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Patrick Becker

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AAMAS Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Efficiently Computing Equilibria in Budget-Aggregation Games

  • Patrick Becker
  • Alexander Fries
  • Matthias Greger
  • Erel Segal-Halevi

Budgetaggregationdealswiththesocialchoiceproblemofdistributing an exogenously given budget among a set of public projects, given agents’ preferences. Taking a game-theoretic perspective, we study budget-aggregation games where each agent has virtual decision power over some fraction of the budget. We investigate the structure and show efficient computability of Nash equilibria for various common preference models in this setting. In particular, we show that equilibria for Leontief utilities can be found in polynomial time, solving an open problem from Brandt et al. [15], and give an explicit polynomial-time algorithm for computing equilibria for ℓ1 preferences.

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AAMAS Conference 2026 Conference Paper

On Minimal Achievable Quotas in Multiwinner Voting

  • Patrick Becker
  • Fabian Frank

Justified representation (JR) and extended justified representation (EJR) are well-established proportionality axioms in approval-based multiwinner voting. Both axioms are always satisfiable, but they rely on a fixed quota (typically Hare or Droop), with the Droop quota being the smallest one that guarantees existence across all instances. With this in mind, we take a step beyond the fixed-quota paradigm by studying instance-dependent proportionality notions. More specifically, we minimize the quota requirements for JR and EJR using the parameter 𝛼. We demonstrate that all commonly studied voting rules can have an additive gap to the optimum of 𝑘2 (𝑘+1)2. Moreover, we examine the computational aspects of our instance-dependent quota and prove that determining the optimal valueof𝛼 foragivenapprovalprofilethatallowssomecommitteeto satisfy𝛼-JRisNP-complete. Toaddressthis, weintroduceaninteger linear programming (ILP) formulation for computing committees that satisfy 𝛼-JR, and we provide positive computational results in the voter interval (VI) and candidate interval (CI) domains.

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v2026.09.13