Author name cluster

Shengwei An

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

7 papers

2 author rows

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Temporal Logic-Based Multi-Vehicle Backdoor Attacks against Offline RL Agents in End-to-end Autonomous Driving

Xuan Chen
Shiwei Feng
Zikang Xiong
Shengwei An
Yunshu Mao
Lu Yan
Guanhong Tao
Wenbo Guo

Assessing the safety of autonomous driving (AD) systems against security threats, particularly backdoor attacks, is a stepping stone for real-world deployment. However, existing works mainly focus on pixel-level triggers which are impractical to deploy in the real world. We address this gap by introducing a novel backdoor attack against the end-to-end AD systems that leverage one or more other vehicles' trajectories as triggers. To generate precise trigger trajectories, we first use temporal logic (TL) specifications to define the behaviors of attacker vehicles. Configurable behavior models are then used to generate these trajectories, which are quantitatively evaluated and iteratively refined based on the TL specifications. We further develop a negative training strategy by incorporating patch trajectories that are similar to triggers but are designated not to activate the backdoor. It enhances the stealthiness of the attack and refines the system’s responses to trigger scenarios. Through extensive experiments on 5 offline reinforcement learning (RL) driving agents with 6 trigger patterns and target actions combinations, we demonstrate the flexibility and effectiveness of our proposed attack, showing the under-exploration of existing end-to-end AD systems' vulnerabilities to such trajectory-based backdoor attacks. Videos of our attack are available at: https: //sites. google. com/view/tlbackdoor/home.

PDF Details

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Elijah: Eliminating Backdoors Injected in Diffusion Models via Distribution Shift

Shengwei An
Sheng-Yen Chou
Kaiyuan Zhang
Qiuling Xu
Guanhong Tao
Guangyu Shen
Siyuan Cheng
Shiqing Ma

Diffusion models (DM) have become state-of-the-art generative models because of their capability of generating high-quality images from noises without adversarial training. However, they are vulnerable to backdoor attacks as reported by recent studies. When a data input (e.g., some Gaussian noise) is stamped with a trigger (e.g., a white patch), the backdoored model always generates the target image (e.g., an improper photo). However, effective defense strategies to mitigate backdoors from DMs are underexplored. To bridge this gap, we propose the first backdoor detection and removal framework for DMs. We evaluate our framework Elijah on over hundreds of DMs of 3 types including DDPM, NCSN and LDM, with 13 samplers against 3 existing backdoor attacks. Extensive experiments show that our approach can have close to 100% detection accuracy and reduce the backdoor effects to close to zero without significantly sacrificing the model utility.

PDF Details DOI

AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Inspecting Prediction Confidence for Detecting Black-Box Backdoor Attacks

Tong Wang
Yuan Yao
Feng Xu
Miao Xu
Shengwei An
Ting Wang

Backdoor attacks have been shown to be a serious security threat against deep learning models, and various defenses have been proposed to detect whether a model is backdoored or not. However, as indicated by a recent black-box attack, existing defenses can be easily bypassed by implanting the backdoor in the frequency domain. To this end, we propose a new defense DTInspector against black-box backdoor attacks, based on a new observation related to the prediction confidence of learning models. That is, to achieve a high attack success rate with a small amount of poisoned data, backdoor attacks usually render a model exhibiting statistically higher prediction confidences on the poisoned samples. We provide both theoretical and empirical evidence for the generality of this observation. DTInspector then carefully examines the prediction confidences of data samples, and decides the existence of backdoor using the shortcut nature of backdoor triggers. Extensive evaluations on six backdoor attacks, four datasets, and three advanced attacking types demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense.

PDF Details DOI

NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Django: Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration

Guangyu Shen
Siyuan Cheng
Guanhong Tao
Kaiyuan Zhang
Yingqi Liu
Shengwei An
Shiqing Ma
Xiangyu Zhang

Object detection models are vulnerable to backdoor or trojan attacks, where an attacker can inject malicious triggers into the model, leading to altered behavior during inference. As a defense mechanism, trigger inversion leverages optimization to reverse-engineer triggers and identify compromised models. While existing trigger inversion methods assume that each instance from the support set is equally affected by the injected trigger, we observe that the poison effect can vary significantly across bounding boxes in object detection models due to its dense prediction nature, leading to an undesired optimization objective misalignment issue for existing trigger reverse-engineering methods. To address this challenge, we propose the first object detection backdoor detection framework Django (Detecting Trojans in Object Detection Models via Gaussian Focus Calibration). It leverages a dynamic Gaussian weighting scheme that prioritizes more vulnerable victim boxes and assigns appropriate coefficients to calibrate the optimization objective during trigger inversion. In addition, we combine Django with a novel label proposal pre-processing technique to enhance its efficiency. We evaluate Django on 3 object detection image datasets, 3 model architectures, and 2 types of attacks, with a total of 168 models. Our experimental results show that Django outperforms 6 state-of-the-art baselines, with up to 38% accuracy improvement and 10x reduced overhead. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DJGO.

PDF Details

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

FLIP: A Provable Defense Framework for Backdoor Mitigation in Federated Learning

Kaiyuan Zhang 0002
Guanhong Tao 0001
Qiuling Xu
Siyuan Cheng 0005
Shengwei An
Yingqi Liu
Shiwei Feng 0002
Guangyu Shen

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on nine competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

Details

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Constrained Optimization with Dynamic Bound-scaling for Effective NLP Backdoor Defense

Guangyu Shen
Yingqi Liu
Guanhong Tao 0001
Qiuling Xu
Zhuo Zhang 0002
Shengwei An
Shiqing Ma
Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Modern language models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. An injected malicious token sequence (i. e. , a trigger) can cause the compromised model to misbehave, raising security concerns. Trigger inversion is a widely-used technique for scanning backdoors in vision models. It can- not be directly applied to NLP models due to their discrete nature. In this paper, we develop a novel optimization method for NLP backdoor inversion. We leverage a dynamically reducing temperature coefficient in the softmax function to provide changing loss landscapes to the optimizer such that the process gradually focuses on the ground truth trigger, which is denoted as a one-hot value in a convex hull. Our method also features a temperature rollback mechanism to step away from local optimals, exploiting the observation that local optimals can be easily determined in NLP trigger inversion (while not in general optimization). We evaluate the technique on over 1600 models (with roughly half of them having injected backdoors) on 3 prevailing NLP tasks, with 4 different backdoor attacks and 7 architectures. Our results show that the technique is able to effectively and efficiently detect and remove backdoors, outperforming 5 baseline methods. The code is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/DBS.

Details

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Backdoor Scanning for Deep Neural Networks through K-Arm Optimization

Guangyu Shen
Yingqi Liu
Guanhong Tao 0001
Shengwei An
Qiuling Xu
Siyuan Cheng 0005
Shiqing Ma
Xiangyu Zhang 0001

Back-door attack poses a severe threat to deep learning systems. It injects hidden malicious behaviors to a model such that any input stamped with a special pattern can trigger such behaviors. Detecting back-door is hence of pressing need. Many existing defense techniques use optimization to generate the smallest input pattern that forces the model to misclassify a set of benign inputs injected with the pattern to a target label. However, the complexity is quadratic to the number of class labels such that they can hardly handle models with many classes. Inspired by Multi-Arm Bandit in Reinforcement Learning, we propose a K-Arm optimization method for backdoor detection. By iteratively and stochastically selecting the most promising labels for optimization with the guidance of an objective function, we substantially reduce the complexity, allowing to handle models with many classes. Moreover, by iteratively refining the selection of labels to optimize, it substantially mitigates the uncertainty in choosing the right labels, improving detection accuracy. At the time of submission, the evaluation of our method on over 4000 models in the IARPA TrojAI competition from round 1 to the latest round 4 achieves top performance on the leaderboard. Our technique also supersedes five state-of-the-art techniques in terms of accuracy and the scanning time needed. The code of our work is available at https: //github. com/PurduePAML/K-ARM_Backdoor_Optimization

Details