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Shiqing Ma

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16 papers
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16

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

From Chaos to Clarity: A Knowledge Graph-Driven Audit Dataset Generation Framework for LLM Unlearning

  • Weipeng Jiang
  • Juan Zhai
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Ziyan Lei
  • Xiaofei Xie
  • Yige Wang
  • Chao Shen

Recently LLMs have faced increasing demands to selectively remove specific information through Machine Unlearning. While evaluating unlearning effectiveness is crucial, existing benchmarks suffer from fundamental limitations in audit dataset generation from unstructured corpora. We identify two critical challenges: ensuring audit adequacy and handling knowledge redundancy between forget and retain datasets. Current approaches rely on ad-hoc question generation from unstructured text, leading to unpredictable coverage gaps and evaluation blind spots. Knowledge redundancy between forget and retain corpora further obscures evaluation, making it difficult to distinguish genuine unlearning failures from legitimately retained knowledge. To bring clarity to this challenge, we propose LUCID, an automated framework that leverages knowledge graphs to achieve comprehensive audit dataset generation with fine-grained coverage and systematic redundancy elimination. By converting unstructured corpora into structured knowledge representations, it transforms the ad-hoc audit dataset generation process into a transparent and automated generation pipeline that ensures both adequacy and non-redundancy. Applying LUCID to the MUSE benchmark, we generated over 69,000 and 111,000 audit cases for News and Books datasets respectively, identifying thousands of previously undetected knowledge memorization instances. Our analysis reveals that knowledge redundancy significantly skews metrics, artificially inflating ROUGE from 19.7% to 26.1% and Entailment Scores from 32.4% to 35.2%, highlighting the necessity of deduplication for accurate assessment.

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Continuous Concepts Removal in Text-to-image Diffusion Models

  • Tingxu Han
  • Weisong Sun
  • Yanrong Hu
  • Chunrong Fang
  • Yonglong zhang
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Tao Zheng
  • Zhenyu Chen

Text-to-image diffusion models have shown an impressive ability to generate high-quality images from input textual descriptions/prompts. However, concerns have been raised about the potential for these models to create content that infringes on copyrights or depicts disturbing subject matter. Removing specific concepts from these models is a promising solution to this issue. However, existing methods for concept removal do not work well in practical but challenging scenarios where concepts need to be continuously removed. Specifically, these methods lead to poor alignment between the text prompts and the generated image after the continuous removal process. To address this issue, we propose a novel concept removal approach called CCRT that includes a designed knowledge distillation paradigm. CCRT constrains the text-image alignment behavior during the continuous concept removal process by using a set of text prompts. These prompts are generated through our genetic algorithm, which employs a designed fuzzing strategy. To evaluate the effectiveness of CCRT, we conduct extensive experiments involving the removal of various concepts, algorithmic metrics, and human studies. The results demonstrate that CCRT can effectively remove the targeted concepts from the model in a continuous manner while maintaining the high image generation quality (e. g. , text-image alignment). The code of CCRT is available at https: //github. com/wssun/CCRT.

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

STAFF: Speculative Coreset Selection for Task-Specific Fine-tuning

  • Xiaoyu Zhang 0013
  • Juan Zhai
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Chao Shen 0001
  • Tianlin Li
  • Weipeng Jiang
  • Yang Liu 0003

Task-specific fine-tuning is essential for the deployment of large language models (LLMs), but it requires significant computational resources and time. Existing solutions have proposed coreset selection methods to improve data efficiency and reduce model training overhead, but they still have limitations: ❶ Overlooking valuable samples at high pruning rates, which degrades the coreset’s performance. ❷ Requiring high time overhead during coreset selection to fine-tune and evaluate the target LLM. In this paper, we introduce STAFF, a speculative coreset selection method. STAFF leverages a small model from the same family as the target LLM to efficiently estimate data scores and then verifies the scores on the target LLM to accurately identify and allocate more selection budget to important regions while maintaining coverage of easy regions. We evaluate STAFF on three LLMs and three downstream tasks and show that STAFF improves the performance of SOTA methods by up to 54.3% and reduces selection overhead by up to 70.5% at different pruning rates. Furthermore, we observe that the coreset selected by STAFF at low pruning rates (i.e., 20%) can even obtain better fine-tuning performance than the full dataset.

ICLR Conference 2024 Conference Paper

DIAGNOSIS: Detecting Unauthorized Data Usages in Text-to-image Diffusion Models

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Chen Chen 0043
  • Lingjuan Lyu
  • Dimitris N. Metaxas
  • Shiqing Ma

Recent text-to-image diffusion models have shown surprising performance in generating high-quality images. However, concerns have arisen regarding the unauthorized data usage during the training or fine-tuning process. One example is when a model trainer collects a set of images created by a particular artist and attempts to train a model capable of generating similar images without obtaining permission and giving credit to the artist. To address this issue, we propose a method for detecting such unauthorized data usage by planting the injected memorization into the text-to-image diffusion models trained on the protected dataset. Specifically, we modify the protected images by adding unique contents on these images using stealthy image warping functions that are nearly imperceptible to humans but can be captured and memorized by diffusion models. By analyzing whether the model has memorized the injected content (i.e., whether the generated images are processed by the injected post-processing function), we can detect models that had illegally utilized the unauthorized data. Experiments on Stable Diffusion and VQ Diffusion with different model training or fine-tuning methods (i.e, LoRA, DreamBooth, and standard training) demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed method in detecting unauthorized data usages. Code: https://github.com/ZhentingWang/DIAGNOSIS.

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift

  • Shengwei An
  • Sheng-Yen Chou
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Guangyu Shen
  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Shiqing Ma

Diffusion models (DM) have become state-of-the-art generative models because of their capability of generating high-quality images from noises without adversarial training. However, they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks as reported by recent studies. When a data input (e.g., some Gaussian noise) is stamped with a trigger (e.g., a white patch), the backdoored model always generates the target image (e.g., an improper photo). However, effective defense strategies to mitigate backdoors from DMs are underexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose the first backdoor detection and removal framework for DMs. We evaluate our framework Elijah on over hundreds of DMs of 3 types including DDPM, NCSN and LDM, with 13 samplers against 3 existing backdoor attacks. Extensive experiments show that our approach can have close to 100% detection accuracy and reduce the backdoor effects to close to zero without significantly sacrificing the model utility.

ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

How to Trace Latent Generative Model Generated Images without Artificial Watermark?

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Vikash Sehwag
  • Chen Chen 0043
  • Lingjuan Lyu
  • Dimitris N. Metaxas
  • Shiqing Ma

Latent generative models (e. g. , Stable Diffusion) have become more and more popular, but concerns have arisen regarding potential misuse related to images generated by these models. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the origin of images by inferring if a particular image was generated by a specific latent generative model. Most existing methods (e. g. , image watermark and model fingerprinting) require extra steps during training or generation. These requirements restrict their usage on the generated images without such extra operations, and the extra required operations might compromise the quality of the generated images. In this work, we ask whether it is possible to effectively and efficiently trace the images generated by a specific latent generative model without the aforementioned requirements. To study this problem, we design a latent inversion based method called LatentTracer to trace the generated images of the inspected model by checking if the examined images can be well-reconstructed with an inverted latent input. We leverage gradient based latent inversion and identify a encoder-based initialization critical to the success of our approach. Our experiments on the state-of-the-art latent generative models, such as Stable Diffusion, show that our method can distinguish the images generated by the inspected model and other images with a high accuracy and efficiency. Our findings suggest the intriguing possibility that today’s latent generative generated images are naturally watermarked by the decoder used in the source models. Code: https: //github. com/ZhentingWang/LatentTracer.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Django: Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Guanhong Tao
  • Kaiyuan Zhang
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Shengwei An
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Object detection models are vulnerable to backdoor or trojan attacks, where an attacker can inject malicious triggers into the model, leading to altered behavior during inference. As a defense mechanism, trigger inversion leverages optimization to reverse-engineer triggers and identify compromised models. While existing trigger inversion methods assume that each instance from the support set is equally affected by the injected trigger, we observe that the poison effect can vary significantly across bounding boxes in object detection models due to its dense prediction nature, leading to an undesired optimization objective misalignment issue for existing trigger reverse-engineering methods. To address this challenge, we propose the first object detection backdoor detection framework Django (Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration). It leverages a dynamic Gaussian weighting scheme that prioritizes more vulnerable victim boxes and assigns appropriate coefficients to calibrate the optimization objective during trigger inversion. In addition, we combine Django with a novel label proposal pre-processing technique to enhance its efficiency. We evaluate Django on 3 object detection image datasets, 3 model architectures, and 2 types of attacks, with a total of 168 models. Our experimental results show that Django outperforms 6 state-of-the-art baselines, with up to 38% accuracy improvement and 10x reduced overhead. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DJGO.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

FLIP: A Provable Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated Learning

  • Kaiyuan Zhang 0002
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Siyuan Cheng 0005
  • Shengwei An
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Shiwei Feng 0002
  • Guangyu Shen

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on nine competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

UNICORN: A Unified Backdoor Trigger Inversion Framework

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Kai Mei
  • Juan Zhai
  • Shiqing Ma

The backdoor attack, where the adversary uses inputs stamped with triggers (e.g., a patch) to activate pre-planted malicious behaviors, is a severe threat to Deep Neural Network (DNN) models. Trigger inversion is an effective way of identifying backdoor models and understanding embedded adversarial behaviors. A challenge of trigger inversion is that there are many ways of constructing the trigger. Existing methods cannot generalize to various types of triggers by making certain assumptions or attack-specific constraints. The fundamental reason is that existing work does not formally define the trigger and the inversion problem. This work formally defines and analyzes the trigger and the inversion problem. Then, it proposes a unified framework to invert backdoor triggers based on the formalization of triggers and the identified inner behaviors of backdoor models from our analysis. Our prototype UNICORN is general and effective in inverting backdoor triggers in DNNs. The code can be found at https://github.com/RU-System-Software-and-Security/UNICORN.

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Where Did I Come From? Origin Attribution of AI-Generated Images

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Chen Chen
  • Yi Zeng
  • Lingjuan Lyu
  • Shiqing Ma

Image generation techniques have been gaining increasing attention recently, but concerns have been raised about the potential misuse and intellectual property (IP) infringement associated with image generation models. It is, therefore, necessary to analyze the origin of images by inferring if a specific image was generated by a particular model, i. e. , origin attribution. Existing methods only focus on specific types of generative models and require additional procedures during the training phase or generation phase. This makes them unsuitable for pre-trained models that lack these specific operations and may impair generation quality. To address this problem, we first develop an alteration-free and model-agnostic origin attribution method via reverse-engineering on image generation models, i. e. , inverting the input of a particular model for a specific image. Given a particular model, we first analyze the differences in the hardness of reverse-engineering tasks for generated samples of the given model and other images. Based on our analysis, we then propose a method that utilizes the reconstruction loss of reverse-engineering to infer the origin. Our proposed method effectively distinguishes between generated images of a specific generative model and other images, i. e. , images generated by other models and real images.

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Constrained Optimization with Dynamic Bound-scaling for Effective NLP Backdoor Defense

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Zhuo Zhang 0002
  • Shengwei An
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Modern language models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. An injected malicious token sequence (i. e. , a trigger) can cause the compromised model to misbehave, raising security concerns. Trigger inversion is a widely-used technique for scanning backdoors in vision models. It can- not be directly applied to NLP models due to their discrete nature. In this paper, we develop a novel optimization method for NLP backdoor inversion. We leverage a dynamically reducing temperature coefficient in the softmax function to provide changing loss landscapes to the optimizer such that the process gradually focuses on the ground truth trigger, which is denoted as a one-hot value in a convex hull. Our method also features a temperature rollback mechanism to step away from local optimals, exploiting the observation that local optimals can be easily determined in NLP trigger inversion (while not in general optimization). We evaluate the technique on over 1600 models (with roughly half of them having injected backdoors) on 3 prevailing NLP tasks, with 4 different backdoor attacks and 7 architectures. Our results show that the technique is able to effectively and efficiently detect and remove backdoors, outperforming 5 baseline methods. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DBS.

NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Rethinking the Reverse-engineering of Trojan Triggers

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Kai Mei
  • Hailun Ding
  • Juan Zhai
  • Shiqing Ma

Deep Neural Networks are vulnerable to Trojan (or backdoor) attacks. Reverse-engineering methods can reconstruct the trigger and thus identify affected models. Existing reverse-engineering methods only consider input space constraints, e. g. , trigger size in the input space. Expressly, they assume the triggers are static patterns in the input space and fail to detect models with feature space triggers such as image style transformations. We observe that both input-space and feature-space Trojans are associated with feature space hyperplanes. Based on this observation, we design a novel reverse-engineering method that exploits the feature space constraint to reverse-engineer Trojan triggers. Results on four datasets and seven different attacks demonstrate that our solution effectively defends both input-space and feature-space Trojans. It outperforms state-of-the-art reverse-engineering methods and other types of defenses in both Trojaned model detection and mitigation tasks. On average, the detection accuracy of our method is 93%. For Trojan mitigation, our method can reduce the ASR (attack success rate) to only 0. 26% with the BA (benign accuracy) remaining nearly unchanged. Our code can be found at https: //github. com/RU-System-Software-and-Security/FeatureRE.

NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Training with More Confidence: Mitigating Injected and Natural Backdoors During Training

  • Zhenting Wang
  • Hailun Ding
  • Juan Zhai
  • Shiqing Ma

The backdoor or Trojan attack is a severe threat to deep neural networks (DNNs). Researchers find that DNNs trained on benign data and settings can also learn backdoor behaviors, which is known as the natural backdoor. Existing works on anti-backdoor learning are based on weak observations that the backdoor and benign behaviors can differentiate during training. An adaptive attack with slow poisoning can bypass such defenses. Moreover, these methods cannot defend natural backdoors. We found the fundamental differences between backdoor-related neurons and benign neurons: backdoor-related neurons form a hyperplane as the classification surface across input domains of all affected labels. By further analyzing the training process and model architectures, we found that piece-wise linear functions cause this hyperplane surface. In this paper, we design a novel training method that forces the training to avoid generating such hyperplanes and thus remove the injected backdoors. Our extensive experiments on five datasets against five state-of-the-art attacks and also benign training show that our method can outperform existing state-of-the-art defenses. On average, the ASR (attack success rate) of the models trained with NONE is 54. 83 times lower than undefended models under standard poisoning backdoor attack and 1. 75 times lower under the natural backdoor attack. Our code is available at https: //github. com/RU-System-Software-and-Security/NONE.

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Backdoor Scanning for Deep Neural Networks through K-Arm Optimization

  • Guangyu Shen
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Guanhong Tao 0001
  • Shengwei An
  • Qiuling Xu
  • Siyuan Cheng 0005
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Back-door attack poses a severe threat to deep learning systems. It injects hidden malicious behaviors to a model such that any input stamped with a special pattern can trigger such behaviors. Detecting back-door is hence of pressing need. Many existing defense techniques use optimization to generate the smallest input pattern that forces the model to misclassify a set of benign inputs injected with the pattern to a target label. However, the complexity is quadratic to the number of class labels such that they can hardly handle models with many classes. Inspired by Multi-Arm Bandit in Reinforcement Learning, we propose a K-Arm optimization method for backdoor detection. By iteratively and stochastically selecting the most promising labels for optimization with the guidance of an objective function, we substantially reduce the complexity, allowing to handle models with many classes. Moreover, by iteratively refining the selection of labels to optimize, it substantially mitigates the uncertainty in choosing the right labels, improving detection accuracy. At the time of submission, the evaluation of our method on over 4000 models in the IARPA TrojAI competition from round 1 to the latest round 4 achieves top performance on the leaderboard. Our technique also supersedes five state-of-the-art techniques in terms of accuracy and the scanning time needed. The code of our work is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/K-ARM_Backdoor_Optimization

AAAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Deep Feature Space Trojan Attack of Neural Networks by Controlled Detoxification

  • Siyuan Cheng
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Trojan (backdoor) attack is a form of adversarial attack on deep neural networks where the attacker provides victims with a model trained/retrained on malicious data. The backdoor can be activated when a normal input is stamped with a certain pattern called trigger, causing misclassification. Many existing trojan attacks have their triggers being input space patches/objects (e. g. , a polygon with solid color) or simple input transformations such as Instagram filters. These simple triggers are susceptible to recent backdoor detection algorithms. We propose a novel deep feature space trojan attack with five characteristics: effectiveness, stealthiness, controllability, robustness and reliance on deep features. We conduct extensive experiments on 9 image classifiers on various datasets including ImageNet to demonstrate these properties and show that our attack can evade state-of-the-art defense.

NeurIPS Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Attacks Meet Interpretability: Attribute-steered Detection of Adversarial Samples

  • Guanhong Tao
  • Shiqing Ma
  • Yingqi Liu
  • Xiangyu Zhang

Adversarial sample attacks perturb benign inputs to induce DNN misbehaviors. Recent research has demonstrated the widespread presence and the devastating consequences of such attacks. Existing defense techniques either assume prior knowledge of specific attacks or may not work well on complex models due to their underlying assumptions. We argue that adversarial sample attacks are deeply entangled with interpretability of DNN models: while classification results on benign inputs can be reasoned based on the human perceptible features/attributes, results on adversarial samples can hardly be explained. Therefore, we propose a novel adversarial sample detection technique for face recognition models, based on interpretability. It features a novel bi-directional correspondence inference between attributes and internal neurons to identify neurons critical for individual attributes. The activation values of critical neurons are enhanced to amplify the reasoning part of the computation and the values of other neurons are weakened to suppress the uninterpretable part. The classification results after such transformation are compared with those of the original model to detect adversaries. Results show that our technique can achieve 94% detection accuracy for 7 different kinds of attacks with 9. 91% false positives on benign inputs. In contrast, a state-of-the-art feature squeezing technique can only achieve 55% accuracy with 23. 3% false positives.

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