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Ronen Gradwohl

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

5 papers
2 author rows

Possible papers

5

NeurIPS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Fairness under Competition

  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Eilam Shapira
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

Algorithmic fairness has emerged as a central issue in ML, and it has become standard practice to adjust ML algorithms so that they will satisfy fairness requirements such as Equal Opportunity. In this paper we consider the effects of adopting such fair classifiers on the overall level of ecosystem fairness. Specifically, we introduce the study of fairness with competing firms, and demonstrate the failure of fair classifiers in yielding fair ecosystems. Our results quantify the loss of fairness in systems, under a variety of conditions, based on classifiers' correlation and the level of their data overlap. We show that even if competing classifiers are individually fair, the ecosystem's outcome may be unfair; and that adjusting biased algorithms to improve their individual fairness may lead to an overall decline in ecosystem fairness. In addition to these theoretical results, we also provide supporting experimental evidence. Together, our model and results provide a novel and essential call for action.

JAIR Journal 2023 Journal Article

Coopetition Against an Amazon

  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

This paper analyzes cooperative data-sharing between competitors vying to predict a consumer's tastes. We design optimal data-sharing schemes both for when they compete only with each other, and for when they additionally compete with an Amazon – a company with more, better data. We show that simple schemes – threshold rules that probabilistically induce either full data-sharing between competitors, or the full transfer of data from one competitor to another – are either optimal or approximately optimal, depending on properties of the information structure. We also provide conditions under which firms share more data when they face stronger outside competition, and describe situations in which this conclusion is reversed.

TARK Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Selling Data to a Competitor (Extended Abstract)

  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Moshe Tennenholtz

We study the costs and benefits of selling data to a competitor. Although selling all consumers' data may decrease total firm profits, there exist other selling mechanisms -- in which only some consumers' data is sold -- that render both firms better off. We identify the profit-maximizing mechanism, and show that the benefit to firms comes at a cost to consumers. We then construct Pareto-improving mechanisms, in which each consumers' welfare, as well as both firms' profits, increase. Finally, we show that consumer opt-in can serve as an instrument to induce firms to choose a Pareto-improving mechanism over a profit-maximizing one.

SODA Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Algorithms for Persuasion with Limited Communication

  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Niklas Hahn 0001
  • Martin Hoefer 0001
  • Rann Smorodinsky

The Bayesian persuasion paradigm of strategic communication models interaction between a privately-informed agent, called the sender, and an ignorant but rational agent, called the receiver. The goal is typically to design a (near-)optimal communication (or signaling ) scheme for the sender. It enables the sender to disclose information to the receiver in a way as to incentivize her to take an action that is preferred by the sender. Finding the optimal signaling scheme is known to be computationally difficult in general. This hardness is further exacerbated when there is also a constraint on the size of the message space, leading to NP-hardness of approximating the optimal sender utility within any constant factor. In this paper, we show that in several natural and prominent cases the optimization problem is tractable even when the message space is limited. In particular, we study signaling under a symmetry or an independence assumption on the distribution of utility values for the actions. For symmetric distributions, we provide a novel characterization of the optimal signaling scheme. It results in a polynomial-time algorithm to compute an optimal scheme for many compactly represented symmetric distributions. In the independent case, we design a constant-factor approximation algorithm, which stands in marked contrast to the hardness of approximation in the general case.

FOCS Conference 2010 Conference Paper

Sequential Rationality in Cryptographic Protocols

  • Ronen Gradwohl
  • Noam Livne
  • Alon Rosen

Much of the literature on rational cryptography focuses on analyzing the strategic properties of cryptographic protocols. However, due to the presence of computationally-bounded players and the asymptotic nature of cryptographic security, a definition of sequential rationality for this setting has thus far eluded researchers. We propose a new framework for overcoming these obstacles, and provide the first definitions of computational solution concepts that guarantee sequential rationality. We argue that natural computational variants of sub game perfection are too strong for cryptographic protocols. As an alternative, we introduce a weakening called threat-free Nash equilibrium that is more permissive but still eliminates the undesirable "empty threats'' of non-sequential solution concepts. To demonstrate the applicability of our framework, we revisit the problem of implementing a mediator for correlated equilibria (Dodis-Halevi-Rabin, Crypto'00), and propose a variant of their protocol that is sequentially rational for a non-trivial class of correlated equilibria. Our treatment provides a better understanding of the conditions under which mediators in a correlated equilibrium can be replaced by a stable protocol.

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