AAMAS Conference 2026 Conference Paper
Approximating Electoral Control Problems
- Huy Vu Bui
- Michael C. Chavrimootoo
- Kien T. Le
- Son M. Nguyen
Much research in electoral control—one of the most studied forms ofelectoralattacks, inwhichanentityaltersthestructureofanelection to yield a preferred outcome—has focused on giving decisioncomplexity results. Approximability on the other hand has received little attention in electoral control, despite its prevalence in the study of other forms of electoral attacks, such as manipulation and bribery. Early work established preliminary results with respect to popular voting rules such as plurality, approval, and Condorcet. In this work, we completely determine for each of the “standard” control problems under the aforementioned voting rules whether they are approximable (for weighted and unweighted votes).