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Neil Newman

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

3 papers
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3

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

The Positronic Economist: A Computational System for Analyzing Economic Mechanisms

  • David Thompson
  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

Computational mechanism analysis is a recent approach to economic analysis in which a mechanism design setting is analyzed entirely by a computer. For games with non-trivial numbers of players and actions, the approach is only feasible when these games can be encoded compactly, e. g. , as Action-Graph Games. Such encoding is currently a manual process requiring expert knowledge; our aim is to simplify and automate it. Our contribution, the Positronic Economist is a software system having two parts: (1) a Python-based language for succinctly describing mechanisms; and (2) a system that takes such descriptions as input, automatically identifies computationally useful structure, and produces a compact Action-Graph Game.

AAAI Conference 2016 Conference Paper

Solving the Station Repacking Problem

  • Alexandre Fréchette
  • Neil Newman
  • Kevin Leyton-Brown

We investigate the problem of repacking stations in the FCC’s upcoming, multi-billion-dollar “incentive auction”. Early efforts to solve this problem considered mixed-integer programming formulations, which we show are unable to reliably solve realistic, national-scale problem instances. We describe the result of a multi-year investigation of alternatives: a solver, SATFC, that has been adopted by the FCC for use in the incentive auction. SATFC is based on a SAT encoding paired with a wide range of techniques: constraint graph decomposition; novel caching mechanisms that allow for reuse of partial solutions from related, solved problems; algorithm configuration; algorithm portfolios; and the marriage of local-search and complete solver strategies. We show that our approach solves virtually all of a set of problems derived from auction simulations within the short time budget required in practice.