Author name cluster

Paula Böhm

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3 papers

2 author rows

AAMAS Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Maximizing Index Diversity in Committee Elections

Paula Böhm
Robert Bredereck
Till Fluschnik

We introduce two models of multiwinner elections with approval preferences and labelled candidates that take the committee’s diversity into account. One model aims to find a committee with maximal diversity given a scoring function (e. g. of a scoring-based voting rule) and a lower bound for the score to be respected. The second model seeks to maximize the diversity given a minimal satisfaction for each agent to be respected. To measure the diversity of a committee, we use multiple diversity indices used in ecology and introduce one new index. We define (desirable) properties of diversity indices, test the indices considered against these properties, and characterize the new index. We analyze the computational complexity of computing a committee for both models and scoring functions of well-known voting rules, and investigate the influence of weakening the score or satisfaction constraints on the diversity empirically.

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AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Putting Fair Division on the Map

Paula Böhm
Robert Bredereck
Paul Gölz
Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
Stanisław Szufa

The fair division of indivisible goods is not only a subject of theoretical research, but also an important problem in practice, with solutions being offered on several online platforms. Little is known, however, about the characteristics of real-world allocation instances and how they compare to synthetic instances. Using dimensionality reduction, we compute a map of allocation instances: a 2-dimensional embedding such that an instance's location on the map is predictive of the instance's origin and other key instance features. Because the axes of this map closely align with the utility matrix's two largest singular values, we define a second, explicit map, which we theoretically characterize.

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ECAI Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Properties of Egalitarian Sequences of Committees: Theory and Experiments

Paula Böhm
Robert Bredereck
Till Fluschnik

We study the task of electing egalitarian sequences of τ committees given a set of agents with additive utilities for candidates available on each of τ levels. We introduce several rules for electing an egalitarian committee sequence as well as properties for such rules. We settle the computational complexity of finding a winning sequence for our rules and classify them against our properties. Additionally, we transform sequential election data from existing election data from the literature. Using this data set, we compare our rules empirically and test them experimentally against our properties.

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