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Steven Ketchpel

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

2 papers
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2

AAAI Conference 1994 Conference Paper

Forming Coalitions in the Face of Uncertain Rewards

  • Steven Ketchpel

When agents are in an environment where they can interact with each other, groups of agents may agree to work together for the benefit of all the members of the group. Finding these coalitions of agents and determining how the joint reward should be divided among them is a difficult problem. This problem is aggravated when the agents have different estimates of the value that the coalition will obtain. A "two agent auction" mechanism is suggested to complement an existing coalition formation algorithm for solving this problem.

AAAI Conference 1994 Short Paper

The Formation of Coalitions among Self-Interested Agents

  • Steven Ketchpel

Researchers in the multi-agent systems community of DA1 assume that agents will have to interact with others agents that were designed by different designers for different goals. These diverse agents could benefit each other by collaborating, but they will do so only if the resulting deal is beneficial from each agent’s point of view. One useful definition of beneficial is that of economic rationality, maximizing the agent’s expected payoff in terms of a utility function. An open problem in this area is to design a protocol that allows a large pool of agents to determine which of the subsets among them can profit by working together. A solution to a coalition problem is a partition of the agents into subsets (coalitions), such that each agent in every coalition receives the most utility it can expect.

v2026.09.13