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Steven Shapiro

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

7 papers
2 author rows

Possible papers

7

AAMAS Conference 2012 Conference Paper

Revising Conflicting Intention Sets in BDI Agents

  • Steven Shapiro
  • Sebastian Sardina
  • John Thangarajah
  • Lawrence Cavedon
  • Lin Padgham

Autonomous agents typically have several goals they are pursuing simultaneously. Even if the goals themselves are not necessarily inconsistent, choices made about how to pursue each of these goals may well result in a set of intentions which are conflicting. A rational autonomous agent should be able to reason about and modify its set of intentions to take account of such issues. This paper presents the semantics of some preferences regarding modified sets of intentions. We look at the possibility of simply deleting some intention(s) but more importantly we also look at the possibility of modifying intentions, such that the goals will still be achieved but in a different way.

AIJ Journal 2011 Journal Article

Iterated belief change in the situation calculus

  • Steven Shapiro
  • Maurice Pagnucco
  • Yves Lespérance
  • Hector J. Levesque

John McCarthy's situation calculus has left an enduring mark on artificial intelligence research. This simple yet elegant formalism for modelling and reasoning about dynamic systems is still in common use more than forty years since it was first proposed. The ability to reason about action and change has long been considered a necessary component for any intelligent system. The situation calculus and its numerous extensions as well as the many competing proposals that it has inspired deal with this problem to some extent. In this paper, we offer a new approach to belief change associated with performing actions that addresses some of the shortcomings of these approaches. In particular, our approach is based on a well-developed theory of action in the situation calculus extended to deal with belief. Moreover, by augmenting this approach with a notion of plausibility over situations, our account handles nested belief, belief introspection, mistaken belief, and handles belief revision and belief update together with iterated belief change.

IJCAI Conference 2007 Conference Paper

  • Steven Shapiro
  • Gerhard Brewka

Shapiro et al. , presented a framework for representing goal change in the situation calculus. In that framework, agents adopt a goal when requested to do so (by some agent), and they remain committed to the goal unless the request is cancelled by that agent. A common assumption in the agent theory literature is that achievement goals that are believed to be impossible to achieve should be dropped. In this paper, we incorporate this assumption into Shapiro et al. 's framework, however we go a step further. If an agent believes a goal is impossible to achieve, it is dropped. However, if the agent later believes that it was mistaken about the impossibility of achieving the goal, the agent might readopt the goal. In addition, we consider an agent's goals as a whole when making them compatible with their beliefs, rather than considering them individually.

IJCAI Conference 2005 Conference Paper

Goal Change

  • Steven Shapiro
  • Yves Lespérance
  • Hector J

Although there has been much discussion of belief change (e. g. , [Gärdenfors, 1988; Spohn, 1988]), goal change has not received much attention. In this paper, we propose a method for goal change in the framework of Reiter’s [2001] theory of action in the situation calculus [McCarthy and Hayes, 1969; Levesque et al. , 1998], and investigate its properties. We extend the framework developed by Shapiro et al. [1998] and Shapiro and Lespérance [2001], where goals and goal expansion were modelled, but goal contraction was not.

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