AAMAS Conference 2026 Conference Paper
Approximating Nash Equilibria in General-Sum Games via Meta-Learning
- David Sychrovský
- Christopher Solinas
- Revan MacQueen
- Kevin Wang
- James R. Wright
- Nathan R. Sturtevant
- Michael Bowling
Nash equilibrium is perhaps the best-known solution concept in game theory. Such a solution assigns a strategy to each player which offers no incentive to unilaterally deviate. While a Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to always exist, the problem of finding one in general-sum games is PPAD-complete, generally considered intractable. Regret minimization is an efficient framework for approximatingNashequilibriaintwo-playerzero-sumgames. However, in general-sum games, such algorithms are only guaranteed to converge to a coarse-correlated equilibrium (CCE), a solution concept where players can correlate their strategies. In this work, we use meta-learning to minimize the correlations in strategies produced by a regret minimizer. This encourages the regret minimizer to find strategies that are closer to a Nash equilibrium. The meta-learned regret minimizer is still guaranteed to converge to a CCE, but we give a bound on the distance to Nash equilibrium in terms of our meta-loss. We evaluate our approach in general-sum imperfect information games. Our algorithms provide significantly betterapproximationsofNashequilibriathanstate-of-the-artregret minimization techniques.