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Manoj Prabhakaran 0001

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

8 papers
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8

STOC Conference 2014 Conference Paper

Circuits resilient to additive attacks with applications to secure computation

  • Daniel Genkin
  • Yuval Ishai
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Amit Sahai
  • Eran Tromer

We study the question of protecting arithmetic circuits against additive attacks, which can add an arbitrary fixed value to each wire in the circuit. This extends the notion of algebraic manipulation detection (AMD) codes, which protect information against additive attacks, to that of AMD circuits which protect computation . We present a construction of such AMD circuits: any arithmetic circuit C over a finite field F can be converted into a functionally-equivalent randomized arithmetic circuit • C of size O (| C |) that is fault-tolerant in the following sense. For any additive attack on the wires of C , its effect on the output of C can be simulated, up to O (| C |/|F|) statistical distance, by an additive attack on just the input and output. Given a small tamper-proof encoder/decoder for AMD codes, the input and output can be protected as well. We also give an alternative construction, applicable to small fields (for example, to protect Boolean circuits against wire-toggling attacks). It uses a small tamper-proof decoder to ensure that, except with negligible failure probability, either the output is correct or tampering is detected. Our study of AMD circuits is motivated by simplifying and improving protocols for secure multiparty computation (MPC). Typically, securing MPC protocols against active adversaries is much more difficult than securing them against passive adversaries. We observe that in simple passive-secure MPC protocols for circuit evaluation, the effect of any active adversary corresponds precisely to an additive attack on the original circuit's wires. Thus, to securely evaluate a circuit C in the presence of active adversaries, it suffices to apply the passive-secure protocol to C . We use this methodology to simplify feasibility results and attain efficiency improvements in several standard MPC models.

FOCS Conference 2010 Conference Paper

On the Computational Complexity of Coin Flipping

  • Hemanta K. Maji
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Amit Sahai

Coin flipping is one of the most fundamental tasks in cryptographic protocol design. Informally, a coin flipping protocol should guarantee both (1) Completeness: an honest execution of the protocol by both parties results in a fair coin toss, and (2) Security: a cheating party cannot increase the probability of its desired outcome by any significant amount. Since its introduction by Blum, coin flipping has occupied a central place in the theory of cryptographic protocols. In this paper, we explore what are the implications of the existence of secure coin flipping protocols for complexity theory. As exposited recently by Impagliazzo, surprisingly little is known about this question. Previous work has shown that if we interpret the Security property of coin flipping protocols very strongly, namely that nothing beyond a negligible bias by cheating parties is allowed, then one-way functions must exist. However, for even a slight weakening of this security property (for example that cheating parties cannot bias the outcome by any additive constant ε > 0), the only complexity-theoretic implication that was known was that PSPACE ⊈ BPP. We put forward a new attack to establish our main result, which shows that, informally speaking, the existence of any (weak) coin flipping protocol that prevents a cheating adversary from biasing the output by more than 1/4 - ε implies that NP ⊈ BPP. Furthermore, for constant-round protocols, we show that the existence of any (weak) coin flipping protocol that allows an honest party to maintain any noticeable chance of prevailing against a cheating party implies the existence of (infinitely often) one-way functions.

FOCS Conference 2006 Conference Paper

Concurrent Non-Malleable Zero Knowledge

  • Boaz Barak
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Amit Sahai

We provide the first construction of a concurrent and non-malleable zero knowledge argument for every language in NP. We stress that our construction is in the plain model with no common random string, trusted parties, or super-polynomial simulation. That is, we construct a zero knowledge protocol Pi such that for every polynomial-time adversary that can adaptively and concurrently schedule polynomially many executions of Pi, and corrupt some of the verifiers and some of the provers in these sessions, there is a polynomial-time simulator that can simulate a transcript of the entire execution, along with the witnesses for all statements proven by a corrupt prover to an honest verifier Our security model is the traditional model for concurrent zero knowledge, where the statements to be proven by the honest provers are fixed in advance and do not depend on the previous history (but can be correlated with each other); corrupted provers, of course, can chose the statements adaptively. We also prove that there exists some functionality F (a combination of zero knowledge and oblivious transfer) such that it is impossible to obtain a concurrent non-malleable protocol for F in this model. Previous impossibility results for composable protocols ruled out existence of protocols for a wider class of functionalities {including zero knowledge!) but only if these protocols were required to remain secure when executed concurrently with arbitrarily chosen different protocols (Lindell, FOCS 2003) or if these protocols were required to remain secure when the honest parties' inputs in each execution are chosen adaptively based on the results of previous executions (Lindell, TCC2004). We obtain an Otilde(n) -round protocol under the assumption that one-to-one one-way functions exist. This can be improved to Otilde(k log n) rounds under the assumption that there exist k-round statistically hiding commitment schemes. Our protocol is a black-box zero knowledge protocol

STOC Conference 2005 Conference Paper

Concurrent general composition of secure protocols in the timing model

  • Yael Tauman Kalai
  • Yehuda Lindell
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001

In the setting of secure multiparty computation, a set of mutually distrustful parties wish to jointly compute some function of their input (i.e., they wish to securely carry out some distributed task). %The joint computation should be such that even In the stand-alone case, it has been shown that every efficient function can be securely computed. However, in the setting of concurrent composition, broad impossibility results have been proven for the case where there is no honest majority (or trusted setup).In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of obtaining secure multiparty protocols in a network where certain time bounds are assumed. Specifically, the security of our protocols rely on the very reasonable assumption that local clocks do not "drift" too much (i.e., it is assumed that they proceed at approximately the same rate). We show that under this mild timing assumption, it is possible to securely compute any functionality under concurrent general composition (as long as messages from the arbitrary other protocols are delayed for a specified amount of time).

STOC Conference 2004 Conference Paper

New notions of security: achieving universal composability without trusted setup

  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Amit Sahai

We propose a modification to the framework of Universally Composable (UC) security [3]. Our new notion involves comparing the real protocol execution with an ideal execution involving ideal functionalities (just as in UC-security), but allowing the environment and adversary access to some super-polynomial computational power. We argue the meaningfulness of the new notion, which in particular subsumes many of the traditional notions of security. We generalize the Universal Composition theorem of [3] to the new setting. Then under new computational assumptions, we realize secure multi-party computation (for static adversaries) without a common reference string or any other set-up assumptions, in the new framework. This is known to be impossible under the UC framework.

FOCS Conference 2004 Conference Paper

On the (Im)possibility of Cryptography with Imperfect Randomness

  • Yevgeniy Dodis
  • Shien Jin Ong
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Amit Sahai

We investigate the feasibility of a variety of cryptographic tasks with imperfect randomness. The kind of imperfect randomness we consider are entropy sources, such as those considered by Santha and Vazirani, Chor and Goldreich, and Zuckerman. We show the following: (1) certain cryptographic tasks like bit commitment, encryption, secret sharing, zero-knowledge, non-interactive zero-knowledge, and secure two-party computation for any non-trivial junction are impossible to realize if parties have access to entropy sources with slightly less-than-perfect entropy, i. e. , sources with imperfect randomness. These results are unconditional and do not rely on any un-proven assumption. (2) On the other hand, based on stronger variants of standard assumptions, secure signature schemes are possible with imperfect entropy sources. As another positive result, we show (without any unproven assumption) that interactive proofs can be made sound with respect to imperfect entropy sources.

STOC Conference 2002 Conference Paper

Approximating the smallest grammar: Kolmogorov complexity in natural models

  • Moses Charikar
  • Eric Lehman
  • Ding Liu
  • Rina Panigrahy
  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • April Rasala
  • Amit Sahai
  • Abhi Shelat

We consider the problem of finding the smallest context-free grammar that generates exactly one given string of length n . The size of this grammar is of theoretical interest as an efficiently computable variant of Kolmogorov complexity. The problem is of practical importance in areas such as data compression and pattern extraction.The smallest grammar is known to be hard to approximate to within a constant factor, and an o (log n /log log n ) approximation would require progress on a long-standing algebraic problem [10]. Previously, the best proved approximation ratio was O ( n 1/2 ) for the Bisection algorithm [8]. Our main result is an exponential improvement of this ratio; we give an O (log ( n/g * )) approximation algorithm, where g * is the size of the smallest grammar.We then consider other computable variants of Kolomogorov complexity. In particular we give an O (log 2 n ) approximation for the smallest non-deterministic finite automaton with advice that produces a given string. We also apply our techniques to "advice-grammars" and "edit-grammars", two other natural models of string complexity.

FOCS Conference 2002 Conference Paper

Concurrent Zero Knowledge with Logarithmic Round-Complexity

  • Manoj Prabhakaran 0001
  • Alon Rosen
  • Amit Sahai

We show that every language in NP has a (black-box) concurrent zero-knowledge proof system using O/spl tilde/(log n) rounds of interaction. The number of rounds in our protocol is optimal, in the sense that any language outside BPP requires at least /spl Omega//spl tilde/(log n) rounds of interaction in order to be proved in black-box concurrent zero-knowledge. The zero-knowledge property of our main protocol is proved under the assumption that there exists a collection of claw free functions. Assuming only the existence of one-way functions, we show the existence of O/spl tilde/(log n)-round concurrent zero-knowledge arguments for all languages in NP.

v2026.09.13