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Roei Schuster

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3 papers

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TMLR Journal 2025 Journal Article

Learned-Database Systems Security

Roei Schuster
Jin Peng Zhou
Thorsten Eisenhofer
Paul Grubbs
Nicolas Papernot

A learned database system uses machine learning (ML) internally to improve performance. We can expect such systems to be vulnerable to some adversarial-ML attacks. Often, the learned component is shared between mutually-distrusting users or processes, much like microarchitectural resources such as caches, potentially giving rise to highly-realistic attacker models. However, compared to attacks on other ML-based systems, attackers face a level of indirection as they cannot interact directly with the learned model. Additionally, the difference between the attack surface of learned and non-learned versions of the same system is often subtle. These factors obfuscate the de-facto risks that the incorporation of ML carries. We analyze the root causes of potentially-increased attack surface in learned database systems and develop a framework for identifying vulnerabilities that stem from the use of ML. We apply our framework to a broad set of learned components currently being explored in the database community. To empirically validate the vulnerabilities surfaced by our framework, we choose 3 of them and implement and evaluate exploits against these. We show that the use of ML cause leakage of past queries in a database, enable a poisoning attack that causes exponential memory blowup in an index structure and crashes it in seconds, and enable index users to snoop on each others' key distributions by timing queries over their own keys. We find that adversarial ML is an universal threat against learned components in database systems, point to open research gaps in our understanding of learned-systems security, and conclude by discussing mitigations, while noting that data leakage is inherent in systems whose learned component is shared between multiple parties.

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

In Differential Privacy, There is Truth: on Vote-Histogram Leakage in Ensemble Private Learning

Jiaqi Wang
Roei Schuster
I Shumailov
David Lie
Nicolas Papernot

When learning from sensitive data, care must be taken to ensure that training algorithms address privacy concerns. The canonical Private Aggregation of Teacher Ensembles, or PATE, computes output labels by aggregating the predictions of a (possibly distributed) collection of teacher models via a voting mechanism. The mechanism adds noise to attain a differential privacy guarantee with respect to the teachers' training data. In this work, we observe that this use of noise, which makes PATE predictions stochastic, enables new forms of leakage of sensitive information. For a given input, our adversary exploits this stochasticity to extract high-fidelity histograms of the votes submitted by the underlying teachers. From these histograms, the adversary can learn sensitive attributes of the input such as race, gender, or age. Although this attack does not directly violate the differential privacy guarantee, it clearly violates privacy norms and expectations, and would not be possible $\textit{at all}$ without the noise inserted to obtain differential privacy. In fact, counter-intuitively, the attack $\textbf{becomes easier as we add more noise}$ to provide stronger differential privacy. We hope this encourages future work to consider privacy holistically rather than treat differential privacy as a panacea.

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NeurIPS Conference 2020 Conference Paper

De-Anonymizing Text by Fingerprinting Language Generation

Zhen Sun
Roei Schuster
Vitaly Shmatikov

Components of machine learning systems are not (yet) perceived as security hotspots. Secure coding practices, such as ensuring that no execution paths depend on confidential inputs, have not yet been adopted by ML developers. We initiate the study of code security of ML systems by investigating how nucleus sampling---a popular approach for generating text, used for applications such as auto-completion---unwittingly leaks texts typed by users. Our main result is that the series of nucleus sizes for many natural English word sequences is a unique fingerprint. We then show how an attacker can infer typed text by measuring these fingerprints via a suitable side channel (e. g. , cache access times), explain how this attack could help de-anonymize anonymous texts, and discuss defenses.

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