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Nir Vulkan

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KER Journal 2000 Journal Article

A multidisciplinary perspective on multi-agent systems

  • EDMUND CHATTOE
  • KERSTIN DAUTENHAHN
  • Ian Dickinson
  • Jim Doran
  • Nir Vulkan

The theory, principles and practice of multi-agent systems is typically characterised as a computational and engineering discipline, since it is through the medium of computational systems that artificial agent systems are most commonly expressed. However, most definitions of agency draw directly on non-computational disciplines for inspiration. During the 1999 UK workshop on multi-agent systems, UKMAS'99, we invited four speakers to address the conceptualisation of multi-agent systems from their perspective as non-computer scientists. This paper presents their arguments and summarises some of the key points of discussion during the panel.

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AAAI Conference 1999 Conference Paper

Bargaining with Deadlines

  • Tuomas Sandholm
  • Washington University
  • Nir Vulkan
  • University of Bristol

This paper analyzes automated distributive negotiation whereagents havefirm deadlines that are private information. The agents are allowed to makeand accept offers in any order in continuous time. Weshow that the only sequential equilibrium outcomeis one wherethe agents walt until the first deadline, at which point that agent concedeseverythingto the other. This holds for pure and mixedstrategies. So, interestingly, rational agents can never agree to a nontrivial split because offers signal enoughweaknessof bargaining power (early deadline) so that the recipient should never accept. Similarly, the offerer knowsthat it offered too much if the offer gets accepted: the offerer could have done better by out-waiting the opponent. In mostcases, the deadline effect completelyoverrides time discounting and risk aversion: an agent’s payoff does not changewith its discount factor or risk attitude. Several implications for the design of negotiating agents are discussed. Wealso present an effective protocol that implementsthe equilibrium outcomein dominantstrategies.

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