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Meena Jagadeesan

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11 papers

2 author rows

TMLR Journal 2025 Journal Article

Accounting for AI and Users Shaping One Another: The Role of Mathematical Models

Sarah Dean
Evan Dong
Meena Jagadeesan
Liu Leqi

As AI systems enter into a growing number of societal domains, these systems increasingly shape and are shaped by user preferences, opinions, and behaviors. However, the design of AI systems only sometimes accounts for how AI and users shape one another. In this survey paper, we discuss the development of formal interaction models which mathematically specify how AI and users shape one another. Formal interaction models can be leveraged to (1) specify interactions for implementation, (2) monitor interactions through empirical analysis, (3) anticipate societal impacts via counterfactual analysis, and (4) control societal impacts via interventions. The design space of formal interaction models is vast, and model design requires careful consideration of factors such as style, granularity, mathematical complexity, and measurability. Using content recommender systems as a case study, we critically examine the nascent literature of formal interaction models with respect to these use-cases and design axes. More broadly, we call for the community to leverage formal interaction models when designing, evaluating, or auditing any AI system which interacts with users.

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ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Feedback Loops With Language Models Drive In-Context Reward Hacking

Alexander Pan
Erik Jones
Meena Jagadeesan
Jacob Steinhardt

Language models influence the external world: they query APIs that read and write to web pages, generate content that shapes human behavior, and run system commands as autonomous agents. These interactions form feedback loops: LLM outputs affect the world, which in turn affect subsequent LLM outputs. In this work, we show that feedback loops can cause in-context reward hacking (ICRH), where the LLM at test-time optimizes a (potentially implicit) objective but creates negative side effects in the process. For example, consider an LLM agent deployed to increase Twitter engagement; the LLM may retrieve its previous tweets into the context window and make them more controversial, increasing engagement but also toxicity. We identify and study two processes that lead to ICRH: output-refinement and policy-refinement. For these processes, evaluations on static datasets are insufficient—they miss the feedback effects and thus cannot capture the most harmful behavior. In response, we provide three recommendations for evaluation to capture more instances of ICRH. As AI development accelerates, the effects of feedback loops will proliferate, increasing the need to understand their role in shaping LLM behavior.

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ICML Conference 2024 Conference Paper

Impact of Decentralized Learning on Player Utilities in Stackelberg Games

Kate Donahue
Nicole Immorlica
Meena Jagadeesan
Brendan Lucier
Aleksandrs Slivkins

When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the rewards of the two agents are not perfectly aligned. To better understand such cases, we examine the learning dynamics of the two-agent system and the implications for each agent’s objective. We model these systems as Stackelberg games with decentralized learning and show that standard regret benchmarks (such as Stackelberg equilibrium payoffs) result in worst-case linear regret for at least one player. To better capture these systems, we construct a relaxed regret benchmark that is tolerant to small learning errors by agents. We show that standard learning algorithms fail to provide sublinear regret, and we develop algorithms to achieve near-optimal $\mathcal{O}(T^{2/3})$ regret for both players with respect to these benchmarks. We further design relaxed environments under which faster learning ($\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$) is possible. Altogether, our results take a step towards assessing how two-agent interactions in sequential and decentralized learning environments affect the utility of both agents.

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AAAI Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Competition, Alignment, and Equilibria in Digital Marketplaces

Meena Jagadeesan
Michael I. Jordan
Nika Haghtalab

Competition between traditional platforms is known to improve user utility by aligning the platform's actions with user preferences. But to what extent is alignment exhibited in data-driven marketplaces? To study this question from a theoretical perspective, we introduce a duopoly market where platform actions are bandit algorithms and the two platforms compete for user participation. A salient feature of this market is that the quality of recommendations depends on both the bandit algorithm and the amount of data provided by interactions from users. This interdependency between the algorithm performance and the actions of users complicates the structure of market equilibria and their quality in terms of user utility. Our main finding is that competition in this market does not perfectly align market outcomes with user utility. Interestingly, market outcomes exhibit misalignment not only when the platforms have separate data repositories, but also when the platforms have a shared data repository. Nonetheless, the data sharing assumptions impact what mechanism drives misalignment and also affect the specific form of misalignment (e.g. the quality of the best-case and worst-case market outcomes). More broadly, our work illustrates that competition in digital marketplaces has subtle consequences for user utility that merit further investigation.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Improved Bayes Risk Can Yield Reduced Social Welfare Under Competition

Meena Jagadeesan
Michael Jordan
Jacob Steinhardt
Nika Haghtalab

As the scale of machine learning models increases, trends such as scaling laws anticipate consistent downstream improvements in predictive accuracy. However, these trends take the perspective of a single model-provider in isolation, while in reality providers often compete with each other for users. In this work, we demonstrate that competition can fundamentally alter the behavior of these scaling trends, even causing overall predictive accuracy across users to be non-monotonic or decreasing with scale. We define a model of competition for classification tasks, and use data representations as a lens for studying the impact of increases in scale. We find many settings where improving data representation quality (as measured by Bayes risk) decreases the overall predictive accuracy across users (i. e. , social welfare) for a marketplace of competing model-providers. Our examples range from closed-form formulas in simple settings to simulations with pretrained representations on CIFAR-10. At a conceptual level, our work suggests that favorable scaling trends for individual model-providers need not translate to downstream improvements in social welfare in marketplaces with multiple model providers.

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NeurIPS Conference 2023 Conference Paper

Supply-Side Equilibria in Recommender Systems

Meena Jagadeesan
Nikhil Garg
Jacob Steinhardt

Algorithmic recommender systems such as Spotify and Netflix affect not only consumer behavior but also producer incentives. Producers seek to create content that will be shown by the recommendation algorithm, which can impact both the diversity and quality of their content. In this work, we investigate the resulting supply-side equilibria in personalized content recommender systems. We model the decisions of producers as choosing multi-dimensional content vectors and users as having heterogenous preferences, which contrasts with classical low-dimensional models. Multi-dimensionality and heterogeneity creates the potential for specialization, where different producers create different types of content at equilibrium. Using a duality argument, we derive necessary and sufficient conditions for whether specialization occurs. Then, we characterize the distribution of content at equilibrium in concrete settings with two populations of users. Lastly, we show that specialization can enable producers to achieve positive profit at equilibrium, which means that specialization can reduce the competitiveness of the marketplace. At a conceptual level, our analysis of supply-side competition takes a step towards elucidating how personalized recommendations shape the marketplace of digital goods.

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NeurIPS Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Performative Power

Moritz Hardt
Meena Jagadeesan
Celestine Mendler-Dünner

We introduce the notion of performative power, which measures the ability of a firm operating an algorithmic system, such as a digital content recommendation platform, to cause change in a population of participants. We relate performative power to the economic study of competition in digital economies. Traditional economic concepts struggle with identifying anti-competitive patterns in digital platforms not least due to the complexity of market definition. In contrast, performative power is a causal notion that is identifiable with minimal knowledge of the market, its internals, participants, products, or prices. Low performative power implies that a firm can do no better than to optimize their objective on current data. In contrast, firms of high performative power stand to benefit from steering the population towards more profitable behavior. We confirm in a simple theoretical model that monopolies maximize performative power. A firm's ability to personalize increases performative power, while competition and outside options decrease performative power. On the empirical side, we propose an observational causal design to identify performative power from discontinuities in how digital platforms display content. This allows to repurpose causal effects from various studies about digital platforms as lower bounds on performative power. Finally, we speculate about the role that performative power might play in competition policy and antitrust enforcement in digital marketplaces.

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ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Regret Minimization with Performative Feedback

Meena Jagadeesan
Tijana Zrnic
Celestine Dünner

In performative prediction, the deployment of a predictive model triggers a shift in the data distribution. As these shifts are typically unknown ahead of time, the learner needs to deploy a model to get feedback about the distribution it induces. We study the problem of finding near-optimal models under performativity while maintaining low regret. On the surface, this problem might seem equivalent to a bandit problem. However, it exhibits a fundamentally richer feedback structure that we refer to as performative feedback: after every deployment, the learner receives samples from the shifted distribution rather than bandit feedback about the reward. Our main contribution is regret bounds that scale only with the complexity of the distribution shifts and not that of the reward function. The key algorithmic idea is careful exploration of the distribution shifts that informs a novel construction of confidence bounds on the risk of unexplored models. The construction only relies on smoothness of the shifts and does not assume convexity. More broadly, our work establishes a conceptual approach for leveraging tools from the bandits literature for the purpose of regret minimization with performative feedback.

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ICML Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Alternative Microfoundations for Strategic Classification

Meena Jagadeesan
Celestine Dünner
Moritz Hardt

When reasoning about strategic behavior in a machine learning context it is tempting to combine standard microfoundations of rational agents with the statistical decision theory underlying classification. In this work, we argue that a direct combination of these ingredients leads to brittle solution concepts of limited descriptive and prescriptive value. First, we show that rational agents with perfect information produce discontinuities in the aggregate response to a decision rule that we often do not observe empirically. Second, when any positive fraction of agents is not perfectly strategic, desirable stable points—where the classifier is optimal for the data it entails—no longer exist. Third, optimal decision rules under standard microfoundations maximize a measure of negative externality known as social burden within a broad class of assumptions about agent behavior. Recognizing these limitations we explore alternatives to standard microfoundations for binary classification. We describe desiderata that help navigate the space of possible assumptions about agent responses, and we then propose the noisy response model. Inspired by smoothed analysis and empirical observations, noisy response incorporates imperfection in the agent responses, which we show mitigates the limitations of standard microfoundations. Our model retains analytical tractability, leads to more robust insights about stable points, and imposes a lower social burden at optimality.

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NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Learning Equilibria in Matching Markets from Bandit Feedback

Meena Jagadeesan
Alexander Wei
Yixin Wang
Michael Jordan
Jacob Steinhardt

Large-scale, two-sided matching platforms must find market outcomes that align with user preferences while simultaneously learning these preferences from data. But since preferences are inherently uncertain during learning, the classical notion of stability (Gale and Shapley, 1962; Shapley and Shubik, 1971) is unattainable in these settings. To bridge this gap, we develop a framework and algorithms for learning stable market outcomes under uncertainty. Our primary setting is matching with transferable utilities, where the platform both matches agents and sets monetary transfers between them. We design an incentive-aware learning objective that captures the distance of a market outcome from equilibrium. Using this objective, we analyze the complexity of learning as a function of preference structure, casting learning as a stochastic multi-armed bandit problem. Algorithmically, we show that "optimism in the face of uncertainty, " the principle underlying many bandit algorithms, applies to a primal-dual formulation of matching with transfers and leads to near-optimal regret bounds. Our work takes a first step toward elucidating when and how stable matchings arise in large, data-driven marketplaces.

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NeurIPS Conference 2019 Conference Paper

Understanding Sparse JL for Feature Hashing

Meena Jagadeesan

Feature hashing and other random projection schemes are commonly used to reduce the dimensionality of feature vectors. The goal is to efficiently project a high-dimensional feature vector living in R^n into a much lower-dimensional space R^m, while approximately preserving Euclidean norm. These schemes can be constructed using sparse random projections, for example using a sparse Johnson-Lindenstrauss (JL) transform. A line of work introduced by Weinberger et. al (ICML '09) analyzes the accuracy of sparse JL with sparsity 1 on feature vectors with small l infinity-to-l 2 norm ratio. Recently, Freksen, Kamma, and Larsen (NeurIPS '18) closed this line of work by proving a tight tradeoff between l infinity-to-l 2 norm ratio and accuracy for sparse JL with sparsity 1. In this paper, we demonstrate the benefits of using sparsity s greater than 1 in sparse JL on feature vectors. Our main result is a tight tradeoff between l infinity-to-l 2 norm ratio and accuracy for a general sparsity s, that significantly generalizes the result of Freksen et. al. Our result theoretically demonstrates that sparse JL with s > 1 can have significantly better norm-preservation properties on feature vectors than sparse JL with s = 1; we also empirically demonstrate this finding.

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