Author name cluster

Michael D. Dennis

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

11 papers

1 author row

ICLR Conference 2025 Conference Paper

BAMDP Shaping: a Unified Framework for Intrinsic Motivation and Reward Shaping

Aly Lidayan
Michael D. Dennis
Stuart Russell 0001

Intrinsic motivation and reward shaping guide reinforcement learning (RL) agents by adding pseudo-rewards, which can lead to useful emergent behaviors. However, they can also encourage counterproductive exploits, e.g., fixation with noisy TV screens. Here we provide a theoretical model which anticipates these behaviors, and provides broad criteria under which adverse effects can be bounded. We characterize all pseudo-rewards as reward shaping in Bayes-Adaptive Markov Decision Processes (BAMDPs), which formulates the problem of learning in MDPs as an MDP over the agent's knowledge. Optimal exploration maximizes BAMDP state value, which we decompose into the value of the information gathered and the prior value of the physical state. Psuedo-rewards guide RL agents by rewarding behavior that increases these value components, while they hinder exploration when they align poorly with the actual value. We extend potential-based shaping theory to prove BAMDP Potential-based shaping Functions (BAMPFs) are immune to reward-hacking (convergence to behaviors maximizing composite rewards to the detriment of real rewards) in meta-RL, and show empirically how a BAMPF helps a meta-RL agent learn optimal RL algorithms for a Bernoulli Bandit domain. We finally prove that BAMPFs with bounded monotone increasing potentials also resist reward-hacking in the regular RL setting. We show that it is straightforward to retrofit or design new pseudo-reward terms in this form, and provide an empirical demonstration in the Mountain Car environment.

Details

ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Genie: Generative Interactive Environments

Jake Bruce
Michael D. Dennis
Ashley Edwards
Jack Parker-Holder
Yuge Shi
Edward Hughes 0001
Matthew Lai
Aditi Mavalankar

We introduce Genie, the first generative interactive environment trained in an unsupervised manner from unlabelled Internet videos. The model can be prompted to generate an endless variety of action-controllable virtual worlds described through text, synthetic images, photographs, and even sketches. At 11B parameters, Genie can be considered a foundation world model. It is comprised of a spatiotemporal video tokenizer, an autoregressive dynamics model, and a simple and scalable latent action model. Genie enables users to act in the generated environments on a frame-by-frame basis despite training without any ground-truth action labels or other domain specific requirements typically found in the world model literature. Further the resulting learned latent action space facilitates training agents to imitate behaviors from unseen videos, opening the path for training generalist agents of the future.

Details

ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Position: Open-Endedness is Essential for Artificial Superhuman Intelligence

Edward Hughes 0001
Michael D. Dennis
Jack Parker-Holder
Feryal M. P. Behbahani
Aditi Mavalankar
Yuge Shi
Tom Schaul
Tim Rocktäschel

In recent years there has been a tremendous surge in the general capabilities of AI systems, mainly fuelled by training foundation models on internet-scale data. Nevertheless, the creation of open-ended, ever self-improving AI remains elusive. In this position paper, we argue that the ingredients are now in place to achieve open-endedness in AI systems with respect to a human observer. Furthermore, we claim that such open-endedness is an essential property of any artificial superhuman intelligence (ASI). We begin by providing a concrete formal definition of open-endedness through the lens of novelty and learnability. We then illustrate a path towards ASI via open-ended systems built on top of foundation models, capable of making novel, human-relevant discoveries. We conclude by examining the safety implications of generally-capable open-ended AI. We expect that open-ended foundation models will prove to be an increasingly fertile and safety-critical area of research in the near future.

Details

ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Refining Minimax Regret for Unsupervised Environment Design

Michael Beukman
Samuel Coward
Michael T. Matthews
Mattie Fellows
Minqi Jiang
Michael D. Dennis
Jakob N. Foerster

In unsupervised environment design, reinforcement learning agents are trained on environment configurations (levels) generated by an adversary that maximises some objective. Regret is a commonly used objective that theoretically results in a minimax regret (MMR) policy with desirable robustness guarantees; in particular, the agent’s maximum regret is bounded. However, once the agent reaches this regret bound on all levels, the adversary will only sample levels where regret cannot be further reduced. Although there may be possible performance improvements to be made outside of these regret-maximising levels, learning stagnates. In this work, we introduce Bayesian level-perfect MMR (BLP), a refinement of the minimax regret objective that overcomes this limitation. We formally show that solving for this objective results in a subset of MMR policies, and that BLP policies act consistently with a Perfect Bayesian policy over all levels. We further introduce an algorithm, ReMiDi, that results in a BLP policy at convergence. We empirically demonstrate that training on levels from a minimax regret adversary causes learning to prematurely stagnate, but that ReMiDi continues learning.

Details

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Adversarial Policies Beat Superhuman Go AIs

Tony Tong Wang
Adam Gleave
Tom Tseng
Kellin Pelrine
Nora Belrose
Joseph Miller
Michael D. Dennis
Yawen Duan

We attack the state-of-the-art Go-playing AI system KataGo by training adversarial policies against it, achieving a $>$97% win rate against KataGo running at superhuman settings. Our adversaries do not win by playing Go well. Instead, they trick KataGo into making serious blunders. Our attack transfers zero-shot to other superhuman Go-playing AIs, and is comprehensible to the extent that human experts can implement it without algorithmic assistance to consistently beat superhuman AIs. The core vulnerability uncovered by our attack persists even in KataGo agents adversarially trained to defend against our attack. Our results demonstrate that even superhuman AI systems may harbor surprising failure modes. Example games are available https: //goattack. far. ai/.

Details

ICLR Conference 2023 Conference Paper

MAESTRO: Open-Ended Environment Design for Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning

Mikayel Samvelyan
Akbir Khan
Michael D. Dennis
Minqi Jiang
Jack Parker-Holder
Jakob N. Foerster
Roberta Raileanu
Tim Rocktäschel

Open-ended learning methods that automatically generate a curriculum of increasingly challenging tasks serve as a promising avenue toward generally capable reinforcement learning agents. Existing methods adapt curricula independently over either environment parameters (in single-agent settings) or co-player policies (in multi-agent settings). However, the strengths and weaknesses of co-players can manifest themselves differently depending on environmental features. It is thus crucial to consider the dependency between the environment and co-player when shaping a curriculum in multi-agent domains. In this work, we use this insight and extend Unsupervised Environment Design (UED) to multi-agent environments. We then introduce Multi-Agent Environment Design Strategist for Open-Ended Learning (MAESTRO), the first multi-agent UED approach for two-player zero-sum settings. MAESTRO efficiently produces adversarial, joint curricula over both environments and co-players and attains minimax-regret guarantees at Nash equilibrium. Our experiments show that MAESTRO outperforms a number of strong baselines on competitive two-player games, spanning discrete and continuous control settings.

Details

ICML Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Who Needs to Know? Minimal Knowledge for Optimal Coordination

Niklas Lauffer
Ameesh Shah
Micah Carroll
Michael D. Dennis
Stuart Russell 0001

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one’s collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https: //minknowledge. github. io.

Details

ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Evolving Curricula with Regret-Based Environment Design

Jack Parker-Holder
Minqi Jiang
Michael D. Dennis
Mikayel Samvelyan
Jakob N. Foerster
Edward Grefenstette
Tim Rocktäschel

Training generally-capable agents with reinforcement learning (RL) remains a significant challenge. A promising avenue for improving the robustness of RL agents is through the use of curricula. One such class of methods frames environment design as a game between a student and a teacher, using regret-based objectives to produce environment instantiations (or levels) at the frontier of the student agent’s capabilities. These methods benefit from theoretical robustness guarantees at equilibrium, yet they often struggle to find effective levels in challenging design spaces in practice. By contrast, evolutionary approaches incrementally alter environment complexity, resulting in potentially open-ended learning, but often rely on domain-specific heuristics and vast amounts of computational resources. This work proposes harnessing the power of evolution in a principled, regret-based curriculum. Our approach, which we call Adversarially Compounding Complexity by Editing Levels (ACCEL), seeks to constantly produce levels at the frontier of an agent’s capabilities, resulting in curricula that start simple but become increasingly complex. ACCEL maintains the theoretical benefits of prior regret-based methods, while providing significant empirical gains in a diverse set of environments. An interactive version of this paper is available at https: //accelagent. github. io.

Details

ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

A New Formalism, Method and Open Issues for Zero-Shot Coordination

Johannes Treutlein
Michael D. Dennis
Caspar Oesterheld
Jakob N. Foerster

In many coordination problems, independently reasoning humans are able to discover mutually compatible policies. In contrast, independently trained self-play policies are often mutually incompatible. Zero-shot coordination (ZSC) has recently been proposed as a new frontier in multi-agent reinforcement learning to address this fundamental issue. Prior work approaches the ZSC problem by assuming players can agree on a shared learning algorithm but not on labels for actions and observations, and proposes other-play as an optimal solution. However, until now, this “label-free” problem has only been informally defined. We formalize this setting as the label-free coordination (LFC) problem by defining the label-free coordination game. We show that other-play is not an optimal solution to the LFC problem as it fails to consistently break ties between incompatible maximizers of the other-play objective. We introduce an extension of the algorithm, other-play with tie-breaking, and prove that it is optimal in the LFC problem and an equilibrium in the LFC game. Since arbitrary tie-breaking is precisely what the ZSC setting aims to prevent, we conclude that the LFC problem does not reflect the aims of ZSC. To address this, we introduce an alternative informal operationalization of ZSC as a starting point for future work.

Details

ICLR Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Quantifying Differences in Reward Functions

Adam Gleave
Michael D. Dennis
Shane Legg
Stuart Russell 0001
Jan Leike

For many tasks, the reward function is inaccessible to introspection or too complex to be specified procedurally, and must instead be learned from user data. Prior work has evaluated learned reward functions by evaluating policies optimized for the learned reward. However, this method cannot distinguish between the learned reward function failing to reflect user preferences and the policy optimization process failing to optimize the learned reward. Moreover, this method can only tell us about behavior in the evaluation environment, but the reward may incentivize very different behavior in even a slightly different deployment environment. To address these problems, we introduce the Equivalent-Policy Invariant Comparison (EPIC) distance to quantify the difference between two reward functions directly, without a policy optimization step. We prove EPIC is invariant on an equivalence class of reward functions that always induce the same optimal policy. Furthermore, we find EPIC can be efficiently approximated and is more robust than baselines to the choice of coverage distribution. Finally, we show that EPIC distance bounds the regret of optimal policies even under different transition dynamics, and we confirm empirically that it predicts policy training success. Our source code is available at https://github.com/HumanCompatibleAI/evaluating-rewards.

Details

ICLR Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Adversarial Policies: Attacking Deep Reinforcement Learning

Adam Gleave
Michael D. Dennis
Cody Wild
Neel Kant
Sergey Levine
Stuart Russell 0001

Deep reinforcement learning (RL) policies are known to be vulnerable to adversarial perturbations to their observations, similar to adversarial examples for classifiers. However, an attacker is not usually able to directly modify another agent's observations. This might lead one to wonder: is it possible to attack an RL agent simply by choosing an adversarial policy acting in a multi-agent environment so as to create natural observations that are adversarial? We demonstrate the existence of adversarial policies in zero-sum games between simulated humanoid robots with proprioceptive observations, against state-of-the-art victims trained via self-play to be robust to opponents. The adversarial policies reliably win against the victims but generate seemingly random and uncoordinated behavior. We find that these policies are more successful in high-dimensional environments, and induce substantially different activations in the victim policy network than when the victim plays against a normal opponent. Videos are available at https://adversarialpolicies.github.io/.

Details