  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Anna Lysyanskaya
  • Tal Rabin

A fundamental problem of distributed computing is that of simulating a (secure) broadcast channel, within the setting of a point-to-point network. This problem is known as Byzantine Agreement and has been the focus of much research. Lamport et al. showed that in order to achieve Byzantine Agreement in the standard model, more than 2/3 of the participating parties must be honest. They further showed that by augmenting the network with a public-key infrastructure, it is possible to obtain secure protocols for any number of faulty parties. This augmented problem is called "authenticated Byzantine Agreement".In this paper we consider the question of concurrent, parallel and sequential composition of authenticated Byzantine Agreement protocols. We present surprising impossibility results showing that: Authenticated Byzantine Agreement cannot be composed in parallel or concurrently (even twice), if 1/3 or more of the parties are faulty.

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I&C Journal 2001 Journal Article

Robust Threshold DSS Signatures

  • Rosario Gennaro
  • Stanisław Jarecki
  • Hugo Krawczyk
  • Tal Rabin

We present threshold DSS (digital signature standard) signatures where the power to sign is shared by n players such that for a given parameter t<n/2 any subset of 2t+1 signers can collaborate to produce a valid DSS signature on any given message, but no subset of t corrupted players can forge a signature (in particular, cannot learn the signature key). In addition, we present a robust threshold DSS scheme that can also tolerate n/3 payers who refuse to participate in the signature protocol. We can also endure n/4 maliciously faulty players that generate incorrect partial signatures at the time of signature computation. This results in a highly secure and resilient DSS signature system applicable to the protection of the secret signature key, the prevention of forgery, and increased system availability. Assuming that secret communication between the players is available, we prove the security of our protocols solely based on the hardness of forging a regular DSS signature.

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STOC Conference 2001 Conference Paper

The round complexity of verifiable secret sharing and secure multicast

  • Rosario Gennaro
  • Yuval Ishai
  • Eyal Kushilevitz
  • Tal Rabin

The round complexity of interactive protocols is one of their most important complexity measures. In this work we study the exact round complexity of two basic secure computation tasks: Verifiable Secret Sharing (VSS) and Secure Multicast .

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TCS Journal 2000 Journal Article

Secure distributed storage and retrieval

  • Juan A. Garay
  • Rosario Gennaro
  • Charanjit Jutla
  • Tal Rabin

In his well-known Information Dispersal Algorithm paper, Rabin showed a way to distribute information in n pieces among n servers in such a way that recovery of the information is possible in the presence of up to t inactive servers. An enhanced mechanism to enable construction in the presence of malicious faults, which can intentionally modify their pieces of the information, was later presented by Krawczyk. Yet, these methods assume that the malicious faults occur only at reconstruction time. In this paper we address the more general problem of secure storage and retrieval of information (SSRI), and guarantee that also the process of storing the information is correct even when some of the servers fail. Our protocols achieve this while maintaining the (asymptotical) space optimality of the above methods. We also consider SSRI with the added requirement of confidentiality, by which no party except for the rightful owner of the information is able to learn anything about it. This is achieved through novel applications of cryptographic techniques, such as the distributed generation of receipts, distributed key management via threshold cryptography, and “blinding”. An interesting byproduct of our scheme is the construction of a secret sharing scheme with shorter shares size in the amortized sense. An immediate practical application of our work is a system for the secure deposit of sensitive data. We also extend SSRI to a “proactive” setting, where an adversary may corrupt all the servers during the lifetime of the system, but only a fraction during any given time interval.

Details DOI
v2026.09.13