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Lingfeng Yao

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

2 papers
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2

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

iSeal: Encrypted Fingerprinting for Reliable LLM Ownership Verification

  • Zixun Xiong
  • Gaoyi Wu
  • Qingyang Yu
  • Mingyu Derek Ma
  • Lingfeng Yao
  • Miao Pan
  • Xiaojiang Du
  • Hao Wang

Given the high cost of large language model (LLM) training from scratch, safeguarding LLM intellectual property (IP) becomes increasingly crucial. As the standard paradigm for IP ownership verification, LLM fingerprinting thus plays a vital role in addressing this challenge. Existing LLM fingerprinting methods verify ownership by extracting or injecting model-specific features. However, they overlook potential attacks during the verification process, leaving them ineffective when the model thief fully controls the LLM's inference process. In such settings, attackers may share prompt-response pairs to enable fingerprint unlearning, or manipulate outputs to evade exact-match verification. We propose iSeal, the first fingerprinting method designed for reliable verification when the model thief controls the suspected LLM in an end-to-end manner. It injects unique features into both the model and an external module, reinforced by an error-correction mechanism and a similarity-based verification strategy. These components are resistant to verification-time attacks, including collusion-based fingerprint unlearning and response manipulation, backed by both theoretical analysis and empirical results. iSeal achieves 100% Fingerprint Success Rate (FSR) on 12 LLMs against more than 10 attacks, while baselines fail under unlearning and response manipulations.

AAAI Conference 2026 Conference Paper

Yours or Mine? Overwriting Attacks Against Neural Audio Watermarking

  • Lingfeng Yao
  • Chenpei Huang
  • Shengyao Wang
  • Junpei Xue
  • Hanqing Guo
  • Jiang Liu
  • Phone Lin
  • Tomoaki Ohtsuki

As generative audio models are rapidly evolving, AI-generated audios increasingly raise concerns about copyright infringement and misinformation spread. Audio watermarking, as a proactive defense, can embed secret messages into audio for copyright protection and source verification. However, current neural audio watermarking methods focus primarily on the imperceptibility and robustness of watermarking, while ignoring its vulnerability to security attacks. In this paper, we develop a simple yet powerful attack: the overwriting attack that overwrites the legitimate audio watermark with a forged one and makes the original legitimate watermark undetectable. Based on the audio watermarking information that the adversary has, we propose three categories of overwriting attacks, i.e., white-box, gray-box, and black-box attacks. We also thoroughly evaluate the proposed attacks on state-of-the-art neural audio watermarking methods. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed overwriting attacks can effectively compromise existing watermarking schemes across various settings and achieve a nearly 100% attack success rate. The practicality and effectiveness of the proposed overwriting attacks expose security flaws in existing neural audio watermarking systems, underscoring the need to enhance security in future audio watermarking designs.

v2026.09.13