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Shahin Jabbari

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12 papers

2 author rows

TMLR Journal 2026 Journal Article

Learning-Augmented Robust Algorithmic Recourse

Kshitij Kayastha
Vasilis Gkatzelis
Shahin Jabbari

Algorithmic recourse provides individuals who receive undesirable outcomes from machine learning systems with minimum-cost improvements to achieve a desirable outcome. However, machine learning models often get updated, so the recourse may not lead to the desired outcome. The robust recourse framework chooses recourses that are less sensitive to adversarial model changes, but this comes at a higher cost. To address this, we initiate the study of learning-augmented algorithmic recourse and evaluate the extent to which a designer equipped with a prediction of the future model can reduce the cost of recourse when the prediction is accurate (consistency) while also limiting the cost even when the prediction is inaccurate (robustness). We propose a novel algorithm, study the robustness-consistency trade-off, and analyze how prediction accuracy affects performance.

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TMLR Journal 2024 Journal Article

The Disagreement Problem in Explainable Machine Learning: A Practitioner’s Perspective

Satyapriya Krishna
Tessa Han
Alex Gu
Steven Wu
Shahin Jabbari
Himabindu Lakkaraju

As various post hoc explanation methods are increasingly being leveraged to explain complex models in high-stakes settings, it becomes critical to develop a deeper understanding of if and when the explanations output by these methods disagree with each other, and how such disagreements are resolved in practice. However, there is little to no research that provides answers to these critical questions. In this work, we introduce and study the disagreement problem in explainable machine learning. More specifically, we formalize the notion of disagreement between explanations, analyze how often such disagreements occur in practice, and how practitioners resolve these disagreements. We first conduct interviews with data scientists to understand what constitutes disagreement between explanations generated by different methods for the same model prediction and introduce a novel quantitative framework to formalize this understanding. We then leverage this framework to carry out a rigorous empirical analysis with four real-world datasets, six state-of-the-art post hoc explanation methods, and six different predictive models, to measure the extent of disagreement between the explanations generated by various popular explanation methods. In addition, we carry out an online user study with data scientists to understand how they resolve the aforementioned disagreements. Our results indicate that (1) state-of-the-art explanation methods often disagree in terms of the explanations they output, and (2) machine learning practitioners often employ ad hoc heuristics when resolving such disagreements. These findings suggest that practitioners may be relying on misleading explanations when making consequential decisions. They also underscore the importance of developing principled frameworks for effectively evaluating and comparing explanations output by various explanation techniques.

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UAI Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Solving structured hierarchical games using differential backward induction

Zun Li 0002
Feiran Jia
Aditya Mate
Shahin Jabbari
Mithun Chakraborty
Milind Tambe
Yevgeniy Vorobeychik

From large-scale organizations to decentralized political systems, hierarchical strategic decision making is commonplace. We introduce a novel class of structured hierarchical games (SHGs) that formally capture such hierarchical strategic interactions. In an SHG, each player is a node in a tree, and strategic choices of players are sequenced from root to leaves, with root moving first, followed by its children, then followed by their children, and so on until the leaves. A player’s utility in an SHG depends on its own decision, and on the choices of its parent and all the tree leaves. SHGs thus generalize simultaneous-move games, as well as Stackelberg games with many followers. We leverage the structure of both the sequence of player moves as well as payoff dependence to develop a gradient-based back propagation-style algorithm, which we call Differential Backward Induction (DBI), for approximating equilibria of SHGs. We provide a sufficient condition for convergence of DBI and demonstrate its efficacy in finding approximate equilibrium solutions to several SHG models of hierarchical policy-making problems.

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AAMAS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Active Screening for Recurrent Diseases: A Reinforcement Learning Approach

Han-Ching Ou
Haipeng Chen
Shahin Jabbari
Milind Tambe

Active screening is a common approach in controlling the spread of recurring infectious diseases such as tuberculosis and influenza. In this approach, health workers periodically select a subset of population for screening. However, given the limited number of health workers, only a small subset of the population can be visited in any given time period. Given the recurrent nature of the disease and rapid spreading, the goal is to minimize the number of infections over a long time horizon. Active screening can be formalized as a sequential combinatorial optimization over the network of people and their connections. The main computational challenges in this formalization arise from i) the combinatorial nature of the problem, ii) the need of sequential planning and iii) the uncertainties in the infectiousness states of the population. Previous works on active screening fail to scale to large time horizon while fully considering the future effect of current interventions. In this paper, we propose a novel reinforcement learning (RL) approach based on Deep Q-Networks (DQN), with several innovative adaptations that are designed to address the above challenges. First, we use graph convolutional networks (GCNs) to represent the Q-function that exploit the node correlations of the underlying contact network. Second, to avoid solving a combinatorial optimization problem in each time period, we decompose the node set selection as a sub-sequence of decisions, and further design a two-level RL framework that solves the problem in a hierarchical way. Finally, to speed-up the slow convergence of RL which arises from reward sparseness, we incorporate ideas from curriculum learning into our hierarchical RL approach. We evaluate our RL algorithm on several real-world networks. Results show that our RL algorithm can scale up to 10 times the problem size of state-of-the-art (the variant that considers the effect of future interventions but un-scalable) in terms of planning time horizon. Meanwhile, it outperforms state-of-theart (the variant that scales up but does not consider the effect of future interventions) by up to 33% in solution quality.

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AAAI Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Fair Influence Maximization: a Welfare Optimization Approach

Aida Rahmattalabi
Shahin Jabbari
Himabindu Lakkaraju
Phebe Vayanos
Max Izenberg
Ryan Brown
Eric Rice
Milind Tambe

Several behavioral, social, and public health interventions, such as suicide/HIV prevention or community preparedness against natural disasters, leverage social network information to maximize outreach. Algorithmic influence maximization techniques have been proposed to aid with the choice of “peer leaders” or “influencers” in such interventions. Yet, traditional algorithms for influence maximization have not been designed with these interventions in mind. As a result, they may disproportionately exclude minority communities from the benefits of the intervention. This has motivated research on fair influence maximization. Existing techniques come with two major drawbacks. First, they require committing to a single fairness measure. Second, these measures are typically imposed as strict constraints leading to undesirable properties such as wastage of resources. To address these shortcomings, we provide a principled characterization of the properties that a fair influence maximization algorithm should satisfy. In particular, we propose a framework based on social welfare theory, wherein the cardinal utilities derived by each community are aggregated using the isoelastic social welfare functions. Under this framework, the trade-off between fairness and efficiency can be controlled by a single inequality aversion design parameter. We then show under what circumstances our proposed principles can be satisfied by a welfare function. The resulting optimization problem is monotone and submodular and can be solved efficiently with optimality guarantees. Our framework encompasses as special cases leximin and proportional fairness. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real world datasets including a case study on landslide risk management demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed framework12

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ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Towards the Unification and Robustness of Perturbation and Gradient Based Explanations

Sushant Agarwal
Shahin Jabbari
Chirag Agarwal
Sohini Upadhyay
Zhiwei Steven Wu
Himabindu Lakkaraju

As machine learning black boxes are increasingly being deployed in critical domains such as healthcare and criminal justice, there has been a growing emphasis on developing techniques for explaining these black boxes in a post hoc manner. In this work, we analyze two popular post hoc interpretation techniques: SmoothGrad which is a gradient based method, and a variant of LIME which is a perturbation based method. More specifically, we derive explicit closed form expressions for the explanations output by these two methods and show that they both converge to the same explanation in expectation, i. e. , when the number of perturbed samples used by these methods is large. We then leverage this connection to establish other desirable properties, such as robustness, for these techniques. We also derive finite sample complexity bounds for the number of perturbations required for these methods to converge to their expected explanation. Finally, we empirically validate our theory using extensive experimentation on both synthetic and real-world datasets.

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IJCAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Equilibrium Characterization for Data Acquisition Games

Jinshuo Dong
Hadi Elzayn
Shahin Jabbari
Michael Kearns
Zachary Schutzman

We study a game between two firms which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their products. The firms can decide whether or not they want to buy the data, as well as which learning model to build on that data. We demonstrate a reduction from this potentially complicated action space to a one-shot, two-action game in which each firm only decides whether or not to buy the data. The game admits several regimes which depend on the relative strength of the two firms at the outset and the price at which the data is being offered. We analyze the game's Nash equilibria in all parameter regimes and demonstrate that, in expectation, the outcome of the game is that the initially stronger firm's market position weakens whereas the initially weaker firm's market position becomes stronger. Finally, we consider the perspective of the users of the service and demonstrate that the expected outcome at equilibrium is not the one which maximizes the welfare of the consumers.

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IJCAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Network Formation under Random Attack and Probabilistic Spread

Yu Chen
Shahin Jabbari
Michael Kearns
Sanjeev Khanna
Jamie Morgenstern

We study a network formation game where agents receive benefits by forming connections to other agents but also incur both direct and indirect costs from the formed connections. Specifically, once the agents have purchased their connections, an attack starts at a randomly chosen vertex in the network and spreads according to the independent cascade model with a fixed probability, destroying any infected agents. The utility or welfare of an agent in our game is defined to be the expected size of the agent's connected component post-attack minus her expenditure in forming connections. Our goal is to understand the properties of the equilibrium networks formed in this game. Our first result concerns the edge density of equilibrium networks. A network connection increases both the likelihood of remaining connected to other agents after an attack as well the likelihood of getting infected by a cascading spread of infection. We show that the latter concern primarily prevails and any equilibrium network in our game contains only $O(n\log n)$ edges where $n$ denotes the number of agents. On the other hand, there are equilibrium networks that contain $\Omega(n)$ edges showing that our edge density bound is tight up to a logarithmic factor. Our second result shows that the presence of attack and its spread through a cascade does not significantly lower social welfare as long as the network is not too dense. We show that any non-trivial equilibrium network with $O(n)$ edges has $\Theta(n^2)$ social welfare, asymptotically similar to the social welfare guarantee in the game without any attacks.

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ICML Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Fairness in Reinforcement Learning

Shahin Jabbari
Matthew Joseph
Michael J. Kearns
Jamie Morgenstern
Aaron Roth 0001

We initiate the study of fairness in reinforcement learning, where the actions of a learning algorithm may affect its environment and future rewards. Our fairness constraint requires that an algorithm never prefers one action over another if the long-term (discounted) reward of choosing the latter action is higher. Our first result is negative: despite the fact that fairness is consistent with the optimal policy, any learning algorithm satisfying fairness must take time exponential in the number of states to achieve non-trivial approximation to the optimal policy. We then provide a provably fair polynomial time algorithm under an approximate notion of fairness, thus establishing an exponential gap between exact and approximate fairness.

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RLDM Conference 2017 Conference Abstract

Fairness in Reinforcement Learning

Shahin Jabbari
Matthew Joseph
Michael Kearns
Jamie Morgenstern
Aaron Roth

We initiate the study of fair reinforcement learning, where the actions of a learning algorithm may affect its environment and future rewards. We define a fairness constraint requiring that an algorithm never prefers one action over another if the long-term (discounted) reward of choosing the latter action is higher. Our first result is negative: despite the fact that fairness is consistent with the optimal policy, any learning algorithm satisfying fairness must take exponentially many rounds in the number of states to achieve non-trivial approximation to the optimal policy. We then provide a provably fair polynomial time algorithm under an approximate notion of fairness, thus establishing an exponential gap between exact and approximate fairness.

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NeurIPS Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Learning from Rational Behavior: Predicting Solutions to Unknown Linear Programs

Shahin Jabbari
Ryan Rogers
Aaron Roth
Steven Wu

We define and study the problem of predicting the solution to a linear program (LP) given only partial information about its objective and constraints. This generalizes the problem of learning to predict the purchasing behavior of a rational agent who has an unknown objective function, that has been studied under the name “Learning from Revealed Preferences". We give mistake bound learning algorithms in two settings: in the first, the objective of the LP is known to the learner but there is an arbitrary, fixed set of constraints which are unknown. Each example is defined by an additional known constraint and the goal of the learner is to predict the optimal solution of the LP given the union of the known and unknown constraints. This models the problem of predicting the behavior of a rational agent whose goals are known, but whose resources are unknown. In the second setting, the objective of the LP is unknown, and changing in a controlled way. The constraints of the LP may also change every day, but are known. An example is given by a set of constraints and partial information about the objective, and the task of the learner is again to predict the optimal solution of the partially known LP.

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ICML Conference 2013 Conference Paper

Adaptive Task Assignment for Crowdsourced Classification

Chien-Ju Ho
Shahin Jabbari
Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Crowdsourcing markets have gained popularity as a tool for inexpensively collecting data from diverse populations of workers. Classification tasks, in which workers provide labels (such as “offensive” or “not offensive”) for instances (such as websites), are among the most common tasks posted, but due to a mix of human error and the overwhelming prevalence of spam, the labels collected are often noisy. This problem is typically addressed by collecting labels for each instance from multiple workers and combining them in a clever way. However, the question of how to choose which tasks to assign to each worker is often overlooked. We investigate the problem of task assignment and label inference for heterogeneous classification tasks. By applying online primal-dual techniques, we derive a provably near-optimal adaptive assignment algorithm. We show that adaptively assigning workers to tasks can lead to more accurate predictions at a lower cost when the available workers are diverse.

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