TCS Journal 2026 Journal Article
Stability of peer-to-peer networks under greedy peering
- Lucianna Kiffer
- Rajmohan Rajaraman
Major cryptocurrency networks traditionally rely on random peering choices to establish connections in their peer-to-peer networks. While effective for open, permissionless systems, random peering does not account for actors who optimize connections to reduce propagation delays. This paper investigates the dynamics of such “greedy” strategies. We model nodes selecting peers to minimize their average distance to a designated subset of nodes, analyzing factors such as peer selection methods, degree constraints, and the size of the subset-a key aspect in blockchain networks where only a fraction of nodes propagate content or run high-performance hardware. We first analyze an idealized version of the game where each node has full knowledge of the current network and aims to select the d best connections, and prove the existence of equilibria under various model assumptions. Since in reality nodes only have local knowledge based on their peers’ behavior, we also study a greedy protocol which runs in rounds, with each node replacing its worst-performing edge with a new random edge. We exactly characterize stability properties of networks that evolve with this peering rule and derive regimes (based on number of nodes and degree) where stability is possible and even inevitable. We also run extensive simulations with this peering rule examining both how the network evolves and how different network parameters affect the stability properties of the network. Our findings generally show that the only stable networks that arise from greedy peering choices are low-diameter and result in disparate performance for nodes in the network.