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Neil Newman

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

3 papers
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3

AIJ Journal 2024 Journal Article

Matching papers and reviewers at large conferences

  • Kevin Leyton-Brown
  • Mausam
  • Yatin Nandwani
  • Hedayat Zarkoob
  • Chris Cameron
  • Neil Newman
  • Dinesh Raghu

Peer-reviewed conferences, the main publication venues in CS, rely critically on matching highly qualified reviewers for each paper. Because of the growing scale of these conferences, the tight timelines on which they operate, and a recent surge in explicitly dishonest behavior, there is now no alternative to performing this matching in an automated way. This paper introduces Large Conference Matching (LCM), a novel reviewer–paper matching approach that was recently deployed in the 35th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI 2021), and has since been adopted (wholly or partially) by other conferences including ICML 2022, AAAI 2022-2024, and IJCAI 2022-2024. LCM has three main elements: (1) collecting and processing input data to identify problematic matches and generate reviewer–paper scores; (2) formulating and solving an optimization problem to find good reviewer–paper matchings; and (3) a two-phase reviewing process that shifts reviewing resources away from papers likely to be rejected and towards papers closer to the decision boundary. This paper also describes an evaluation of these innovations based on an extensive post-hoc analysis on real data—including a comparison with the matching algorithm used in AAAI's previous (2020) iteration—and supplements this with additional numerical experimentation. 2

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

The Positronic Economist: A Computational System for Analyzing Economic Mechanisms

  • David Thompson
  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Computational mechanism analysis is a recent approach to economic analysis in which a mechanism design setting is analyzed entirely by a computer. For games with non-trivial numbers of players and actions, the approach is only feasible when these games can be encoded compactly, e. g. , as Action-Graph Games. Such encoding is currently a manual process requiring expert knowledge; our aim is to simplify and automate it. Our contribution, the Positronic Economist is a software system having two parts: (1) a Python-based language for succinctly describing mechanisms; and (2) a system that takes such descriptions as input, automatically identifies computationally useful structure, and produces a compact Action-Graph Game.

AAAI Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Solving the Station Repacking Problem

  • Alexandre Fréchette
  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

We investigate the problem of repacking stations in the FCC’s upcoming, multi-billion-dollar “incentive auction”. Early efforts to solve this problem considered mixed-integer programming formulations, which we show are unable to reliably solve realistic, national-scale problem instances. We describe the result of a multi-year investigation of alternatives: a solver, SATFC, that has been adopted by the FCC for use in the incentive auction. SATFC is based on a SAT encoding paired with a wide range of techniques: constraint graph decomposition; novel caching mechanisms that allow for reuse of partial solutions from related, solved problems; algorithm configuration; algorithm portfolios; and the marriage of local-search and complete solver strategies. We show that our approach solves virtually all of a set of problems derived from auction simulations within the short time budget required in practice.

v2026.09.13