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Rick Goldstein

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4 papers

2 author rows

IROS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Cooperative Schedule-Driven Intersection Control with Connected and Autonomous Vehicles

Hsu-Chieh Hu
Stephen F. Smith
Rick Goldstein

Recent work in decentralized, schedule-driven traffic control has demonstrated the ability to improve the efficiency of traffic flow in complex urban road networks. In this approach, a scheduling agent is associated with each intersection. Each agent senses the traffic approaching its intersection and in real-time constructs a schedule that minimizes the cumulative wait time of vehicles approaching the intersection over the current look-ahead horizon. In this paper, we propose a cooperative algorithm that utilizes both connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) and schedule-driven traffic control to create better traffic flow in the city. The algorithm enables an intersection scheduling agent to adjust the arrival time of an approaching platoon through use of wireless communication to control the velocity of vehicles. The sequence of approaching platoons is thus shifted toward a new shape that has smaller cumulative delay. We demonstrate how this algorithm outperforms the original approach in a real-time traffic signal control problem.

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AAAI Conference 2019 Short Paper

Expressive Real-Time Intersection Scheduling

Rick Goldstein

Traffic congestion is a widespread annoyance throughout global metropolitan areas. It causes increases in travel time, increases in emissions, inefficient usage of gasoline, and driver frustration. Inefficient signal patterns at traffic lights are one major cause of such congestion. Intersection scheduling strategies that make real-time decisions to extend or end a green signal based on real-time traffic data offer one opportunity reduce congestion and its negative impacts. My research proposes Expressive Real-time Intersection Scheduling (ERIS). ERIS is a decentralized, schedule-driven control method which makes a decision every second based on current traffic conditions to reduce congestion.

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AAAI Conference 2018 Conference Paper

Expressive Real-Time Intersection Scheduling

Rick Goldstein
Stephen Smith

We present Expressive Real-time Intersection Scheduling (ERIS), a schedule-driven control strategy for adaptive intersection control to reduce trafﬁc congestion. ERIS maintains separate estimates for each lane approaching a trafﬁc intersection allowing it to more accurately estimate the effects of scheduling decisions than previous schedule-driven approaches. We present a detailed description of the search space and A* search heuristic employed by ERIS to make scheduling decisions in real-time (every second). As a result of its increased expressiveness, ERIS outperforms a less expressive schedule-driven approach and a fully-actuated control method in a variety of simulated trafﬁc environments.

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AAAI Conference 2011 Conference Paper

Market Manipulation with Outside Incentives

Yiling Chen
Xi Gao
Rick Goldstein
Ian Kash

Much evidence has shown that prediction markets, when used in isolation, can effectively aggregate dispersed information about uncertain future events and produce remarkably accurate forecasts. However, if the market prediction will be used for decision making, a strategic participant with a vested interest in the decision outcome may want to manipulate the market prediction in order to inﬂuence the resulting decision. The presence of such incentives outside of the market would seem to damage information aggregation because of the potential distrust among market participants. While this is true under some conditions, we ﬁnd that, if the existence of such incentives is certain and common knowledge, then in many cases, there exists a separating equilibrium for the market where information is fully aggregated. This equilibrium also maximizes social welfare for convex outside payoff functions. At this equilibrium, the participant with outside incentives makes a costly move to gain the trust of other participants. When the existence of outside incentives is uncertain, however, trust cannot be established between players if the outside incentive is sufﬁciently large and we lose the separability in equilibrium.

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