Author name cluster

Kostas Kollias

Possible papers associated with this exact author name in Arrow. This page groups case-insensitive exact name matches and is not a full identity disambiguation profile.

8 papers

2 author rows

AAMAS Conference 2025 Conference Paper

Fairness and Optimality in Routing

Sreenivas Gollapudi
Kostas Kollias
Alkmini Sgouritsa
Ali Kemal Sinop

We study the existence of almost fair and near-optimal solutions to a routing problem as defined in the seminal work of Rosenthal [41]. We focus on the setting where multiple alternative routes are available for each potential request (which corresponds to a potential user of the network). This model captures a collection of diverse applications such as packet routing in communication networks, routing in road networks with multiple alternative routes, and the economics of transportation of goods. Our proposed centralized routes have provable guarantees in terms of both the total cost and fairness concepts such as approximate envy-freeness. We employ and appropriately combine tools from algorithmic game theory and fair division. Our results apply on two distinct models: the splittable case where the request is split among the selected paths (e. g. , routing a fleet of trucks) and the unsplittable case where the request is assigned to one of its designated paths (e. g. , a single user request). Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis to test the performance of our approach against simpler baselines using the real world road network of New York City.

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AAAI Conference 2024 Conference Paper

When Are Two Lists Better than One?: Benefits and Harms in Joint Decision-Making

Kate Donahue
Sreenivas Gollapudi
Kostas Kollias

Historically, much of machine learning research has focused on the performance of the algorithm alone, but recently more attention has been focused on optimizing joint human-algorithm performance. Here, we analyze a specific type of human-algorithm collaboration where the algorithm has access to a set of n items, and presents a subset of size k to the human, who selects a final item from among those k. This scenario could model content recommendation, route planning, or any type of labeling task. Because both the human and algorithm have imperfect, noisy information about the true ordering of items, the key question is: which value of k maximizes the probability that the best item will be ultimately selected? For k=1, performance is optimized by the algorithm acting alone, and for k=n it is optimized by the human acting alone. Surprisingly, we show that for multiple of noise models, it is optimal to set k in [2, n-1] - that is, there are strict benefits to collaborating, even when the human and algorithm have equal accuracy separately. We demonstrate this theoretically for the Mallows model and experimentally for the Random Utilities models of noisy permutations. However, we show this pattern is *reversed* when the human is anchored on the algorithm's presented ordering - the joint system always has strictly worse performance. We extend these results to the case where the human and algorithm differ in their accuracy levels, showing that there always exist regimes where a more accurate agent would strictly benefit from collaborating with a less accurate one, but these regimes are asymmetric between the human and the algorithm's accuracy.

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JMLR Journal 2023 Journal Article

Prediction Equilibrium for Dynamic Network Flows

Lukas Graf
Tobias Harks
Kostas Kollias
Michael Markl

We study a dynamic traffic assignment model, where agents base their instantaneous routing decisions on real-time delay predictions. We formulate a mathematically concise model and define dynamic prediction equilibrium (DPE) in which no agent can at any point during their journey improve their predicted travel time by switching to a different route. We demonstrate the versatility of our framework by showing that it subsumes the well-known full information and instantaneous information models, in addition to admitting further realistic predictors as special cases. We then proceed to derive properties of the predictors that ensure a dynamic prediction equilibrium exists. Additionally, we define $\varepsilon$-approximate DPE wherein no agent can improve their predicted travel time by more than $\varepsilon$ and provide further conditions of the predictors under which such an approximate equilibrium can be computed. Finally, we complement our theoretical analysis by an experimental study, in which we systematically compare the induced average travel times of different predictors, including two machine-learning based models trained on data gained from previously computed approximate equilibrium flows, both on synthetic and real world road networks. [abs] [ pdf ][ bib ] [ code ] &copy JMLR 2023. ( edit, beta )

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ICML Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Congested Bandits: Optimal Routing via Short-term Resets

Pranjal Awasthi
Kush Bhatia
Sreenivas Gollapudi
Kostas Kollias

For traffic routing platforms, the choice of which route to recommend to a user depends on the congestion on these routes – indeed, an individual’s utility depends on the number of people using the recommended route at that instance. Motivated by this, we introduce the problem of Congested Bandits where each arm’s reward is allowed to depend on the number of times it was played in the past $\Delta$ timesteps. This dependence on past history of actions leads to a dynamical system where an algorithm’s present choices also affect its future pay-offs, and requires an algorithm to plan for this. We study the congestion aware formulation in the multi-armed bandit (MAB) setup and in the contextual bandit setup with linear rewards. For the multi-armed setup, we propose a UCB style algorithm and show that its policy regret scales as $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{K \Delta T})$. For the linear contextual bandit setup, our algorithm, based on an iterative least squares planner, achieves policy regret $\tilde{O}(\sqrt{dT} + \Delta)$. From an experimental standpoint, we corroborate the no-regret properties of our algorithms via a simulation study.

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AAAI Conference 2022 Conference Paper

Machine-Learned Prediction Equilibrium for Dynamic Traffic Assignment

Lukas Graf
Tobias Harks
Kostas Kollias
Michael Markl

We study a dynamic traffic assignment model, where agents base their instantaneous routing decisions on real-time delay predictions. We formulate a mathematically concise model and derive properties of the predictors that ensure a dynamic prediction equilibrium exists. We demonstrate the versatility of our framework by showing that it subsumes the wellknown full information and instantaneous information models, in addition to admitting further realistic predictors as special cases. We complement our theoretical analysis by an experimental study, in which we systematically compare the induced average travel times of different predictors, including a machine-learning model trained on data gained from previously computed equilibrium flows, both on a synthetic and a real road network.

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NeurIPS Conference 2021 Conference Paper

Contextual Recommendations and Low-Regret Cutting-Plane Algorithms

Sreenivas Gollapudi
Guru Guruganesh
Kostas Kollias
Pasin Manurangsi
Renato Leme
Jon Schneider

We consider the following variant of contextual linear bandits motivated by routing applications in navigational engines and recommendation systems. We wish to learn a hidden $d$-dimensional value $w^*$. Every round, we are presented with a subset $\mathcal{X}_t \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ of possible actions. If we choose (i. e. recommend to the user) action $x_t$, we obtain utility $\langle x_t, w^* \rangle$ but only learn the identity of the best action $\arg\max_{x \in \X_t} \langle x, w^* \rangle$. We design algorithms for this problem which achieve regret $O(d\log T)$ and $\exp(O(d \log d))$. To accomplish this, we design novel cutting-plane algorithms with low “regret” -- the total distance between the true point $w^*$ and the hyperplanes the separation oracle returns. We also consider the variant where we are allowed to provide a list of several recommendations. In this variant, we give an algorithm with $O(d^2 \log d)$ regret and list size $\poly(d)$. Finally, we construct nearly tight algorithms for a weaker variant of this problem where the learner only learns the identity of an action that is better than the recommendation. Our results rely on new algorithmic techniques in convex geometry (including a variant of Steiner’s formula for the centroid of a convex set) which may be of independent interest.

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NeurIPS Conference 2020 Conference Paper

Adaptive Probing Policies for Shortest Path Routing

Aditya Bhaskara
Sreenivas Gollapudi
Kostas Kollias
Kamesh Munagala

Inspired by traffic routing applications, we consider the problem of finding the shortest path from a source $s$ to a destination $t$ in a graph, when the lengths of the edges are unknown. Instead, we are given {\em hints} or predictions of the edge lengths from a collection of ML models, trained possibly on historical data and other contexts in the network. Additionally, we assume that the true length of any candidate path can be obtained by {\em probing} an up-to-date snapshot of the network. However, each probe introduces a latency, and thus the goal is to minimize the number of probes while finding a near-optimal path with high probability. We formalize this problem and show assumptions under which it admits to efficient approximation algorithms. We verify these assumptions and validate the performance of our algorithms on real data.

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AAAI Conference 2019 Conference Paper

You Get What You Share: Incentives for a Sharing Economy

Sreenivas Gollapudi
Kostas Kollias
Debmalya Panigrahi

In recent years, a range of online applications have facilitated resource sharing among users, resulting in a significant increase in resource utilization. In all such applications, sharing one’s resources or skills with other agents increases social welfare. In general, each agent will look for other agents whose available resources complement hers, thereby forming natural sharing groups. In this paper, we study settings where a large population self-organizes into sharing groups. In many cases, centralized optimization approaches for creating an optimal partition of the user population are infeasible because either the central authority does not have the necessary information to compute an optimal partition, or it does not have the power to enforce a partition. Instead, the central authority puts in place an incentive structure in the form of a utility sharing method, before letting the participants form the sharing groups by themselves. We first analyze a simple equal-sharing method, which is the one most typically encountered in practice and show that it can lead to highly inefficient equilibria. We then propose a Shapley-sharing method and show that it significantly improves overall social welfare.

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