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Luis Ortiz

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15 papers
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15

JAIR Journal 2020 Journal Article

On Sparse Discretization for Graphical Games

  • Luis Ortiz

Graphical games are one of the earliest examples of the impact that the general field of graphical models have had in other areas, and in this particular case, in classical mathematical models in game theory. Graphical multi-hypermatrix games, a concept formally introduced in this research note, generalize graphical games while allowing the possibility of further space savings in model representation to that of standard graphical games. The main focus of this research note is discretization schemes for computing approximate Nash equilibria, with emphasis on graphical games, but also briefly touching on normal-form and polymatrix games. The main technical contribution is a theorem that establishes sufficient conditions for a discretization of the players’ space of mixed strategies to contain an approximate Nash equilibrium. The result is actually stronger because every exact Nash equilibrium has a nearby approximate Nash equilibrium on the grid induced by the discretization. The sufficient conditions are weaker than those of previous results. In particular, a uniform discretization of size linear in the inverse of the approximation error and in the natural game-representation parameters suffices. The theorem holds for a generalization of graphical games, introduced here. The result has already been useful in the design and analysis of tractable algorithms for graphical games with parametric payoff functions and certain game-graph structures. For standard graphical games, under natural conditions, the discretization is logarithmic in the game-representation size, a substantial improvement over the linear dependency previously required. Combining the improved discretization result with old results on constraint networks in AI simplifies the derivation and analysis of algorithms for computing approximate Nash equilibria in graphical games.

AAAI Conference 2017 Conference Paper

Tractable Algorithms for Approximate Nash Equilibria in Generalized Graphical Games with Tree Structure

  • Luis Ortiz
  • Mohammad Irfan

We provide the first fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS) for computing an approximate mixedstrategy Nash equilibrium in graphical multi-hypermatrix games (GMhGs), which are generalizations of normal-form games, graphical games, graphical polymatrix games, and hypergraphical games. Computing an exact mixed-strategy Nash equilibria in graphical polymatrix games is PPADcomplete and thus generally believed to be intractable. In contrast, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to establish an FPTAS for tree polymatrix games as well as tree graphical games when the number of actions is bounded by a constant. As a corollary, we give a quasi-polynomial time approximation scheme (quasi-PTAS) when the number of actions is bounded by a logarithm of the number of players.

AAAI Conference 2015 Conference Paper

Computing Nash Equilibrium in Interdependent Defense Games

  • Hau Chan
  • Luis Ortiz

Roughly speaking, Interdependent Defense (IDD) games, previously proposed, model the situation where an attacker wants to cause as much damage as possible to a network by attacking one of the sites in the network. Each site must make an investment decision regarding security to protect itself against a direct or indirect attack, the latter due to potential transfer-risk from an unprotected neighboring site. The work introducing IDD games discusses potential applications to model the essence of real-world scenarios such as the 2006 transatlantic aircraft plot. In this paper, our focus is the study of the problem of computing a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in IDD games. We show that an efficient algorithm to determine whether some attacker’s strategy can be a part of a NE in an instance of IDD games is unlikely to exist. Yet, we provide a dynamic programming algorithm to compute an approximate NE when the graph/network structure of the game is a directed tree with a single source, and show that it is an FPTAS. We also introduce an improved heuristic to compute an approximate NE on arbitrary graph structures. Our experiments show that our heuristic is more efficient, and provides better approximations, than best-response-gradient dynamics for the case of Internet games, a class of games introduced and studied in the original work on IDD games.

JMLR Journal 2015 Journal Article

Learning the Structure and Parameters of Large-Population Graphical Games from Behavioral Data

  • Jean Honorio
  • Luis Ortiz

We consider learning, from strictly behavioral data, the structure and parameters of linear influence games (LIGs), a class of parametric graphical games introduced by Irfan and Ortiz (2014). LIGs facilitate causal strategic inference (CSI): Making inferences from causal interventions on stable behavior in strategic settings. Applications include the identification of the most influential individuals in large (social) networks. Such tasks can also support policy-making analysis. Motivated by the computational work on LIGs, we cast the learning problem as maximum-likelihood estimation (MLE) of a generative model defined by pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE). Our simple formulation uncovers the fundamental interplay between goodness-of-fit and model complexity: good models capture equilibrium behavior within the data while controlling the true number of equilibria, including those unobserved. We provide a generalization bound establishing the sample complexity for MLE in our framework. We propose several algorithms including convex loss minimization (CLM) and sigmoidal approximations. We prove that the number of exact PSNE in LIGs is small, with high probability; thus, CLM is sound. We illustrate our approach on synthetic data and real-world U.S. congressional voting records. We briefly discuss our learning framework's generality and potential applicability to general graphical games. [abs] [ pdf ][ bib ] &copy JMLR 2015. ( edit, beta )

NeurIPS Conference 2014 Conference Paper

Causal Strategic Inference in Networked Microfinance Economies

  • Mohammad Irfan
  • Luis Ortiz

Performing interventions is a major challenge in economic policy-making. We propose \emph{causal strategic inference} as a framework for conducting interventions and apply it to large, networked microfinance economies. The basic solution platform consists of modeling a microfinance market as a networked economy, learning the parameters of the model from the real-world microfinance data, and designing algorithms for various computational problems in question. We adopt Nash equilibrium as the solution concept for our model. For a special case of our model, we show that an equilibrium point always exists and that the equilibrium interest rates are unique. For the general case, we give a constructive proof of the existence of an equilibrium point. Our empirical study is based on the microfinance data from Bangladesh and Bolivia, which we use to first learn our models. We show that causal strategic inference can assist policy-makers by evaluating the outcomes of various types of interventions, such as removing a loss-making bank from the market, imposing an interest rate cap, and subsidizing banks.

NeurIPS Conference 2014 Conference Paper

Computing Nash Equilibria in Generalized Interdependent Security Games

  • Hau Chan
  • Luis Ortiz

We study the computational complexity of computing Nash equilibria in generalized interdependent-security (IDS) games. Like traditional IDS games, originally introduced by economists and risk-assessment experts Heal and Kunreuther about a decade ago, generalized IDS games model agents’ voluntary investment decisions when facing potential direct risk and transfer risk exposure from other agents. A distinct feature of generalized IDS games, however, is that full investment can reduce transfer risk. As a result, depending on the transfer-risk reduction level, generalized IDS games may exhibit strategic complementarity (SC) or strategic substitutability (SS). We consider three variants of generalized IDS games in which players exhibit only SC, only SS, and both SC+SS. We show that determining whether there is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in SC+SS-type games is NP-complete, while computing a single PSNE in SC-type games takes worst-case polynomial time. As for the problem of computing all mixed-strategy Nash equilibria (MSNE) efficiently, we produce a partial characterization. Whenever each agent in the game is indiscriminate in terms of the transfer-risk exposure to the other agents, a case that Kearns and Ortiz originally studied in the context of traditional IDS games in their NIPS 2003 paper, we can compute all MSNE that satisfy some ordering constraints in polynomial time in all three game variants. Yet, there is a computational barrier in the general (transfer) case: we show that the computational problem is as hard as the Pure-Nash-Extension problem, also originally introduced by Kearns and Ortiz, and that it is NP complete for all three variants. Finally, we experimentally examine and discuss the practical impact that the additional protection from transfer risk allowed in generalized IDS games has on MSNE by solving several randomly-generated instances of SC+SS-type games with graph structures taken from several real-world datasets.

AAAI Conference 2011 Conference Paper

A Game-Theoretic Approach to Influence in Networks

  • Mohammad Irfan
  • Luis Ortiz

We propose influence games, a new class of graphical games, as a model of the behavior of large but finite networked populations. Grounded in non-cooperative game theory, we introduce a new approach to the study of influence in networks that captures the strategic aspects of complex interactions in the network. We study computational problems on influence games, including the identification of the most influential nodes. We characterize the computational complexity of various problems in influence games, propose several heuristics for the hard cases, and design approximation algorithms, with provable guarantees, for the most influential nodes problem.

NeurIPS Conference 2009 Conference Paper

Sparse and Locally Constant Gaussian Graphical Models

  • Jean Honorio
  • Dimitris Samaras
  • Nikos Paragios
  • Rita Goldstein
  • Luis Ortiz

Locality information is crucial in datasets where each variable corresponds to a measurement in a manifold (silhouettes, motion trajectories, 2D and 3D images). Although these datasets are typically under-sampled and high-dimensional, they often need to be represented with low-complexity statistical models, which are comprised of only the important probabilistic dependencies in the datasets. Most methods attempt to reduce model complexity by enforcing structure sparseness. However, sparseness cannot describe inherent regularities in the structure. Hence, in this paper we first propose a new class of Gaussian graphical models which, together with sparseness, imposes local constancy through ${\ell}_1$-norm penalization. Second, we propose an efficient algorithm which decomposes the strictly convex maximum likelihood estimation into a sequence of problems with closed form solutions. Through synthetic experiments, we evaluate the closeness of the recovered models to the ground truth. We also test the generalization performance of our method in a wide range of complex real-world datasets and demonstrate that it can capture useful structures such as the rotation and shrinking of a beating heart, motion correlations between body parts during walking and functional interactions of brain regions. Our method outperforms the state-of-the-art structure learning techniques for Gaussian graphical models both for small and large datasets.

NeurIPS Conference 2007 Conference Paper

CPR for CSPs: A Probabilistic Relaxation of Constraint Propagation

  • Luis Ortiz

This paper proposes constraint propagation relaxation (CPR), a probabilistic approach to classical constraint propagation that provides another view on the whole parametric family of survey propagation algorithms SP(ρ), ranging from belief propagation (ρ = 0) to (pure) survey propagation(ρ = 1). More importantly, the approach elucidates the implicit, but fundamental assumptions underlying SP(ρ), thus shedding some light on its effectiveness and leading to applications beyond k-SAT.

NeurIPS Conference 2006 Conference Paper

Game Theoretic Algorithms for Protein-DNA binding

  • Luis Pérez-breva
  • Luis Ortiz
  • Chen-hsiang Yeang
  • Tommi Jaakkola

We develop and analyze game-theoretic algorithms for predicting coordinate binding of multiple DNA binding regulators. The allocation of proteins to local neighborhoods and to sites is carried out with resource constraints while explicating competing and coordinate binding relations among proteins with affinity to the site or region. The focus of this paper is on mathematical foundations of the approach. We also briefly demonstrate the approach in the context of the -phage switch.

NeurIPS Conference 2004 Conference Paper

Economic Properties of Social Networks

  • Sham Kakade
  • Michael Kearns
  • Luis Ortiz
  • Robin Pemantle
  • Siddharth Suri

We examine the marriage of recent probabilistic generative models for social networks with classical frameworks from mathematical eco- nomics. We are particularly interested in how the statistical structure of such networks influences global economic quantities such as price vari- ation. Our findings are a mixture of formal analysis, simulation, and experiments on an international trade data set from the United Nations.

NeurIPS Conference 2003 Conference Paper

Algorithms for Interdependent Security Games

  • Michael Kearns
  • Luis Ortiz

nspired by events ranging from 9/11 to the collapse of the accounting firm Arthur Ander- sen, economists Kunreuther and Heal [5] recently introduced an interesting game-theoretic model for problems of interdependent security (IDS), in which a large number of players must make individual investment decisions related to security — whether physical, finan- cial, medical, or some other type — but in which the ultimate safety of each participant may depend in a complex way on the actions of the entire population. A simple example is the choice of whether to install a fire sprinkler system in an individual condominium in a large building. While such a system might greatly reduce the chances of the owner’s prop- erty being destroyed by a fire originating within their own unit, it might do little or nothing to reduce the chances of damage caused by fires originating in other units (since sprinklers can usually only douse small fires early). If “enough” other unit owners have not made the investment in sprinklers, it may be not cost-effective for any individual to do so.

JMLR Journal 2003 Journal Article

Concentration Inequalities for the Missing Mass and for Histogram Rule Error

  • David McAllester
  • Luis Ortiz

This paper gives distribution-free concentration inequalities for the missing mass and the error rate of histogram rules. Negative association methods can be used to reduce these concentration problems to concentration questions about independent sums. Although the sums are independent, they are highly heterogeneous. Such highly heterogeneous independent sums cannot be analyzed using standard concentration inequalities such as Hoeffding's inequality, the Angluin-Valiant bound, Bernstein's inequality, Bennett's inequality, or McDiarmid's theorem. The concentration inequality for histogram rule error is motivated by the desire to construct a new class of bounds on the generalization error of decision trees. [abs] [ pdf ][ ps.gz ][ ps ]

NeurIPS Conference 2002 Conference Paper

Concentration Inequalities for the Missing Mass and for Histogram Rule Error

  • Luis Ortiz
  • David McAllester

This paper gives distribution-free concentration inequalities for the miss- ing mass and the error rate of histogram rules. Negative association meth- ods can be used to reduce these concentration problems to concentration questions about independent sums. Although the sums are independent, they are highly heterogeneous. Such highly heterogeneous independent sums cannot be analyzed using standard concentration inequalities such as Hoeffding’s inequality, the Angluin-Valiant bound, Bernstein’s in- equality, Bennett’s inequality, or McDiarmid’s theorem.

NeurIPS Conference 2002 Conference Paper

Nash Propagation for Loopy Graphical Games

  • Luis Ortiz
  • Michael Kearns

We introduce NashProp, an iterative and local message-passing algo- rithm for computing Nash equilibria in multi-player games represented by arbitrary undirected graphs. We provide a formal analysis and exper- imental evidence demonstrating that NashProp performs well on large graphical games with many loops, often converging in just a dozen itera- tions on graphs with hundreds of nodes. NashProp generalizes the tree algorithm of (Kearns et al. 2001), and can be viewed as similar in spirit to belief propagation in probabilis- tic inference, and thus complements the recent work of (Vickrey and Koller 2002), who explored a junction tree approach. Thus, as for prob- abilistic inference, we have at least two promising general-purpose ap- proaches to equilibria computation in graphs.